“What I wish to point out here is that even purely at the logical level, there exist certain areas of politics where the assumptions of rational choice theory must break down. Consequently, while the methodological usefulness of the rational choice assumption is undeniable, it is necessary to realize that there is a certain class of political phenomena for which this method of analysis may be inappropriate.” - Partha Chatterjee, "On the Rational Choice Theory of Limited Strategic War"
According to some studies, Chinese society has higher rates of collectivism and identity fusion, and on average individuals in Chinese society employ a more value-driven decision-making apparatus over a “rational” decision-making apparatus. It is my understanding that modern American military strategies all have some basis in rational choice theory (especially deterrence theory), which makes basic value assumptions that often do not stand true for immanent value-driven or otherwise rationally divergent actors with high identity fusion, such as leaders in China. In confrontational situations involving a party with the aforementioned characteristics, rational choice theory breaks down and conflict typically results due to misattributions.
For example, deterrence theory’s effectiveness is posited to rest on three criteria known as the credibility trinity: celerity, severity, and certainty. In the event that violence is perpetrated despite deterrence, the “rational” party typically is led to believe that the credibility (celerity, severity, or certainty) of their retribution threat is in question and so are only allowed two choices as a result of this incorrect conclusion: reestablish credibility by following through with the original deterrent threat or risk the potential consequences of losing face internationally. Following through with the threat means escalation; the same is the case for losing face internationally. The epistemic gap in this thought process, however, lies at the heart of motivation. In many cases involving rationally divergent actors, it is not that the deterrence threat was not credible, but that the threat was in and of itself not deterrent at all. Individuals with high identity fusion, whose judgments are made using immanent values (such as spiritual promises or cultural beliefs in manifest destiny), do not see whatever deterrence costs being incurred as outweighing the benefits or importance of their end goal, and so they breach deterrence boundaries. The misattribution of deterrence failure leads to violence in cases where simple adjustment of deterrence was necessary, or even mild diplomacy. Instead of credibility being the issue with deterrence in this case, it was value assessment. In short, the West (and the US in particular) approaches deterrent selection and manufacture with an ethnocentric view, which ultimately mitigates the effectiveness of deterrence against rationally divergent actors.
So why then does it appear that current US attempts at deterrence and coercion using rational choice theory seem to be having their intended effect on Chinese foreign policy (at least, as close to the intended effect as can be hoped)? Why do we see conflict between the US and rationally divergent actors similar to China (e.g., many middle eastern nations and Asian states throughout the past century such as Iraq, North Korea or Vietnam), and yet not with China itself?
I suggest a new theory to explain this strange relationship: Action Alignment Theory (AAT). AAT posits that the reason two rationally divergent international actors are able to peacefully coexist despite differing values and rationales is due to “action alignment”, which is best explained as two parties both viewing the same action(s) as vital to the achievement of diametrically opposed end goals, despite differing value systems and logic bases. For example, two parties with respective end goals of bolstered global materialism vs global utopian spiritualism (i.e., two goals antithetical to each other) both view peaceful cohabitation with each other as a means of progressing towards those opposing ends and thus cooperate.
In essence, AAT, when applied to the current US-China dynamic, posits that peace does not exist due to the credibility of US deterrence, but rather to mutual interests in the same situation of peace for different reasons arising from different rationales. If this were not the case, world actors culturally and sociologically similar to China (such as those previously mentioned in the middle east or Asia) would have responded to US deterrence in kind with China, or China would have responded to US deterrence similarly to the aforementioned nations (which, from history, we know they have not). Instead, these two powers currently exist in relative peace because relative peace means progress towards their respective end goals, despite those end goals ultimately being anathema to each other (the goals being US economic and military dominance vs. China’s rejuvenation of ancient global Sinocentrism).
While it is true that one could argue this alignment is due to the threat of deterrence, this does not mean that deterrence as a threat of annihilation is the key to peace. In rationally divergent actors, death is not a deterrent. What is a deterrent, however, is not being able to realize a future goal. In the case with China, rejuvenation of Sinocentrism is that future goal, and annihilation would make the realization of that goal impossible, and so they seek peace. Some may say this is splitting hairs, but it is important to keep this distinction between reasons for deterrent success in mind because it means there may be other alternatives to use to threaten the realization of some future goal other than violence in the event that deterrence is breached. This is the value of AAT.
This current convenient alignment of interests is transient at best without active measures of ensuring it’s continuance. As soon as mutual peace does not serve one or more of the parties in advancing them towards their end goals (and assuming actors remain rationally divergent), the collaboration will cease to exist and armed conflict is likely to result unless action alignment can be restored. The CCP's approaching of its 100th anniversary may very well be the impetus that changes this status quo, as they may become increasingly convinced that rejuvenation of Sino centrism cannot be accomplished while peacefully coexisting with the US (for example, US interference in the Taiwan issue could be changing the temperature).
Methods as to how to maintain or restore action alignment vary from militance to diplomacy. Such strategies may include active maintenance of the status quo through force or diplomacy, limited military action oriented towards engineering artificial action alignment, economic interdependence, strategic irregularity, controlled acquiescence, outright bribery, and more.
AAT does not stand on its own, nor is it meant to replace deterrence theory, but rather serves to fill epistemic gaps in rational choice theory (and consequently deterrence theory) that are dangerous pitfalls for the long peace we currently enjoy. I believe the concept of action alignment should be applied to RCT, deterrence theory (with its staunchly deterministic attitude towards violence), and general diplomacy, in the hopes that perhaps by realizing aligned actions and striving to maintain them, we can avoid loss of life and other expenses by engineering an equilibrium of mutual progress among all parties involved, be that progress perceived or actual.
I believe a project analyzing situations involving action alignment and identifying trends in such situations could prove useful for future strategic and political decision-makers, especially in the US-China relations realm. Who knows… maybe through proper development and implementation of consistent action alignment paragons a world where two powers both peacefully achieve their end goals can exist? Perhaps this is the key to avoiding Thucydides' Trap. Perhaps international relations no longer need be a zero-sum game where there are only two sides on the chess board and only at the cost of one side’s king can the other side win. Perhaps a world where the US remains a democratic entity and the independent leading technological and economic powerhouse can exist in a globally Sinocentric international theater that accepts the irrefutability of Marxism... Or perhaps achieving an interminable state of action alignment is wholly untenable. More research (specifically into the following questions I list below) and the development of AA analysis/implementation could be a worthwhile contribution to the field of geopolitics and achieving lasting peace.
1. What theory(ies) does the US or China use when dealing with entities that use differing rationales or who are entirely irrational altogether without resorting to violence if any at all?
2. Does the Chinese government have a Rational Choice Theory original to their own philosophies that has evolved with noticeable differences from Western RCT due to cultural differences and institutional drift?
3. What does the US and or China do when their rational choice theory breaks down in the limits of war or exceptional international circumstances?
**SOURCES**
[(558) Analysing the limits of rational choice in political and cultural conflict | Scott Atran - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxDS2g4qSO8)
http://www.jstor.com/stable/41854567
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249705048_The_Role_of_Values_in_Rational_Choice_Theory
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601362. Accessed 26 Jun. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601362.%20Accessed%2026%20Jun.%202022) Rational Choice Theory in International Relations.
[Full article: ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM (tandfonline.com)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1024269052000344864#:~:text=When%20rational%20choice%20theory%20is,a%20price%20change%20in%20another.)
[Revisiting the criticisms of rational choice theories - Herfeld - 2022 - Philosophy Compass - Wiley Online Library](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12774)
