Note (2022-03-15): For a recent defense of similar axiological views, see my series on minimalist axiologies.
(Crossposted on LessWrong)
Absolute negative utilitarianism (ANU) is a minority view despite the theoretical advantages of terminal value monism (suffering is the only thing that motivates us “by itself”) over pluralism (there are many such things). Notably, ANU doesn’t require solving value incommensurability, because all other values can be instrumentally evaluated by their relationship to the suffering of sentient beings, using only one terminal value-grounded common currency for everything.
Therefore, it is a straw man argument that NUs don’t value life or positive states, because NUs value them instrumentally, which may translate into substantial practical efforts to protect them (compared even with someone who claims to be terminally motivated by them).
If the rationality and EA communities are looking for a unified theory of value, why are they not converging (more) on negative utilitarianism?
What have you read about it that has caused you to stop considering it, or to overlook it from the start?
Can you teach me how to see positive states as terminally (and not just instrumentally) valuable, if I currently don’t? (I still enjoy things, being closer to the extreme of hyperthymia than anhedonia. Am I platonically blind to the intrinsic aspect of positivity?)
And if someone wants to answer: What is the most extreme form of suffering that you’ve experienced and believe can be “outweighed” by positive experiences?