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(Note: All EA Berkeley retrospectives can be found here. This post includes the summary of our Spring 2016 retrospective because the full document is 28 pages long. In addition, we have created a public version of our Google Drive, which we encourage people to use. In particular, we have had a lot of interest in the course we teach -- details of the last iteration of the class can be found in this folder of the Drive.)

This is a report by the Effective Altruists of Berkeley on work done during Spring 2016. It was written mainly by Rohin Shah, with contributions from Ajeya Cotra, Jacob Straus, Matthew Borchardt and Joshua Price. It’s really long, so you may want to first read the one-page summary and then decide what else to read. Please email eaofberkeley@gmail.com with questions and comments, or comment on this post!

(Note: This table of contents links to an external Google Doc)

Summary

The Good

The Okay

The Bad

Club Activities

EA Global X

DeCal

Giving What We Can Pledges

Tabling

Fundraising

Berkeley Crowdfunding

Generous U

Weekly Meetings

One on One Meetings

Advisors and Colleagues

Prospective Members

Internet Outreach

General Mailing List

Facebook Page

Websites

Club Email

Socials

Giving Game Website

Greek Life

Club Management

Member Engagement

Organizational Structure

Retrospectives and Planning

Communication

Plans for Future Semesters

Appendix

Financial Transactions

Time put in by Co-Presidents

Chronology

Summary

The Good

  • We organized EAGxBerkeley on April 30, with about 70-80 attendees. (More)

  • We taught a 2-unit course about Effective Altruism. Of our 16 students, at least 7 took the Giving What We Can pledge, 2 will be new active members next semester, and 2 became vegetarian. (More)

  • In total, we got at least 9 students to take the Giving What We Can pledge, which Giving What We Can values at $540,000. (More)

  • We were awarded a $2,500 Generous U grant. (More)

  • We had one-on-one meetings with EA chapter leaders and EA community members that helped us with high-level strategy. (More)

  • We had one-on-one meetings with prospective members that were likely beneficial in retaining those members over the semester. (More)

  • We had club socials once every two weeks, which helped member engagement. (More)

The Okay

  • We played over 1,100 speed Giving Games, which resulted in around 300 mailing list signups and other changes. However, we do not think the results justify the costs. (More)

  • We held weekly meetings that were well attended, but a lot of the content was logistical and not relevant for many of the attendees. (More)

  • We built up our online presence, but are unsure about its impact. (More)

  • We got a group of students to build us a website for playing Giving Games, but it is not yet fully functional. (More)

  • We solidified our organizational structure, which will hopefully be helpful next semester, but it was not very helpful for this past semester. (More)

The Bad

 

  • We tried to organize a Giving What We Can pledge drive, but it failed, primarily due to lack of effort. (More)

  • We applied for Berkeley Crowdfunding, but were rejected. (More)

  • We tried to organize a retreat for club members, but it fell through. (More)

  • We tried to collaborate with fraternities and sororities to encourage them to fundraise for effective charities, but ultimately nothing changed. (More)

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