PhD student (in bioethics) in the National University of Singapore
My doubt was on the epistemics, and specifically on the estimation of welfare gain by an intervention.
Re: Benatar's view. He holds the view that the continuation of a life accrues harm. At the same time, he indeed also holds that it is overall better (or more like, less bad) for people's lives to continue once they have started, because death is even more significant harm.
I can't say how many anti-natalists are utilitarians of any sort, or the reverse. I am pretty sure many negative utilitarians think that the continuation of any sentient life is net negative.
Going back to Benatar's view and applying it to our subject matter. He would likely claim that:
Thank you very much for the post! I have read some comments (and except for Cynthia's, mostly incompletely). I want to leave a comment that is meant to be a reply to some comments, but also possibly the post itself:
Some comments in the discussion, and perhaps the post implicitly, seem to treat global health as a point of high certainty — Lewis described it as "the closest to total certainty of positive impact of any areas." But I think that "certainty" is partly an artefact of where we stop scrutinising. Yes, we have strong evidence that bednets counterfactually avert statistical deaths. But we have much weaker evidence that the counterfactual life thereby preserved is net-positive over its remaining course, and weaker still that it's more net-positive than the resources spent would have produced elsewhere (even limiting the resources within just humans, or the global health cause). That second layer — the value of the outcome, not the efficacy of the intervention — usually gets carried by unstated assumptions rather than by data. (FWIW, part of the assumptions are philosophical. For instance, there are serious philosophers who think that each extra life year is a net-negative, regardless of people's preferences. Also, people who have their lives saved might go on to harm other humans, but some EAs and ethicists think we ought not consider this when it comes to saving kids.)
I want to be careful not to overstate this, because there are disanalogies: The human prior is genuinely stronger on the immediate impact level. It also seems that on the secondary or further levels, interventions targeting humans are often even less certain than AW ones. So I'm not claiming the two are equally uncertain.
But the (in)consistency point still bites. If AW has a major evidence problem vis-à-vis whether overall welfare was indeed improved, life-saving human interventions have it too — it just happens that we rarely turn the skepticism in that direction (welfare).
P.S. I'm aware of problems raised by population ethics and the meat-eating problem (it's a more productive framing than the version you heard), so not a novel observation in general. I'm raising my points narrowly because the comment section (or maybe just Lewis, and David Reinstein, plus the post implicitly?) leans on global health being the secure benchmark, in comparison to AW interventions seeking to improve welfare.
P.P.S. I used Claude 4.8 to help me check whether my points were already made by someone else here, and to help me draft the reply, of which I modified.
Yes, thanks for the reminder. I have long (incorrectly) thought pond loach is just one species, until Ryan pointed out that there are at least 4 (but seems like only two are commercially popular).
From what I learned, even though mud carp should be the biggest used fry for mandarin fish feed, many other species such as other carps and tilapia are also used in significant amounts. But in terms of cause priortization/conceptualization, grouping them together makes perfect sense!
Yes feeder fish for mandarin fish is a big category. But my understanding is that many species' fry are used, including pond loaches (rarely though, I believe). I am not sure the majority of them are one species (i.e. mud carp).
Also, since we need to count fry to come up with a few trillion figure for feeder fish for mandarin fish, we also need to count pond loach numbers by the fry stage. Estimates of pond loach survival rates from fry to sellable fish vary widely, from 2% to 10%. Given that the number of pond loach slaughtered each year is roughly 10B, that's ~100B-500B pond loaches slaughtered each year.
Yeah, maybe mud carp or some other species is no.1, but I am guessing it is also possible pond loach is still no.1 or close.
Thanks for asking, here are some ideas I personally wish funders would consider at least investigating. The epistemic status of some of these ideas is not great, and I never attempted any robust analysis on the expected values of these potential interventions/causes, but I hope they are worth investigating.
Thank you for the great post! I don't have comments right now on your subject matter, but want to provide a bit of information about my region.
and then trying to steer the conversation as quickly as possible back towards safer, intuitive examples, like malaria nets, lead poisoning, factory farms, biosecurity, etc.
In China, my sense is that factory farming is not a "safe" option when it comes to explaining EA, cause prioritization, etc to non-EAs or even new EAs. On the other hand, for some reason, AI seems to be much more "safe" than factory farming.
I agree these are important questions! I wonder what you think of the idea that maybe we can create tastes that are superior to any meat, perhaps unrecognizable tastes that no humans have tried, that are irresistible?