This post is inspired by question 2 (source).
TLDR:
- The impact of retroactive funding is its impact premium over that of proactive funding.
- Funding decentralization covers a range of fields more efficiently than its centralization.
- Impact competition among funders and calibration training can mitigate biases.
- Retroactive funding participants should enjoy others’ impact.
The counterfactual impact of retroactive funding is the additionality that it provides to the proactive financing landscape. Retroactive funding motivates actors who can afford to take risk to do so. The impact is the sum of the differences between the retroactively funded projects’ impact (irp) and the alternative investment impact of the risk takers (irta) minus the impact of the funders’ alternative investments (irfa).
The impact is positive when the projects do more good than the total that their organizers and funders forgo.
In other words, retroactive funding is beneficial when organizers and buyers forgo relatively unimpactful alternatives and vice versa. For example, if someone works on a painting for the local museum instead of taking a gender studies course and the potential painting buyer gives up a charity donation, the impact is negative. If the risk-taker mitigates gender-based violence instead of going skiing and the potential funder forgoes buying a TV, the impact should be positive. Thus, retroactive funders should be interested in maximizing their impact.
Funders interested in maximizing their impact should be experts in their fields. Then, they will be able to express interest in the most impactful set of projects which also have possibly interested organizers. Decentralization of funding can cover a comprehensive set of fields more efficiently than its centralization, since developing a network of well-connected experts can take more time than gaining the same participation on a platform beneficial to these experts’ organizations. However, unsupervised specialists can be more biased than managed professionals. Thus, retroactive funding should use a bias mitigating mechanism. Impact competition among funders can function in this capacity efficiently.
In reality, funders can choose certificates based on their expected value growth rather than impact. This motivates strategic insights sharing. For example, a funder can notify a small group of potential organizers about their interest, subsequently purchase a large proportion of certificates, and only later share a thorough impact analysis with a wider audience. Prima facie, this favors forecasting experts. However, also people able to bias forecasts can benefit. Since biased allocation of resources decreases total impact, prediction inaccuracies should be mitigated. For example, relevant calibration training should be motivated.
The possibility of speculation can influence subjective wellbeing of project organizers and funders. Their wellbeing premium (wpo and wpf) should be added to the impact sum. Then,
The impact is positive when
The change of wellbeing of organizers and funders is significant relative to the other factors if a project influences a large number of these stakeholders. For example, participants can be enthusiastic about any counterfactually positive impact, including directly negative impact that serves as a learning opportunity. In this case, a structure that optimizes for retroactive funding participants’ wellbeing should be set up.
As of 2022-06-22, the certificate of this article is owned by brb243 (100%).
Oh yes, defs! :-)
Agreed. Preregistration also solves a lot of problems with our version of p-hacking (i-hacking ^.^).
I think we’d need more assumptions for this to happen. When it comes to business ventures, some are better funded from investments and some from loans. But if we imagine a world without investments, with only loans, and then offer investments, it’s not straightforward to me that that would harm the businesses that are better suited for loans. Similarly, I’d think (at first approximation at least) that the projects that are not suited for retro funding will still apply for and receive prospective funding at almost the same rate that it is available today. The bottleneck is currently more the investment of funding than the availability of funding.
Right, those are multiplicative too… That makes them a bit not-robust (volatile?). Would it also be valid to conceive of each of those as a multiplier on the current counterfactual impact, e.g., 10x increase in seed funding, 10x improvement in the allocation of seed funding, 10x through economies of scale, etc.? Here’s a sample Guesstimate. But it feel to me like we’re much too likely to err in upward direction this way even if it’s just an estimate of the success (non–black swan) case. Sort of like the multi-stage fallacy give too low estimates if you multiply many probabilities, so I feel like multiplying all these multipliers probably also ignores lots of bottlenecks.
But that said, almost all the factors are multiplicative here except for two components of the allocation – better allocation thanks to knowledge of more languages and cultures and thanks to being embedded in more communities. (I suppose a person is in about as many communities regardless which language/s they speak.) The language component may seem unusually low, which is because so much of the world speaks English and because the US are such a big part of the world economy.
I’m assuming that more entrepreneurial people will join the fray who are not sufficiently altruistic to already be motivated to start EA charities but who will do a good job if they can get at least somewhat rich from it.
Finally, I’m assuming that retro funders reinvest all their savings into the retro funding and priorities research, and that priorities research still has < 10x room for improvement, which seems modest to me (given evidential cooperation in large worlds for example).
I’d be interested what you think of this version – any other factors that need to be considered, or anything that should be additive instead of multiplicative? But we can discuss all that in our call if you like. No need to reply here.
Perhaps, but I’m worried that they may be incentivized to fib about it because it makes their impact seem more valuable and because it makes it more likely that we’ll continue to program (from which they want to benefit again), since we might discontinue it if we don’t think it’s sufficiently impactful.
Thanks! Still a lot. I’ve updated away from this being an important factor to measure… I’d rather find a way to compare the success rates of investors vs. current prospective funders. If none of them are consistently better, they may lose interest in the system.
Yeah, that sounds good in both cases. It’s probably not easy to talk to them but it would be valuable.
If we’re just reallocating EA money, we’re not adding more. A big source of the impact stems from attracting for-profit money.
Looking forward to our call! Feel free to just respond verbally then. No need to type it all out. :-D