Epistemic status: Not an expert on moral uncertainty.
The Model
There have been many models proposed to resolve moral uncertainty, but I would like to introduce one more. Instead of acting in accordance to the moral theory we are most confident in (my favorite theory) or making complex electoral systems (MEC, the parliamentary model), we might want to pick a moral theory at random. Just assign to every moral theory you know the probability of how confident you are about this theory, put them in a row from least to most likely (or any sequence really) and pick a random real number between 0 and 100. E.g: Say you have 1% credence in 'Kantian ethics', 30.42% in 'Average utilitarianism' and 68.58% in 'Total utilitarianism' and you generate the random number 31, you will therefore pursue 'Average utilitarianism'. Whenever you update your probabilities you can reroll the dice (another version would be that you reroll at a fixed frequency of intervals, e.g every day). Here are some of the advantages and disadvantages of this model.
The Good
- It represents your probabilities
- It is fair, every theory gets an equal chance
- It is easy to understand
- It is fast
- It stops a moral theory from dominating even though it only has slightly more credence than the second largest theory (e.g 49%, 50%)
- It stops a moral theory from dominating even though it has a minority credence (e.g 20%, 20%, 20%, 40%)
- It stops the problem of theory-individuation
- It has no need for intertheoretic comparisons of value
- It makes you less fanatical
- It is cognitively easy (no need to do complex calculations in your head)
The Bad
- Humans need to use something other than their brain (dice/computers) to choose randomly (for an A.I this would not be a problem)
- You're not considering a lot of information about the moral theories. This could lead to you violating “moral dominance” e.g picking a theory that decides on an option that it doesn't have much stake in while another theory screams from the sideline (this problem could potentially be solved by making the 'stakes' an additional metric for deciding any given option, but that increases the complexity)
- It makes you more inconsistent and therefore harder to cooperate with
- Someone might get a wrong impression of you because they met you on a day of very low probability
Overall I'm not really convinced this is the path to a better model of moral uncertainty (or value uncertainty, since this model could also be applied there). I think some variation of MEC is probably the best route. The reason I posted this was because:
- Maybe someone with more expertise in moral uncertainty could expand upon this model to make it better
- Maybe sortition elements could be included in other theories to improve them
- Maybe sortition elements could be included in other theories to make them more useful in practice, since sortition is so easy without sacrificing fairness
Got it. The tricky thing seems to be that sensitivity to stakes is an obvious virtue in some circumstances; and (intuitively) a mistake in others. Not clear to me what marks that difference, though. Note also that maximising expected utility allows for decisions to be dictated by low-credence/likelihood states/events. That's normally intuitively fine, but sometimes leads to 'unfairness' — e.g. St. Petersburg Paradox and Pascal's wager / mugging.
I'm not entirely sure what you're getting at re the envelopes, but that's probably me missing something obvious. To make the analogy clearer: swap out monetary payouts with morally relevant outcomes, such that holding A at the end of the game causes outcome O1 and holding B causes O2. Suppose you're uncertain between T1 and T2. T1 says O1 is morally bad but O2 is permissible, and vice-versa. Instead of paying to switch, you can choose to do something which is slightly wrong on both T1 and T2, but wrong enough that doing it >10 times is worse than O1 and O2 on both theories. Again, it looks like the sortition model is virtually guaranteed to recommend taking a course of action which is far worse than sticking to either envelope on either T1 or T2 — by constantly switching and causing a large number of minor wrongs.
But agreed that we should be uncertain about the best approach to moral uncertainty!