I listened to Rob Wiblin’s interview with Andreas Mogensen earlier in the week and have been mulling over this “electrocuted at the World Cup final” thought experiment. 

In the context of the interview, the experiment seems to be illustrating separate but perhaps related points: one about human psychology in relation to large numbers; the other about consequentialist moral theory.

I largely agree with Rob’s intuitions about human psychology, but I don’t share the intuition that Jones should be allowed to die for the sake of the broadcast, and was hoping to hear further arguments supporting that view. I read Omnizoid’s post about utilitarianism, and don’t feel that transitivity obtains here -- have we simply reached a deontological divide? 

 

My reason for pushing back against the “let Jones die / continue the broadcast” conclusion is first based on believing that the quality of harm that is Jones’s death and the grief of his relations is in a different category of the quality of harm that is an interrupted pleasure. There might even be further arguments that interrupting a pleasure can lead to longer-term benefits in the form of personal development, if, for example, it increases will power or puts one’s priorities in perspective.

Extending this to putting the event in its social context: if I were a fan watching the match, my aggravation at the interruption would be more than compensated for by a feeling of relief and rightness-with-the-world upon learning of the reason for it later, and my enjoyment of the match would be subsequently diminished if I learned than someone died to ensure its broadcast.

Similarly, for all the pleasure a sports fan might derive from this pastime, I also have the sense that we understand these parts of our lives (i.e. entertainment, hobbies, pastimes) as important -- even extremely important and identity-defining for some -- yet nevertheless bracketed, existing on a separate moral plane from something like fatal work-related accidents. In a sports match the overall moral stakes are lower and the consequences steeply discounted because we’ve created a space called “play” or “game” for it to exist in. I feel like this distinction is actually important to the enjoyment of the game itself, allowing the fan to become wrapped up in a form of virtual emotion and excitement while protecting some inner emotional stability with the knowledge that this is not the fundamental source of moral value in the world.

I also recognize that I’m now wandering into speculation on sports sociology, and the examples of own-goal scorers murdered by their home fans suggests I might not be correct about this.

 

I’ve been imagining variations on the experiment to try and pick apart some of the effects, such as:

The Coliseum Effect:

Would it change anything if at the moment of the accident, Jones’s body completed a circuit which connected the outgoing televised broadcast to the footage from a security camera which was recording his slow and painful death, so that everyone watching the match was now watching him die?

Naturally, if this causes widespread outrage and trauma among viewers then the scenario likely becomes a lose-lose and the obvious choice is to turn it off. But what if it turns out that audience interest, excitement and pleasure (as measured by our handy LiveWire audience emotional tracking app) is actually significantly greater than when watching the slow, low-scoring match? Do we have an obligation to allow Jones’s suffering to continue so that others might enjoy it?

Or what if everything described above is true, but the prevailing belief among viewers is that this is some sort of staged slapstick routine inserted by mischievous producers to alleviate the boredom of watching an actual football match and the audience highly enjoys it without realizing at the time what is actually happening.

 

Thanks for reading. Any thoughts or clarifications would be greatly appreciated!


 

Comments2


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

I've always found Parfit's response to be pretty compelling.  As I summarize it here:

Rather than discounting smaller benefits (or refusing to aggregate them), Parfit suggests that we do better to simply weight harms and benefits in a way that gives priority to the worse-off. Two appealing implications of this view are that: (1) We generally should not allow huge harms to befall a single person, if that leaves them much worse off than the others with competing interests. (2) But we should allow (sufficient) small benefits to the worse-off to (in sum) outweigh a single large benefit to someone better-off.

Since we need aggregation in order to secure verdict (2), and we can secure verdict (1) without having to reject aggregation, it looks like our intuitions are overall best served by accepting an aggregative moral theory.

I'll just add that it's a mistake to see the Transmitter Room case as an objection to consequentialism per se.  Nobody (afaict) has the intuition that it would be better for the guy to be electrocuted, but we're just not allowed to let that happen.  Rather, the standard intuition is that it wouldn't even be a good result.  But that's to call for an axiological refinement, not to reject the claim that we should bring about the better outcome.

Thank you! Your article on Parfit  is very helpful -- I'm looking forward to reading the rest in the series.

Curated and popular this week
Paul Present
 ·  · 28m read
 · 
Note: I am not a malaria expert. This is my best-faith attempt at answering a question that was bothering me, but this field is a large and complex field, and I’ve almost certainly misunderstood something somewhere along the way. Summary While the world made incredible progress in reducing malaria cases from 2000 to 2015, the past 10 years have seen malaria cases stop declining and start rising. I investigated potential reasons behind this increase through reading the existing literature and looking at publicly available data, and I identified three key factors explaining the rise: 1. Population Growth: Africa's population has increased by approximately 75% since 2000. This alone explains most of the increase in absolute case numbers, while cases per capita have remained relatively flat since 2015. 2. Stagnant Funding: After rapid growth starting in 2000, funding for malaria prevention plateaued around 2010. 3. Insecticide Resistance: Mosquitoes have become increasingly resistant to the insecticides used in bednets over the past 20 years. This has made older models of bednets less effective, although they still have some effect. Newer models of bednets developed in response to insecticide resistance are more effective but still not widely deployed.  I very crudely estimate that without any of these factors, there would be 55% fewer malaria cases in the world than what we see today. I think all three of these factors are roughly equally important in explaining the difference.  Alternative explanations like removal of PFAS, climate change, or invasive mosquito species don't appear to be major contributors.  Overall this investigation made me more convinced that bednets are an effective global health intervention.  Introduction In 2015, malaria rates were down, and EAs were celebrating. Giving What We Can posted this incredible gif showing the decrease in malaria cases across Africa since 2000: Giving What We Can said that > The reduction in malaria has be
Rory Fenton
 ·  · 6m read
 · 
Cross-posted from my blog. Contrary to my carefully crafted brand as a weak nerd, I go to a local CrossFit gym a few times a week. Every year, the gym raises funds for a scholarship for teens from lower-income families to attend their summer camp program. I don’t know how many Crossfit-interested low-income teens there are in my small town, but I’ll guess there are perhaps 2 of them who would benefit from the scholarship. After all, CrossFit is pretty niche, and the town is small. Helping youngsters get swole in the Pacific Northwest is not exactly as cost-effective as preventing malaria in Malawi. But I notice I feel drawn to supporting the scholarship anyway. Every time it pops in my head I think, “My money could fully solve this problem”. The camp only costs a few hundred dollars per kid and if there are just 2 kids who need support, I could give $500 and there would no longer be teenagers in my town who want to go to a CrossFit summer camp but can’t. Thanks to me, the hero, this problem would be entirely solved. 100%. That is not how most nonprofit work feels to me. You are only ever making small dents in important problems I want to work on big problems. Global poverty. Malaria. Everyone not suddenly dying. But if I’m honest, what I really want is to solve those problems. Me, personally, solve them. This is a continued source of frustration and sadness because I absolutely cannot solve those problems. Consider what else my $500 CrossFit scholarship might do: * I want to save lives, and USAID suddenly stops giving $7 billion a year to PEPFAR. So I give $500 to the Rapid Response Fund. My donation solves 0.000001% of the problem and I feel like I have failed. * I want to solve climate change, and getting to net zero will require stopping or removing emissions of 1,500 billion tons of carbon dioxide. I give $500 to a policy nonprofit that reduces emissions, in expectation, by 50 tons. My donation solves 0.000000003% of the problem and I feel like I have f
LewisBollard
 ·  · 8m read
 · 
> How the dismal science can help us end the dismal treatment of farm animals By Martin Gould ---------------------------------------- Note: This post was crossposted from the Open Philanthropy Farm Animal Welfare Research Newsletter by the Forum team, with the author's permission. The author may not see or respond to comments on this post. ---------------------------------------- This year we’ll be sharing a few notes from my colleagues on their areas of expertise. The first is from Martin. I’ll be back next month. - Lewis In 2024, Denmark announced plans to introduce the world’s first carbon tax on cow, sheep, and pig farming. Climate advocates celebrated, but animal advocates should be much more cautious. When Denmark’s Aarhus municipality tested a similar tax in 2022, beef purchases dropped by 40% while demand for chicken and pork increased. Beef is the most emissions-intensive meat, so carbon taxes hit it hardest — and Denmark’s policies don’t even cover chicken or fish. When the price of beef rises, consumers mostly shift to other meats like chicken. And replacing beef with chicken means more animals suffer in worse conditions — about 190 chickens are needed to match the meat from one cow, and chickens are raised in much worse conditions. It may be possible to design carbon taxes which avoid this outcome; a recent paper argues that a broad carbon tax would reduce all meat production (although it omits impacts on egg or dairy production). But with cows ten times more emissions-intensive than chicken per kilogram of meat, other governments may follow Denmark’s lead — focusing taxes on the highest emitters while ignoring the welfare implications. Beef is easily the most emissions-intensive meat, but also requires the fewest animals for a given amount. The graph shows climate emissions per tonne of meat on the right-hand side, and the number of animals needed to produce a kilogram of meat on the left. The fish “lives lost” number varies significantly by