People often seem to assume that utilitarian impartiality demands leveling down our partial concerns (e.g. for loved ones) until we care equally little about everyone. In the linked post at Good Thoughts, I argue that we should prefer a leveling-up interpretation, which brings our concern for strangers up to the level of concern that we understand to be warranted for those we know best:

The better you get to know someone, the more you tend to (i) care about them, and (ii) appreciate the reasons to wish them well. Moreover, the reasons to wish them well don’t seem contingent on you or your relationship to them—what you discover is instead that there are intrinsic features of the other person that makes them awesome and worth caring about. Those reasons predate your awareness of them. So the best explanation of our initial indifference to strangers is not that there’s truly no (or little) reason to care about them (until, perhaps, we finally get to know them). Rather, the better explanation is simply that we don’t see the reasons (sufficiently clearly), and so can’t be emotionally gripped or moved by them, until we get to know the person better. But the reasons truly were there all along.

It’s hard to be motivated by merely abstract knowledge of the existence of reasons, when the concrete reasons themselves are not within your grasp. So our partial patterns of concern are more or less what we would expect, even assuming that both (i) all reasons are impartial, and (ii) we generally respond correctly to reasons (once grasped). After all, we correctly respond to the reasons we’re vividly acquainted with. The problem is that we’re not vividly acquainted with all the reasons that there really are. And of course correctly responding to a subset of reasons (while failing to grasp others) can lead us significantly astray.

I conclude:

So when others decry utilitarianism as a cold, drab view, I think they couldn’t be more wrong. They imagine leveling down till we have but tepid concern for all. But that’s the wrong view. The better view of utilitarianism involves leveling up: taking all the warmth and wonder and richness that you’re aware of in your personal life, and imaginatively projecting it into the shadows of strangers.

We glimpse but a glimmer of the world’s true value. It’s enough to turn our heads, and rightly so. If we could but see all that’s glimpsed by various others, in all its richness, depth, and importance, we would better understand what’s truly warranted. But even from our limited personal perspectives, we may at least come to understand that there is such value in everyone, even if we cannot always grasp it directly. And if we strive to let that knowledge guide our most important choices, our actions will be more in line with the reasons that exist—reasons we know we would endorse, if only we could see them as clearly as we do the ones in our more personal vicinity.

And yes, from the outside this may look like being moved by drab shadows rather than the vibrant values we grasp closer to home. But of course it isn’t really the shadows that move us, but the promise of the person beneath: a person every bit as complex, vulnerable, and vibrant as those you know and love.

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Love your conclusion. I think for me it's importantly true, useful to convey/remember, and beautifully put.

The better view of utilitarianism involves leveling up: taking all the warmth and wonder and richness that you’re aware of in your personal life, and imaginatively projecting it into the shadows of strangers.

I would take it further and say that utilitarianism levels up your compassion for both those close to you and those distant from you. By becoming aware of the reasons that were already there, as you say, your appreciation of those reasons can become deeper for both sets of people.

I am not sure whether my worldview is strictly utilitarian. However, my worldview is one that extends compassion to all living creatures, everywhere and at all times. With this worldview, it seems I experience what I described in the latter paragraph.