Fanaticism is the apparent problem faced by moral theories that rank a minuscule probability of an arbitrarily large value above a guaranteed modest amount of value.[1][2] Some have argued that fanatical theories should be rejected and that this might undermine the case for certain philosophical positions, such as longtermism.
See also Pascal's mugging.
Beckstead, Nick & Teruji Thomas (2021) A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values, Global Priorities Institute.
Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.
Wiblin, Robert & Keiran Harris (2021) Christian Tarsney on future bias and a possible solution to moral fanaticism, 80,000 Hours, May 5.
alternatives to expected value theory | altruistic wager | decision theory | decision-theoretic uncertainty | expected value | moral uncertainty | naive vs. sophisticated consequentialism | risk aversion
Wilkinson, Hayden (2022) In defense of fanaticism, Ethics, vol. 132, pp. 445–477.
Tarsney, Christian (2020) The epistemic challenge to longtermism, Global Priorities Institute, section 6.2.