Fanaticism

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, section.section 6.2.

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, sec.section. 6.2.

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute.Institute, sec. 6.2.

Fanaticism is the apparent problem faced by moral theories that rank a minuscule probability of an arbitrarily large value above a guaranteed modest amount of value.^[1][2] Some have argued that fanaticismfanatical theories should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Fanaticism is the positionapparent problem faced by moral theories that it's morally better to reject "a certainty ofrank a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved" in favour of "a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tinyminuscule probability of some vastly better outcome (perhaps trillionsan arbitrarily large value above a guaranteed modest amount of additional blissful lives created)."value.^[1][2] Some have argued that fanaticism should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.

Beckstead, Nick & Teruji Thomas (2021) A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values, Global Priorities Institute.

Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

Wilkinson, Hayden (2020) In defence of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).

1. ^{^}

   Wilkinson, Hayden (2020)(2022) In defencedefense of fanaticism, GPI Working Paper No. 4-2020 (updated January 2021).Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.

2. ^{^}

   Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute.