Whose life matters more - a baby's or an adult's?

I recommend The Elephant in the Bednet as an accessible introduction to the different philosophical theories for the badness of death.

This is discussed under the "argument from potential" in ethics. One problem in that argument is if potential matters when babies have it, it seems like it should also matter when other things have it. For instance, a fertilized embryo, a man and woman in a room who could start making a baby, or even a pile of organic matter that, with the help of highly-advanced future technology, could be assembled correctly into a fully-functioning adult ((let's suppose we had such technology now: would we then think piles of organic matter are similarly important as existing people?)). Those things don't seem like they carry the same value as a person.

There's a separate question on whether it's good to make new happy people and add "life years" to the world's total. Even if one thought this was the case, it seems like more of a "morality for global policy" rather than "morality for small-scale decisions." Unless you think individual humans have a duty to have children (assuming enough resources are available to make them reasonably happy), then it seems crazy inconsistent to think the added life years of a surviving baby make up for the total violation of a person's life goals. (Exception: If the adult person doesn't care about their life.) Besides, the view that it's important to bring new people into existence is controversial, even though many EAs believe it. (I wrote a post on population ethics here that discusses more of it. The way I see it, this is a view individuals can have for "What should be our global policy for the future?," but it's not some deep truth of ethics that everyone has to endorse.)

 

This is very sad to think about, but in some contexts, it may also not be the case that "saving the baby leads to greater total lifespan". In places with high childhood mortality, for example, the expected number of life-years gained from saving a relatively young adult might be higher than a baby. This is because some proportion of babies will die from various diseases early in life, whereas young adults who have "made it through" are more likely to die in old age.

I'm not sure how high infant mortality rates would have to be to make a difference though. I believe the major considerations are the philosophical ones Richard mentions.

There is also a great deal of thoughtful analysis on this question on GiveWell's site. For example, a short intro here and a long post about AMF and population ethics here

The short answer is that cognitive "persons" have a stronger interest in their future than merely potential persons. So if we have stronger person-directed reasons (to help individuals advance their interests) than impersonal reasons to generically promote the good (including by bringing new persons into existence), then that explains why we have stronger moral reasons to save cognitive persons than newborns.

For a longer answer, see McMahan's Time-Relative Account of Interests.

Not all utilitarians are hedonists or totalists, which is why you’ll get different answers to the question. Personally, I agree with the reasoning you presented and would save the baby (all things being equal).

Note that although this specific situation rarely arises, there are population ethics questions such as the relative value of 3-month-olds and 5-year-olds that are material when deciding how to give.

GiveWell calls this question “moral weights” and has written about it (for example) in this blog post.

Respectfully, you clearly don’t have a very good understanding of utilitarian ethics. The primary principle is about having the greatest BALANCE of good over bad. Hence, we have to take into consideration a number of factors not just length of life. The mother has developed a personality, has developed consciousness to a much greater extent and understands death , has hopes and dreams and relationships. Obviously, her death, being a rational and developed being has a greater significance. This is the sort of similar to the type of logic we use when making arguments about the value of human vs animal life to draw a parallel. (Obviously babies are not the same as animals, I’m just trying to illustrate what I’m getting at). Second, we have to consider the consequences for others. The mother has relationships, her friends and family, her partner etc. so her death will negatively impact a greater quantity of people more deeply than the baby. Furthermore, her absence in the babies life would also have consequences (single parenthood) Comparatively, the baby’s absence would not be as devastating and the baby is much more replaceable than the mother. Now as for your ‘potential’ argument ; I understand it to an extent, but potential for life is not the same as actual life. It is not convincing enough to justify prioritising the baby over the mother. Surely by that logic, abortions wouldn’t be moral ? anyways, I hope that helps!

My brief opinion:
I believe that prioritizing overall lifespan may not be the most crucial factor to consider. In my view, prioritizing the rescue of an adult holds greater significance, because they have future-oriented interests, a quality that infants lack. Additionally, adults are self-aware and likely have a well-established network of meaningful human connections, including friends and relatives, who would suffer greatly in the event of their loss. In contrast, an infant lacks self-awareness, future-oriented interests, and deep personal relationships.
I do not find the potential argument convincing. It resembles the stance that deems abortion wrong based on the fetus's potential to develop into a fully self-conscious human being, but I think that what actually is (the woman's interests or the actual adult) is so much more important than what could be (the future person).

It depends on whether you take a person-affecting view or totalist view. On the former, the baby isn't a person (and won't be, if you don't save him/her), and so does not and never will have actual preferences in not dying (since that requires fairly sophisticated views of self over time etc). Hence, despite the fact that saving the baby will achieve comparatively more QALYs, there's nothing wrong in saving the mother instead. I think this makes sense, though not everyone accepts PAC (e.g. Richard, who also posted here, and has an excellent philosophy blog worth reading, tends towards a more totalist view in population ethics).

For what it's worth, it's also important to think about the implications that your position here will have on abortion, since any totalist view here has repugnant conclusions there.