I studied Maths and Philosophy, and have helped implement the European Summer Program on Rationality during 2019, 2018 and 2017. Nowadays, I sell some software, and I study and research on my own: nunosempere.github.io, acquiring deeper models of things.
So I think that once you accept a particular framing or ontology, or cluster of beliefs, vegetarianism starts to begin souding pretty obvious. One such cluster might be:
And you seem to be arguing from a framing similar to the above. However, that framing is not obvious, and one could adopt some other cluster of beliefs, such as:
And when arguing with someone which has beliefs near the second cluster, I don't think that assuming that beliefs in the first cluster are obviously right is a great tactical move (I'm ignoring audience effects). In fact, when I used to not be vegetarian, I found that kind of move to be extremely annoying, and to some extent I still do ("that guy is saying that things which took me years to understand and/or come to share, and which in some cases are still not clear to me, are obviously true?").
Instead, may I suggest a moral trade as a tactical move? (see: Morality at its best is a coordination game played in good faith)
Considering this type of moral trade is possible because the original poster quantified his preferences to the best of his ability. This should be highly lauded, and gets a strong upvote from me.
Epistemic status: Experiment. Somewhat parochial.
An example of money which nobody owns might be a bounty which nobody has claimed yet. A good example of that might be the SHA-1 collision bitcoin bounty, which could be (anonymously) claimed by anyone who could produce a SHA-1 collision.
On a larger scale, solving the Millenium Prize Problems would also give you access to a $1 million prize.
That is evil, I like it.
The SlateStarCodex survey data is useful to answer a limited form of that question (a comparison with other SSC-survey answerers).
Code here, in R, may be useful.
International Supply Chain Accountability.
The Good Judgement Open forecasting tournament gives a 66% chance for the answer to "Will the UN declare that a famine exists in any part of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, or Uganda in 2020?"
I think that the 66% is a slight overestimate. But nonetheless, if a famine does hit, it would be terrible, as other countries might not be able to spare enough attention due to the current pandemic.
It is not clear to me what an altruist who realizes that can do, as an individual:
Donating to the World Food Programme, which is already doing work on the matter, might be a promising answer, but I haven't evaluated the programe, nor compared it to other potentially promising options (see here: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/wpaZRoLFJy8DynwQN/the-best-places-to-donate-for-covid-19, or https://www.againstmalaria.com/)
Interesting. Reminds me of this post by Paul Christiano on moral public goods
The classical answer to this is that altruism towards strangers is not evolutionarily adaptative. This is because the altruistic give ressources benefit their own and others' descendants equally, while the nonaltruistic also get those benefits for their descendants without having to pay the cost. See also the tragic story of George R. Price.
Either / Both