This post aims to complement Andreas T Schmidt and Jacob Barrett’s Longtermist Political Philosophy: An Agenda for Future Research.
I will start by arguing the pace, downsides and (near) irreversibility of current-day democratic backsliding, after which I will go on to contextualise my findings within the aforementioned essay’s assessment of the relation between institutional longtermism and contemporary political philosophy.
If you’re already fully convinced of the urgency of democratic backsliding, feel free to scroll all the way down to paragraph 4: Institutional longtermism.
A key aspect of George Orwell’s 1984 is the hopelessness of the liberal cause. With technological advancements far ahead of the novel’s time (a vast network of monitored cameras and microphones) the masses are easily, and indefinitely, controlled.
Now, almost eighty years later, these advancements have been made and are being put into practice. 天网, the Chinese mass-surveillance system that (doubtless coincidentally) translates into Skynet, is estimated to operate over 700 million cameras in the country, most of which have facial recognition, and the number is still growing. Indeed, not for thirty-six years has the CCP faced anything resembling an insurrection, and a successful one seems near unthinkable today.
Worryingly, many recent opinion polls show an increasing apathy, or even aversion, to democracy among democratic electorates. This recent EMI (European Movement International) study, for example, found that only about a third of Europeans consider themselves consistent supporters of democracy. While this obviously doesn’t mean the masses are yearning for dictatorship, it does display an apparent indifference, reflected in a commonplace willingness to overlook autocratic tendencies of political parties/figures.
To understand whether this sentiment is justified, one needs to assess the urgency of the political situation as it adheres to democratic backsliding.
Before that though, it might be useful to reiterate the (inherent and most prevalent) negatives of an autocratic system.
The (considerable) downsides of autocracy
While absolute rule under an enlightened technocrat might theoretically be peaceful and prosperous, history shows us that these figures are rare indeed. Just as authoritarianism itself is near-incompatible with freedom of expression, the skillset required to climb the ladder stands in stark contrast to that of a fair and just rule.
And even when that one-in-a-million manages to take power, the dice are rolled once again for their (usually relatively swift, in what appears an increasingly gerontocratic world) succession.
Apart from the obvious repression and murder of citizens that come to mind with dictatorships (for example: in 2023 Genocide Watch estimated up to two million Uyghurs had been put in gruesome Chinese concentration camps, with many more forcibly sterilised or aborted, raped or kidnapped), I would like to briefly note two, somewhat more subtle, likely more salient in democracies, implications of government-type.
Economically, the effects of autocracy have long been a topic of discussion. Many scholars at the time credited the success of the Asian tigers to their authoritarian rule, shaping much of collective memory even now, but the truth now seems far more nuanced. Overall, authoritarian states on average show similar growth to democracies, but with more variation between nations. In terms of GDP per capita, the few wealthier autocracies tend to be rich in oil.
As for peacefulness, the numbers are a lot more straightforward. Logically, one would assume dictatorships to be more aggressive, and the evidence indeed backs this up. Even accounting for endogeneity, leaders of countries experiencing democratic backsliding are more likely to act aggressively towards other countries.
Democratic backsliding
The bad news, for all those who were not enthused by the conclusions drawn in the previous section, is that the current state of global democracy is very poor indeed. By V-dem’s metrics (V-dem is a watchdog-institute based at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden) in 2004, 51% of the world population lived in a democracy. By 2024, this had fallen to 28%. Their 2025 democracy report goes on to give a bleak warning: the so-called third wave of autocratisation shows no signs of slowing down. Additionally, at least since 1900, never have so many people lived in autocratising countries as now, even as a share of the global population.
Just about every democracy watchdog seems to be crying out desperately, but their warnings seem to be falling on deaf ears, as the wave of right-wing populism continues to sweep the democratic world, widely regarded as the root cause of current democratic backsliding (though also through far-left populism in Latin America).
Meanwhile, for the first time in the history of its yearly index, Journalists Without Borders have downgraded their global state of press freedom to ‘difficult’.
Even in Italy, the third largest EU economy and generally considered a firm Western democracy, last year journalists of the public broadcast agency RAI went on strike against what they described as ‘stifling control’ exercised by prime minister Georgia Meloni, who leads what could well be described as the most extreme-right Italian government since Mussolini.
In 2000, when the far-right Austrian FPÖ managed to get into government for the first time, this was followed by international outcry, with each of the remaining 14 EU member states announcing diplomatic sanctions. 17 years later, however, when the FPÖ once again rose to power, this was silently accepted by the rest of the Union.
This, as I see it, is symptomatic of the current state of intergovernmental politics. Genuine concern for democracy seems to have disappeared entirely, along with international law, as countries shift to a purely transactional foreign policy. Barely anyone still acts on the atrocious human rights violations of states such as China, India and Saudi-Arabia, because they are too important economically. Barely anyone sanctions countries facing democratic backsliding, for, at this point, there are far too many of them.
Without mutual assistance, it’s becoming ever more difficult for democratic nations to resist autocratisation. Take the Arab Spring, for example, where mass protests resulted in democratic improvements across the Middle East, even toppling four dictatorships. A decade later, Tunisia seemed the only success story, with every other country having slipped back into authoritarianism or reverted democratic reforms. Now however, another four years later, the death sentence is being handed out for insulting the president.
This autocrat, Kais Saied, has undoubtedly been aided by the complete lack of international condemnation for his undemocratic reforms. He has further been aided by the European Union, which two years ago signed a Memorandum of Understanding with his government, paying hundreds of millions of euros for the detention of migrants looking to cross the Mediterranean, giving the autocratising government money and legitimacy at a crucial moment.
Though international cooperation against democratic backsliding has near ceased to exist, the same can not be said for foreign investment in its advancement. In just the past couple years, for example, have the democracies of Hong Kong and Georgia actively and successfully been undermined by China and Russia respectively.
Turning the tide (and why we probably won’t)
There have, however, been waves of autocratisation in the past, repeatedly followed by a corresponding wave of democratisation.
These, though, were each time preceded by, or the direct result of, major geopolitical events (namely the Second World War, decolonisation and the fall of the Soviet Union (depending on the historian)), entailing two global struggles between the democratic and undemocratic world (with the exception of decolonisation, which is an outlier for obvious reasons).
Both times, though, the two sides were at least evenly matched, with the democratic world possibly at somewhat of an advantage, resulting in their eventual victories.
Now however, the outlook of a similar conflict, one along ideological lines, would, at a glance, seem far bleaker for the democratic world, especially if the US keeps sailing its current course.
It might seem unthinkable now that a major global conflict will occur after which autocracies consolidate global power and aid each other to stop revolution. This exact scenario, however, already occurred.
In the early days of the summer of 1815 the great European powers, Sweden and Portugal all signed the Final Act of the two-year congress of Vienna, carving up Europe and, importantly, laying the groundwork for a continental congress that would aid each other in case of revolution.
The concert failed after only a few decades, but just imagine what it would have achieved with 700 million AI-powered facial-recognition cameras and a monopoly on disinformation.
As aforementioned, the third wave of autocratisation shows no signs of slowing down. It is dangerously complacent to assume the past will repeat itself, and democracy will endure. In the history of civilisation, democracy is but a tiny speck at the end, and already many times before has it just barely survived.
A possible coming acceleration
Finally, after arguing that democratic backsliding will likely continue, I’d like to hammer it home by saying it will probably (continue to) accelerate.
Firstly, since the number of autocracies is increasing each year, any international pressure left will likely fade quickly. We can already see a large group of dictatorships starting to work together to undermine international law, while democratic efforts waver. Or, as the Council on Foreign Relations puts it: “The worst countries are far more united in protecting human rights abuses than the democracies are in protecting human rights.”
The extreme right, meanwhile, the main driving force of democratic backsliding in the democratic world (cfr. supra), have in the past decade profited hugely from increased immigration.
The IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace) estimated in 2020 that ‘1.2 billion people could be displaced globally by 2050’ from the direct effects of climate change alone, assuming the rate of natural disasters stays the same as the couple preceding decades (and so does not increase).
Climate change might also have a much more direct impact on democracy. The Sahel, for instance, is being disproportionally hit by climate change, causing widespread droughts, poverty and famine. In recent years, the concept of an African Coup Belt has sprung into existence, comprising almost the entire region, an occurrence at least partially due to the massive instability created by the climate crisis. As the crisis worsens, it seems likely that more civilian governments will be overthrown as a result (once again leading to more refugees).
Moreover, indirect crises are also expected to spring from global warming. It has long been known, for example, that climate change increases the chance of pandemics, such as the one Hungarian president Viktor Orbán used in 2020 to consolidate his grip on power.
For this he used an emergency draft law, the likes of which many other democracies have in their constitution. In the Netherlands, for example, the (by now collapsed) coalition of Geert Wilders’ extreme-right PVV party last year tried to emulate this, by declaring a state of emergency for a so-called asylum crisis, which would have allowed them to circumvent parliament. Though this eventually failed, it is discomforting to imagine what many current leaders would do if given legally-justifiable access to such power, almost certain to sporadically happen over the coming decades, as a(n) (in)direct result of global warming alone.
After justifying the salience of democratic backsliding, I’ll now give my thoughts on Longtermist Political Philosophy: An Agenda for Future Research, insofar as it pertains to this topic.
Institutional longtermism
The essay starts off, not entirely unlike this one, making the case for institutional longtermism to be one of, if not the, most important subsection of the longtermist philosophy. It cites the immense power of the state, such as a de jure monopoly on violence, the massive financial budgets and the ability to regulate and shape society at large.
It is indeed clear to see the worst-case long-term institutional scenario measures up perfectly well with that of AI or global warming. The likelihood of this, I hope you will by now agree, too is such that this field deserves considerable attention.
That it doesn’t receive nearly as much attention as these other issues seems the result of the partisan nature of politics, as well as the intangibility of democratic backsliding.
The writers go on to postulate that the case for institutional longtermism is particularly strong, by overcoming factors that cause scepticism of the movement at large.
Those who aren’t convinced of arguments against demandingness, neglectible individual impact or partiality, can sidestep these issues by focusing on institutions.
Institutional longtermism and political philosophy (as they pertain to authoritarianism)
The main aim of Longtermist Political Philosophy: An Agenda for Future Research is to investigate the relation between institutional longtermism and political philosophy, forming a general (and undecided) conclusion on the convergence and tension between the two.
In this post, I will focus on this possible convergence only as it pertains to authoritarianism (or the lack thereof), concluding the importance and legitimacy of institutional longtermism as it relates to democratic backsliding.
The authors split their distillation up into five parts: Justice, Equality, Freedom, Legitimacy and Democracy. As many of their arguments overlap, I will not (entirely) make this distinction and solely focus on the three arguments most relevant for my purposes. These are:
- The legitimacy of longtermism in politics
- Entitlement to freedom and equality
- The possible upsides of authoritarianism
The legitimacy of longtermism in politics
Oftentimes it seems longtermist policy concerning democracy overlaps policy aimed at current-day issues. The authors often mention ‘positive feedback-loops’ and the ‘stickiness’ of institution types, be it authoritarian or otherwise. These concepts signify that the strengthening or weakening of our current-day institutions, possibly to our own benefit, would have a reverberating impact through next generations, aligning the interests of current-day and future people.
There are, however, exceptions. One could very well argue that the British refusal to surrender after the fall of France in 1940 was against contemporary self-interest. Similarly, the current population of Ukraine has arguably chosen more hardship in their own lives to lessen it for countless future generations.
Less drastic measures for the preservation of democracy, too, might be described as longtermist. Economic sanctions, for example, are often put in place with the knowledge they could only bear fruit many years later.
War and decreased prosperity are the most salient sacrifices to be made against democratic backsliding. When with a longtermist nature, however, the question arises whether elected governments have the legitimacy to pursue these measures.
Through intrinsic theories of democracy, the people should have full say over these matters. The state lends its legitimacy from the (majority of the) electorate and can act only through their will. To pure intrinsicists, the nature of a government’s actions, with electoral backing, is therefore obsolete.
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, would argue the democratic system should not necessarily do what the populace wants, but what is best for them. It is commonly taken for granted though, that this extends beyond the electorate. Just about every democracy has laws protecting children, mentally disabled people and even animals, none of which have representation. It seems, then, politically and societally accepted that governments can legitimately disregard the immediate interests of the electorate to further those of other groups.
It seems worthwhile too, to shortly argue the arbitrariness of not extending this to future people (or animals).
A policymaker’s decision always involves estimations, at least due to the guaranteed absence of any certainty on our ‘knowledge’. The non-identity problem extends not just to the future, but to the state of humanity at large from the experience of any individual at any point.
Add to this the fact that in a universe conditional to its own existence, there both will and will not be any future people, of all natures.
In short, a decision that benefits the current populace and disregards a future one favours the first for the high likelihood (but not certainty) that their state is as in the mind of the decision-maker, and disregards the second for the uncertainty over its state (though it can oft be well estimated on relevant areas).
Entitlement to freedom and equality
The essay distinguishes between three different interpretations of freedom. These are liberal freedom, republican freedom and libertarian freedom. All, though, require (in their purest form) at least an absence of interference in pursuit of all ones options.
As for equality, the authors speak of equality in relations and equality in means. Though, notably, they go on to say some longtermists argue the latter might be unimportant so long as economic growth continues, and thus general welfare rises.
While all of these seem incompatible with authoritarianism, one might argue the imperfections found in an optimal dictatorship (non-totalitarian) could be insignificant enough to disregard an intrinsic plea for democracy. As aforementioned, however, these ‘fair autocracies’ are in themselves insignificant enough, in their numbers and average durations. Added to this, autocracies are becoming increasingly totalitarian across the world, as dictators learn oppressive regimes are more durable.
The essay, too, does go on to state that “many political philosophers believe that we at least owe it to future people not to bring them into existence beneath some threshold of sufficiency or in circumstances where their rights will be violated”.
Considering the nature and likelihood of the worst case scenario tied to long-term democratic backsliding, it seems hard to argue the matter of achieving this owed minimum does not extend to the prevention of long-term totalitarianism, fairly weighed with the short-term cost.
The possible upsides of authoritarianism
It is often theorised (including in Schmidt and Barrett’s essay) authoritarianism might be the best way to overcome global crises, such as climate change.
While it is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to disprove the advantages of authoritarianism against any possible global crisis, the fact remains that authoritarianism in itself is such a crisis, and it seems dangerous to consider it a solution.
Notably, when it comes to preventing current disasters, it’s the democratic world that pulls the fore (so far as anyone does). The EU especially seems to have influence shaping longtermist action with what has been dubbed the Brussels-effect, creating global privacy and food regulations and setting the standard for environmental protection among other things.
A solution
Little seems to be happening in the way of halting democratic backsliding, let alone reversing it. Whilst intuitively it might appear most effective to focus our attention on weak autocracies and fading democracies, I personally dispute this. Democracy now, more than ever, needs a strong foundation, in countries committed to its principles both at home and abroad, ideally supported by an international, trustworthy and media-savvy watchdog-institute.
To this end, I imagine a nonprofit working to spread the word of democratic backsliding and warning electorates of its dangers could certainly be classified as effective altruism. If only the state of democracy were to reach a respectable place in voters’ priorities across the free world, that would at least give us a fighting chance.
Conclusion
(I'll keep this short and sweet)
The state of global democracy is in rapid decline.
Humanity is fast approaching a point of no return, after which totalitarian states will be too powerful to overthrow and democracy will fade into history (or, more likely, be erased from it).
Furthermore, the points of tension between broad institutional longtermism and contemporary political philosophy can be sidestepped by focusing solely on the nature of institutions.
If you made it this far, thank you very much for reading.
