On deterrence:

• In the context of massive nuclear attacks, why isn't the danger of nuclear winter widely seen as making nuclear retaliation redundant (as Ellsberg suggested on another 80K podcast episode)?
• The US threatens to retaliate (with nukes) against anyone who nukes certain US allies--how credible is this threat, and why?
  • Part of how the US tries to make this threat more credible is by sharing nukes with some of its allies. How does this sharing work? Does the US share nukes in such a way that, in a crisis, a non-nuclear host country could easily seize and launch a nuke?
• Why has the US relied on mutually assured destruction instead of minimal deterrence?
• What are some ways in which recent developments in cybersecurity and machine learning interact with nuclear deterrence?
• Why have the US and the USSR/Russia invested so much in making lots of land-based nuclear missiles? (If they were mainly trying to ensure their nuclear weapons would survive a first strike, wouldn't it have been better to put that money toward making even more nuclear-armed submarines?)

Other questions on nuclear politics:

• Why did it take decades after the first nuclear weapons for countries to sign nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agreements?

On verification of compliance with arms control agreements:

• The US uses satellites to check whether Russia is following nuclear arms control agreements--as far as is publicly known, just how good are US spy satellites? What about commercial satellites?
• The UN's nuclear watchdog extensively monitors a bunch of nuclear power facilities, to make sure they're not using uranium to make nukes. One might think it'd be helpful to also do these things at uranium mines, but they usually don't do this--why not?
• How good do you think current systems are at detecting secret nuclear facilities?

On what else to check out:

• In addition to your own blog and podcast as well as this podcast, what are some of your favorite blogs or podcasts on nuclear security or international security?

(Edited to add a few.)

(I don't know that there's much of an EA consensus on nuclear weapons issues--and if there is, I don't know what the consensus is--so these aren't quite questions about what EA gets right/wrong on this.)

I'd be curious for him to elaborate more on "the EA community does on nuclear risk... It's as misguided as the Strategic Air Command's original, you know, approach to nuclear weapons" -- what are the specific mistakes EA is making here and what would a not-misguided approach look like?

What are the most promising strategies for reducing the risks posed by nuclear weapons / reducing the risk of nuclear war? What kinds of evidence or other arguments are available for finding effective strategies in this space?

Also agree with one of the other comments: would be interesting to hear some further elaboration on what EA gets wrong, or is in danger of getting wrong, in the nuclear space.

Well, you could start by asking him to dial back the ego chest puffing.  

Next, you could ask him to share the evidence that any amount of activism and expert analysis will ever liberate us from the nuclear threat.  

You might ask him to comment on the claim (mine) that nothing meaningful is likely to happen on nuclear weapons until after the next detonation, because human beings are not very good at learning in the abstract.

You could ask him what role nuclear weapons activists should be preparing to play after the next detonation, when conscious raising is no longer necessary.

You could ask him to reflect on the source of nuclear weapons and all other technological threats, an ever accelerating knowledge explosion.

You could ask him to help us identify thinkers who understand and can articulate from a position of cultural authority that focusing on particular technological threats one by one by one is a loser's game, because the knowledge explosion will generate new threats faster than we can address the existing threats.    Evidence:  Seventy years later, no meaningful progress on nuclear weapons.

You could ask him whether, in his opinion, does it make sense to give humanity ever more, ever larger powers, at an ever accelerating rate, given that, as a culture, we've almost totally lost interest in the existential threat presented by 1940's technology?

Why have the US and the USSR/Russia invested so much in making lots of land-based nuclear missiles?

That's a great question, thanks.   As you probably know, Secretary of Defense William Perry (Clinton administration) suggested getting rid of the land based missiles.  It's the land based missiles which force the decision making on to a single person, the President, under extremely short time frames.