Do nuclear agreements follow a distinct design template compared to other weapon categories? This research tests whether nuclear governance is architecturally distinctive and, if so, whether it can transfer to AI governance—a domain with geographic concentration, state-centric development, and lacking adequate physical inspectability.
Part of Research Sprint: Arms Control & AI Governance, Alva Myrdal Center for Nuclear Disarmament, Uppsala University. By Josephine Schwab, Senior Research Fellow, EIPRHR
This analysis singularly focuses on a single dimension of governance design: trigger mechanisms. The dataset was narrowed from the full AMC collection to agreements meeting these criteria: (1) Time-based: 1963 onwards (excluding non-nuclear precedent frameworks); (2) State-signatories: Russia, USA, and/or China (at least one of the top three nuclear powers must be signatory); (3) Agreement type: bilateral or multilateral (no unilateral agreements); (4) Subject matter: on agreements involving nuclear weapons and non-nuclear CBRN agreements (i.e. chemical and biological weapons). This narrowing was deliberate: understanding how strategic superpowers negotiate trigger mechanisms—and how China's participation differs—provides crucial insight for AI governance, where similar power dynamics and crossover risks (such as catastrophic loss of control scenarios involving CBRN domains) will apply.
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