As noted in my bio, all views I express here are my own. 
 

This is a 2018 paper by the philosophers Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan on whether preventing a platform for a speaker at a university is compatible with liberal politics. I liked it when I read it several years ago, though I'm unsure if I agree with the full implication of the argument they make. I think it's applies well to recent discourse, though there is a difference in context. I'll copy the abstract below, but strongly suggest those interested to read the full paper.  I'd welcome discussion in the comments, but likely won't engage myself. I'll be taking a break from the forum.

This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with
a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose isn’t just to protect the speech of academics, but also to give them the prerogative to determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rigorous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers without
appropriate disciplinary credentials.