Criticisms of effective altruism sometimes claim that it ignores social and systemic change, neglects the roots of poverty and only concentrates on symptoms or that it has no plans to end poverty itself. However, if systemic change is the most effective way of doing good, effective altruists endorse it and the movement advocates for transformations in international labor mobility or the justice system. There may be forms of political change that effective altruism neglects, but then, maybe the chances of their success are low or even if successful, the benefits would require decades to manifest. Some still criticize pessimism about systemic change as well as too much trust in consumer-funded transformation. Critics also note that when we want to achieve certain societal goals, such as education, we do not collect money, but organize and demand political action to establish the necessary institutions and others worry that if we replace public institutions with private initiatives, it might become difficult to get people to participate in politics. However, effective altruists highlight that philanthropy and political change are not opposed to each other, but can work hand in hand.
Be that as it may, when we highlight that either systemic change is often the most effective route to do good or is compatible with or replaceable by philanthropy, we might make it too easy for ourselves. In fact, we neglect a wide variety of cases where systemic change may require causing (or at least threatening) harm. For example, when UK railway workers went on strike to demand better pay, UK Health Secreatary Sajid Javid told they would make it difficult for nurses or doctors to get to work, which puts patients at risk. This, I think, highlights a tension that effective altruism has so far neglected: is it permissible to (threaten to) harm others (or in this case refuse to care for them) for the sake of systemic change?
On the one hand, if railway workers strike, they harm others. The same happens if nurses and doctors themselves threatened to strike – which the actually do, noting that those who work for the well-being of others should not live in poverty. Of course, since effective altruism is about doing the most good, deliberately harming others is clearly against its core principles. On the other hand, according to the values of effective altruism, people are not obligated to sacrifice themselves and their well-being to do good. Put differently, nurses, doctors or railway workers are not required to see their living standards deteriorate. Reaching a conclusion in such cases requires an expansion of the values of effective altruism, as well as a clarification of how our (sometimes contradictory) values apply in certain situations.
Of course, we could sidestep the discussion and propose an efficient compromise. For instance, a solution may be setting up charities for underpaid essential workers. Donations could add to their paycheck, so they can continue to care for their patients. It is perfectly fine for effective altruists to prefer an efficient solution that keeps an injustice intact over eliminating the injustice, if this creates more good overall. Thus, it may be unfair that workers are not adequately paid, but them being dependent on donations is preferable to putting patients at risk. Of course, one may question if those donations to workers in wealthy countries – who still have a higher standard of living than most people in the world – would not do more good somewhere else, but then, if we are talking about the public sector, the same issue arises, since government resources are spent to increase their salaries.
However, in such a case, it is important that we do not look at the world as a collection of separate issues, but as a network, where everything we do affects the social and economic systems around us. If we adopt this view, we can see that donations may create a system where workers can be underpaid and are not morally justified to pressure for change. Thus, by donating to essential workers, we are ensuring that patients have proper care, but also normalize (indeed, reward) exploiting essential workers.
This is not to suggest that effective altruism should become critical of every aspect of our economic system. However, the potential conflicts between efficiency and social change should be noted. There will surely be situations where they do overlap, but it would be naive to assume that all social and political issues will be compatible with efficiency.
In such a case, we have to make uncomfortable decisions. Onora O’Neill already emphasized that we often approach a morally relevant situations with a plurality of values. In such a case, we need practical judgment to find out how to balance them. We may face conflicts between, for example, public security and civil liberties or public health and the freedom to take risks. Put simply, we should not only discuss principles and where they might be applied. We must also think about how these principles are to be enacted in specific situations, and how conflicts between them should be handled.
Relevant for us is finding a balance between doing good as an individual and not creating incentives that reward bad behavior (which would also hinder lasting systemic change). For instance, it is in principle justified to work to establish peace between nations, but, for example, in the case of the invasion of Ukraine, a negotiated settlement (with some concessions by Ukraine) tells the Russian government that military invasions carry little negative consequences, prompting them to launch additonal attacks in the future. Once this happens, we may again demand peace to avoid greater suffering, prompting more violent responses. A way to stop this, unfortunately, may be actual harm to the Russian soldiers in Ukraine, as well as the population at home.
We can extend this to other issues. For example, international sanctions are routinely criticized for making innocent civilians while not achieving their goals. Another case are preferential trade agreements which include human-rights clauses. In short, wealthy democracies enter trade agreements with non-democracies, but the agreement will be paused or nullified if the latter’s human rights record worsens. Empirical evidence shows that this has benefits for human rights However, stopping the trade agreement would likely worsen the living standard in the (poorer) non-democratic country. It is thus the threat of harm which is necessary to nudge countries towards democracy and a respect for human rights. Put differently, it is a conflict between doing good (now) and lasting change (later, but very likely to happen). And for the latter option, we may have to cause harm.
If we refuse this debate, we will be unable to work on various issues where effective altruism could provide moral guidance, such as in the cases described above. Answers may vary depending on the specifics. For example, canceling trade agreements may be permissible, but crippling sanctions as they were put on states like Cuba or Iran may not. Likewise, it may be justified to supply weapons to states defending themselves against an invasion, but not to invade another country with the aim to establish a democratic government. It may be wrong to withhold aid to poorer countries because we are worried about moral hazard, but permissible to withhold aid from a regime that uses it mostly to fund its ability suppress its population and only a small share to help them. An important way to expand effective altruism would be to clarify where we stand on these issues.
Lasting change in these cases is also more sustainable than individual action. Sure, one could donate to underpaid workers or to support refugees of conflicts, but the more sustainable path would be a world where these donations are no longer necessary (and can be invested in other areas). One reason why effective altruists living in wealthy countries can spend so much time and resources on finding out how to help people is because many issues they want to fix do not exist in their home countries (not because of individual action, but because of past systemic transformations). Thus, while it may sometimes be more efficient to not tackle the roots of a problem, it certainly is unsustainable to ignore them in all cases.
While I focused mainly on political issues, individuals can directly affect such large-scale decisions by voting, donating to political movements or voicing opinions on the media. Therefore, what the effective altruism community thinks about them matters. It should therefore engage with such complex topics and craft positions and arguments which can affect political decisions.
The outcomes of such decisions are of course often uncertain, but at the same time, we should not avoid these topics. In a recent interview, Peter Singer already voiced his opinions on how effective altruists should react to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and more such questions will arise in the future. Effective altruism should be prepared to answer when it is justified to credibly threaten others for the sake of lasting change, and when it is not.
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