Yes, it is clear. My question was: "Do we have any specific difference in mind about AI strategies for 1 per cent in 10 years vs. 10 per cent in 10 years cases?" If we going to ignore the risk in both cases, there is no difference is it 1 per cent or 10 per cent.
I don't know any short-term publically available strategy for the 10 years case, no matter what is the probability.
What is the actionable difference between "1-2 per cent" and "10 per cent" predictions? If we knew that an asteroid is coming to Earth and it will hit the Earth with one of these probabilities, how our attempts to diverge it would depend on the probability of the impact?
Should we ignore 1 per cent probability, but go all-in in preventing 10 per cent probability?
If there is no difference in actions, the difference in probability estimates is rather meaningless.
Thanks - just saw this comment now. Not really miss the idea, but not decoded include it here.
If the connection between observer-moments is not regarded as important (as I understand, this is your point of view: there is no identity that chains observer-moments in timelines) - than the creation of happy observer-moments is also a way to dilute past sufferings.
I addressed the problem of the simulation of evil AIs in the "Message to any future AI" text, which we already discussed. The main types of Evil AIs may be predicted by simulating the worlds where they likely to appear. We could get the advantage over the Evil AIs by declaring now, before their creation, that we will simulate and punish them in those timelines where will be able to create Benevolent AI. But we don't need to discuss all the technical details how we will do it, as a benevolent AI will find better ways. (The idea comes from Rolf Nelson)
See patches in comments below: there are ways to do the trick not increasing the total number of suffering observer-moments.
It will also increase the number of happy observer-moments globally, because of the happiness of being saved from agony plus lowering the number of Evil AIs, as they will know they will lose and will be punished.
I just find the way how the whole trick will increase total welfare in the multiverse, copied from the comment below:
No copies of suffering observer-moments will be created - only the next moment after suffering will be simulated and diluted, and this will be obviously the happiest moment for someone in agony - to feel that the pain disappeared and to know that he is saved from hell.
It will be like an angel, who comes to a cancer patient and tells him: your disease was just completely cured. If one ever got a negative result for cancer test, he may know this feeling of relief.
Also, the fact that benevolent AI is capable to save observers from Evil AI (and also model Evil AIs in simulations and punish them if they dare to torture anyone) will significantly reduce (I hope) the number of Evil AIs.
Thus, the combination of the pleasure of being saved from Evil AI plus lowering the world-share of Evil AIs, as they can't win and know it - will increase the total positive utility in the universe.
This is because you use not-copy-friendly theory of personal identity, which is reasonable but has other consequences.
I patched the second problem in comments above - only the next moment after suffering will be simulated and diluted, and this will be obviously the happiest moment for someone in agony - to feel that the pain disappeared and to know that he is saved from hell.
Also, the fact that benevolent AI is capable to save observers from Evil AI (and also model Evil AIs in simulations and punish them if they dare to torture anyone) will significantly reduce (I hope) the number of Evil AI.
See my patch to the argument in the comment to Lukas: we can simulate those moments which are not in intense pain, but still are very close to the initial suffering-observer moment, so they could be regarded its continuation.
It is an algorithmic trick only if personal identity is strongly connected to exact this physical brain. But in the text, it is assumed that identity is not brain-connected, without any discussion. However, it doesn't mean that I completely endorse this "copy-friendly" theory of identity.