Edit: To clarify, when I say "accept Pascal's Wager" I mean accepting the idea that way to do the most (expected) good is to prevent as many people as possible from going to hell, and cause as many as possible to go to heaven, regardless of how likely it is that heaven/hell exists (as long as it's non-zero).
I am a utilitarian and I struggle to see why I shouldn't accept Pascal's Wager. I'm honestly surprised there isn't much discussion about it in this community considering it theoretically presents the most effective way to be altruistic.
I have heard the argument that there could be a god that reverses the positions of heaven and hell and therefore the probabilities cancel out, but this doesn't convince me. It seems quite clear that the probability of a god that matches the god of existing religions is far more likely than a god that is the opposite, therefore they don't cancel out because the expected utilities aren't equal.
I've also heard the argument that we should reject all infinite utilities – for now it seems to me that Pascal's Wager is the only example where the probabilities don't cancel out, so I don't have any paradoxes or inconsistencies, but this is probably quite a fragile position that could be changed. I also don't know how to go about rejecting infinite utilities if it turns out I have to.
I would obviously love to hear any other arguments.
Thanks!
OMG this is EXACTLY the kind of reply I was looking for, and more. Thank you so much!
Since I'm pretty new into philosophy, I believe what you say although I don't understand it. However you have given me a ton of invaluable starting points from which I can now begin learning how to answer these kind of questions myself.
You can be fairly confident that your comment will end up triggering a major (and probably inevitable) turning point in my philosophical journey and therefore my life since it sounds like utilitarianism in the form I have always followed is flawed and will need to be revised or even scrapped entirely.
Once again, thanks so much!