Moral uncertainty

• Normative externalism: We can be required to act in accordance with norms, even if we are not in a position to know what they are (Weatherson 2014)are.^[1]
• My favorite theory: We should act in accordance with the moral theory that we are most confident in (Gustafsson & Torpman 2014).in.^[2]
• Maximize expected choiceworthiness: Moral theories rank actions, and we should act so as to maximize the overall expected choiceworthiness of our actions relative to the theories we are uncertain over (MacAskill 2014).over.^[3] This is an extension of expected value theory to situations of moral uncertainty.
• The parliamentary model: Moral theories should be given weight in accordance with our credences in them, and trades can be made between them to determine the optimal set of actions under uncertainty (Bostrom 2009).uncertainty.^[4]

Two important problems facing the view that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought to act are the regress problem - the problem that we will be uncertain not only about typical moral questions, but also about which approach to moral uncertainty is correct, and so on ad infinitum (Sepielli 2013)^[5] - and the problem of  intertheoretic comparisons - the problem that there seems to be no principled ways to make comparisons between different moral theories (Nissan-Rozen 2015).theories.^[6]

BibliographyFurther reading

Bostrom, Nick (2009) Moral uncertainty - towards a solution?, Overcoming Bias, January 1.

Gustafsson, Johan E. & Olle Torpman (2014) In defence of my favourite theory, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2): 159-174.

MacAskill, William (2014) Normative uncertainty, Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford.

Nissan-Rozen, Ittay (2015) Against moral hedging, Economics and Philosophy, 31(3): 349-369.

Sepielli, Andrew (2013) What to do when you don't know what to do when you don't know what to do…, Nous, 47(1) :521-544.

Weatherson, Brian (2014) Running risks morally, Philosophical Studies,  167: 141–63.

1. ^{^}

   Weatherson, Brian (2014) Running risks morally, Philosophical Studies,  167: 141–63.

2. ^{^}

   Gustafsson, Johan E. & Olle Torpman (2014) In defence of my favourite theory, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2): 159-174.

3. ^{^}

   MacAskill, William (2014) Normative uncertainty, Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford.

4. ^{^}

   Bostrom, Nick (2009) Moral uncertainty - towards a solution?, Overcoming Bias, January 1.

5. ^{^}

   Sepielli, Andrew (2013) What to do when you don't know what to do when you don't know what to do…, Nous, 47(1) :521-544.

6. ^{^}

   Nissan-Rozen, Ittay (2015) Against moral hedging, Economics and Philosophy, 31(3): 349-369.

altruistic wager | decision-theoretic uncertainty | ethics of existential risk | expected value | fanaticism | moral perspectives on existential risk reduction | moral trade | normative uncertainty

Two important problems facing the view that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought to act are the regress problem - the problem that we will be uncertain not only about typical moral questions, but also about which approach to moral uncertainty is correct, and so on ad infinitum (Sepielli 2013) - and the problem of  intertheoretic comparisons - the problem that there seems to be no principled ways to make comparisons between different moral theories (Nissan-Rozen 2015).

altruistic wager | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | fanaticism | moral perspectives on existential risk reduction | moral trade | normative uncertainty

Two important problems facing the view that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought to act are the regress problem - the problem that we will be uncertain not only about typical moral questions, but also about which approach to moral uncertainty is correct, and so on ad infinitum (Sepielli 2013) - and the problem of  intertheoretic comparisons - the problem that there seems to be no principled ways to make comparisons between different moral theories (Nissan-Rozen 2015).

altruistic wager | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | fanaticism | Long Reflectionmoral trade | moral tradenormative uncertainty

altruistic wager | cooperation and coordination | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | fanaticism | Long Reflection | moral trade

altruistic wager | cooperation and coordination | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | fanaticism | Long Reflection | moral trade

Two important problems facing the view that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought to act are the regress problem - the problem that we will be uncertain not only about typical moral questions, but also about which approach to moral uncertainty is correct, and so on ad infinitum (Sepielli 2013) - and the problem of  intertheoretic comparisons - the problem that there seems to be no principled ways to make comparisons between different moral theories (Nissan-Rozen 2015).

altruistic wager | decision-theoretic uncertainty| expected value | fanaticism | Long Reflection | moral trade

altruistic wager | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | fanaticism | Long Reflection