Article published in the first volume of the philosophy journal Aperto Animo. Available here.
Let Reductionism be the correct account of personal identity. How does that change, or constrain our views in ethical theory? In this paper, I presuppose a popular account of Reductionism, the psychological criterion of personal identity, and explore its implications to ethical theory. First, I argue that this view most plausibly implies the extreme view, according to which the ethically significant metaphysical units are momentary experiences. I then argue that the extreme view appropriately responds to the nonidentity problem via rejecting the person-affecting view. I then defend that the extreme view provides support to utilitarianism. Moreover, the extreme view results in the so-called Repugnant conclusion, which says that for any population with very high welfare, there is a population containing more individuals with lives which are barely worth living whose existence, all else equal, is better. I then defend the extreme view’s plausibility in face of this result.