I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
One reason to doubt DiGiovanni's unawareness argument (specifically, his empirical premise) is that it is unclear where the line is between A) myunderstanding of a decision problem isfine-grained enough for me to trust my best guess, and B) it is too coarse-grained (and I must suspend judgment). While DiGiovanni does not object to this and recognizes some version of the problem, he suggests that the line must come before “promoting the impartial good”.
I do not think there is a fact of the matter about the location of the line separating A) and B). I would say it depends on the operationalisation of the claim under assessment, which should be falsifiable. Relatedly, I agree with Brian Tomasik that:
It doesn't make sense to ask questions like, Does a computer program of a mind really instantiate consciousness? That question reifies consciousness as a thing that may or may not be produced by a program. Rather, the particles constituting the computer just move—and that's it. The question of whether a given physical operation is "conscious" is not a factual dispute but a definitional one: Do we want to define consciousness as including those sorts of physical operations?
In the context of consciousness, I think the right move is i) considering all systems have more than exactly 0 moral value instead of ii) separating systems into ones that have exactly 0 moral weight, and ones that have more than exactly 0 moral weight. In the context of cluelessness, I believe the right move is i) considering the expected value (EV) of any 2 actions is comparable more or less robustly instead of ii) separating actions into ones whose EV is comparable, and ones whose EV is not comparable.
As with Caroline Ellison, I don't think anyone is saying that someone who has done something morally egregious should not be able to get a job or should be excluded from society. But does Caroline Ellison need to continue working in a financial role?
Suppose the probability of Caroline committing illegal actions at Manifund is similar to that of typical hires for similar roles. Would you still oppose Austin hiring Caroline? If so, would you also oppose Austin hiring Caroline for any other role at Manifund? If so, why?
For large grants, I do them. I would be very happy to have your analysis help me here.
You are welcome to get in touch if any opportunities arise.
If you have grants or projects you are very interested in, let me know, and I will take them into consideration, especially if you have lots of analysis for them.
Take a school-plates initiative that shifts institutional meals toward plant-based defaults. On any single scale it may look middling. But its counterfactual case may be stronger than any one metric shows, because a fair accounting would convert those effects into a common currency rather than penalising the intervention for succeeding on more than one front.
I think funding i) some interventions that very cost-effectively decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (like those supported by the Climate Fund (CF)), and ii) some other interventions that very cost-effectively increase the welfare of farmed animals (like those supported by the Animal Welfare Fund (AWF)) is better than funding iii) interventions that decrease GHG emissions and increase the welfare of farmed animals, but do not achieve either very cost-effectively (like School Plates, I believe). I estimated School Plates in 2023 increased the welfare of farmed animals 19.4 % as cost-effectively as cage-free corporate campaigns helping hens.
Conversion, not addition, is the operation that matters here, and it is easy to get wrong: suffering-adjusted days, tonnes of CO2-equivalent, and disability-adjusted life years cannot be summed, because the units do not combine.
The benefits to farmed animals can be compared with the benefits to humans of decreasing GHG emissions. I think the benefits to farmed animals from replacing chicken meat with beef or pork are much larger than the harm this causes to humans due to increased GHG emissions.
My concern is a potential future in which AI effectively takes over the skilled labor niche, and this eliminates an important rung on the proverbial ladder low skilled workers have traditionally used to improve their social and economic status.
Fair.
Nobody likes being stuck in a dead end job, and the outcome the article proposes (at least, the more pessimistic parts of the forecast) sounds like the majority of the population effectively trapped in a pre-determined economic caste with little to no meritocratic means of escape.
I think pre-determined economic conditions are not necessarily bad. I guess people will be happy if they have a high income (considering all sources), even if they do not have a job. I assume this is mostly the case for people who have retired in high income countries.
Hello. Welcome to the EA Forum. I am not familiar with feudalism, but I think what matters is increasing welfare. You may be interested in the podcast episode Liberalism Forever.
Hi Marcus. How often do you rely on quantitative analyses to inform your grantmaking at Falcon Fund? I would be happy to review related docs or sheets for free if useful, and I am open to performing analyses from scratch too.
Hi. Have you considered asking people about moral weight being above exactly 0 instead of consciousness? I think what ultimately matters is moral weight, and asking about consciousness leads to lots of confusion due to different people having different definitions/concepts of it in mind. Relatedly, I agree with Brian Tomasik on the following.
It doesn't make sense to ask questions like, Does a computer program of a mind really instantiate consciousness? That question reifies consciousness as a thing that may or may not be produced by a program. Rather, the particles constituting the computer just move—and that's it. The question of whether a given physical operation is "conscious" is not a factual dispute but a definitional one: Do we want to define consciousness as including those sorts of physical operations?
I found this very funny! At the same time, I wonder if writing this sort of post may make one a little bit less open minded than optimal about AI risk.
Hi Jim. Great post.
I do not think there is a fact of the matter about the location of the line separating A) and B). I would say it depends on the operationalisation of the claim under assessment, which should be falsifiable. Relatedly, I agree with Brian Tomasik that:
In the context of consciousness, I think the right move is i) considering all systems have more than exactly 0 moral value instead of ii) separating systems into ones that have exactly 0 moral weight, and ones that have more than exactly 0 moral weight. In the context of cluelessness, I believe the right move is i) considering the expected value (EV) of any 2 actions is comparable more or less robustly instead of ii) separating actions into ones whose EV is comparable, and ones whose EV is not comparable.
Hi Yarrow. Thanks sharing your thoughts.
Suppose the probability of Caroline committing illegal actions at Manifund is similar to that of typical hires for similar roles. Would you still oppose Austin hiring Caroline? If so, would you also oppose Austin hiring Caroline for any other role at Manifund? If so, why?
You are welcome to get in touch if any opportunities arise.
I will keep this in mind.
Hi Barbara. Welcome to posting on the EA Forum.
I think funding i) some interventions that very cost-effectively decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (like those supported by the Climate Fund (CF)), and ii) some other interventions that very cost-effectively increase the welfare of farmed animals (like those supported by the Animal Welfare Fund (AWF)) is better than funding iii) interventions that decrease GHG emissions and increase the welfare of farmed animals, but do not achieve either very cost-effectively (like School Plates, I believe). I estimated School Plates in 2023 increased the welfare of farmed animals 19.4 % as cost-effectively as cage-free corporate campaigns helping hens.
The benefits to farmed animals can be compared with the benefits to humans of decreasing GHG emissions. I think the benefits to farmed animals from replacing chicken meat with beef or pork are much larger than the harm this causes to humans due to increased GHG emissions.
Fair.
I think pre-determined economic conditions are not necessarily bad. I guess people will be happy if they have a high income (considering all sources), even if they do not have a job. I assume this is mostly the case for people who have retired in high income countries.
Hello. Welcome to the EA Forum. I am not familiar with feudalism, but I think what matters is increasing welfare. You may be interested in the podcast episode Liberalism Forever.
Hi Laura. You may want to join EA Lisbon's WhatsApp group, and ask around there.
Hi Marcus. How often do you rely on quantitative analyses to inform your grantmaking at Falcon Fund? I would be happy to review related docs or sheets for free if useful, and I am open to performing analyses from scratch too.
Hi. Have you considered asking people about moral weight being above exactly 0 instead of consciousness? I think what ultimately matters is moral weight, and asking about consciousness leads to lots of confusion due to different people having different definitions/concepts of it in mind. Relatedly, I agree with Brian Tomasik on the following.
I found this very funny! At the same time, I wonder if writing this sort of post may make one a little bit less open minded than optimal about AI risk.