Hide table of contents

Most rare earth analysis treats China's export controls as the primary risk to US AI competitiveness. This piece argues the bigger threat is structural and non-coercive: China's own domestic consumption of rare earths is rising faster than refining capacity, driven by EVs, robotics, and physical AI. The exportable surplus shrinks regardless of policy intent.

The following is excerpted from The Brief, Red Line's rolling research agenda of how geopolitics shapes the AI frontier. Full piece at red-line.ai

How does Chinese REE export availability evolve under different domestic-demand trajectories?

Boundary conditions

To define the boundary conditions for scenario modelling of China’s rare-earth dynamics we will focus on three variables: (1) how quickly US and its allies scale relative to China’s demand over and above top-line quota increases; (2) Chinese domestic demand growth scenarios range from continuation of the status quo (≤5%) to the double digits (10-12%); and (3) policy levers for the export elasticity of what is left.

Risk is defined as access to REE needed for AI development and dominance.

[...]

High-risk scenario: absorptive China

  • Domestic demand grows at 10-12% a year;
  • export controls remain tight; and
  • allied refining capacity lags far behind.

Under this trajectory, exports shrink not because of sanctions or embargoes, but because China extracts more value by keeping materials at home.

The global result is a structural supply squeeze for foreign buyers, spiking prices and entrenched geopolitical leverage.

[...]

Medium-risk scenario: managed competition

  • Medium domestic growth (5-10%);
  • moderate export controls; and
  • allied ramp-up at half the rate as Chinese demand growth.

The result is reactive policy, punctuated by recurring negotiation rounds that mirror the Busan truce.

Meanwhile, China can continue to use price elasticity as a diplomatic instrument, offering temporary discounts or selective quotas to defuse political pressure. For the US and its allies, sustaining investment in higher-cost refining requires either subsidies or security-of-supply mandates.
 

[...]

Low-risk scenario: overbuild

  • Low domestic growth (≤5%);
  • low export controls; and
  • allied ramp-up on par with Chinese demand growth.

The result is a temporary glut: falling prices, excess inventory, and reduced margins for all producers.

Paradoxically, this scenario does not eliminate dependency. Even in an oversupplied market, concentration persists. China would still dominate refining and magnet fabrication.

Rare Earths on the Critical Path to AGI

At the compute layer, REE exposure is critical but tiny. 

[...]

In the energy and connectivity layers, REE requirements move from grams to tonnes. 

[...]

At the embodied AI layer, REE throttling could further extend China’s robotics lead. 

Open question: does the embodied AI layer change how we should prioritise rare earth resilience relative to compute and energy?

1

0
0

Reactions

0
0
Comments
No comments on this post yet.
Be the first to respond.
Curated and popular this week
Relevant opportunities