I find it somewhat hard to take "but what if it's good for third world children themselves to die" all that seriously as an objection. I think most anti-natalist philosophers would deny this. Isn't Benatar's view that is bad for people to come into existence, but it's often better for their lives to continue once they have started. In general anti-natalists are not usually utilitarians, classical or negative.  

Wasn't Dario Amodei one of the earliest signers of the GWWC pledge? Long before Anthropic existed? That makes him quite atypical amongst very rich people right? Though for what it's worth I would probably bet against him giving most of his wealth away, even if he has pledge to do that. 

For what it's worth, whilst I find arguing with Yarrow quite stressful, and I definitely don't always agree with her, and sometimes think she's a bit reluctant to concede, I don't think a ban was a good idea. Her comments are usually substantive, people who don't want to engage with them can just ignore, critical perspectives are always valuable etc. In some cases, she's actually spotted pretty important stuff that people had missed, i.e. that Waymo's still have humans in the loop, or a problem in a Forecasting Research Institute study that I cited during one our arguments. 

Thanks, I follow you now. 

I don't quite follow, can you spell out the reasoning a bit more? 

They way to deal with the vagueness of "AGI" is to think about substitutability for human labour in an imaginary world where no regulatory barriers prevent this. 

What made you convinced the threat is serious? 

The expert survey results are also just compatible with "short timelines", strictly speaking, if that means "AI that can do any work a human can for similar cost". If economists think that even that won't produce explosive growth but just a modest speed up, then they will not necessarily predict super-high growth by 2050 even if you specify that AGI arrives in 2030. 

What about the risk we spread wild animal suffering to other planets? 

One reason to think we might not find anything morally valuable that distinct from what we already know about is that our concept of morality is made to fit with the stuff we already know about.