Bostrom's definition of existential risk is “an event that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development”.


Existential implies a risk to existence, and does imply an event that threatensthe premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life”, but I don't think it implies an event that threatens “the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development”.

Mitigating an event that threatensthe premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life” (I will call these extinction risks from here on) would be prioritised under most ethical and empirical views.

However, the extent to which we should prioritise mitigating a non-extinction event that threatens “the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development” (I will call these stagnation risks, drawing partially on Bostrom’s classification of x-risks) depends greatly on 1) what is defined as desirable future development and 2) how desirable this desirable future development is. Both of these issues depend on your specific ethical views more than concern for extinction risks does. 

By desirable future development, I think longtermists usually mean achieving ‘technological maturity’, defined by Bostrom as “the attainment of capabilities affording a level of economic productivity and control over nature close to the maximum that could feasibly be achieved”. 

I assume that this is considered desirable because it would allow maximisation of wellbeing for the maximum number of consciousnesses. However, the goal of maximising the number of consciousnesses is only present in non-person affecting total utilitarianism and prioritarianism, and absent in most, if not all, other moral theories. Therefore, prioritising the mitigation of stagnation risks is robust to fewer moral theories than prioritising the mitigation of extinction risks.

Individuals who primarily believe in moral theories other than non-person affecting total utilitarianism and prioritarianism (which presumably includes the vast majority of people) may then consider the case for mitigating stagnation risks to be weaker than the case for mitigating extinction risks. Therefore, lumping extinction and stagnation risks together as "existential" risks may weaken the apparent case for mitigating extinction risks. 

Discussing extinction risks and stagnation risks together as “existential risks” also leads to a focus on the “astronomical waste” argument, since extinction risks and stagnation risks both prevent technological maturity from being achieved. Since technological maturity is an instrumental goal to maximising the number of consciousnesses, which is a terminal goal only desirable under non-person affecting total utilitarianism and prioritarianism, and most people don’t subscribe to these moral theories, use of the term “existential risk” makes the case for mitigating extinction risks less convincing.

 

An alternative, more pluralistic approach in terms of moral theories to the different possible meanings of "desirable future development"  doesn't seem feasible to me, since there is probably too much variety on what "desirable future development" could mean (but I might explore this idea in more detail in a future post).


Instead, I think EAs should separate discussion of extinction and stagnation risks, with a more pluralistic approach in terms of moral theories on why extinction risks might be prioritised, but with clarity and honesty on why longtermists are more concerned about extinction risks than people with other views, and why longtermists are also concerned about stagnation risks.


EDIT:
On further thought, it may be worth dividing out existential risk into extinction risk, collapse risk, flawed realisation risk and plateauing risk, where extinction and collapse risks seem robust to many more moral theories, and plateauing and flawed realisation risks seem robust to far fewer moral theories.

Comments3


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

FWIW I think people are normally more concerned with flawed realisation scenarios than stagnation scenarios. (I'm not sure whether this changes your basic point.)

Thanks for your comment. I don’t think it changes my point, but in that case “stagnation risk” is also a badly named term here.

I’ve added this edit to the post:

“ On further thought, it may be worth dividing out existential risk into extinction risk, collapse risk, flawed realisation risk and plateauing risk, where extinction and collapse risks seem robust to many more moral theories, but plateauing and flawed realisation risks seem robust to far fewer moral theories. “

[comment deleted]2
0
0
Curated and popular this week
LintzA
 ·  · 15m read
 · 
Cross-posted to Lesswrong Introduction Several developments over the past few months should cause you to re-evaluate what you are doing. These include: 1. Updates toward short timelines 2. The Trump presidency 3. The o1 (inference-time compute scaling) paradigm 4. Deepseek 5. Stargate/AI datacenter spending 6. Increased internal deployment 7. Absence of AI x-risk/safety considerations in mainstream AI discourse Taken together, these are enough to render many existing AI governance strategies obsolete (and probably some technical safety strategies too). There's a good chance we're entering crunch time and that should absolutely affect your theory of change and what you plan to work on. In this piece I try to give a quick summary of these developments and think through the broader implications these have for AI safety. At the end of the piece I give some quick initial thoughts on how these developments affect what safety-concerned folks should be prioritizing. These are early days and I expect many of my takes will shift, look forward to discussing in the comments!  Implications of recent developments Updates toward short timelines There’s general agreement that timelines are likely to be far shorter than most expected. Both Sam Altman and Dario Amodei have recently said they expect AGI within the next 3 years. Anecdotally, nearly everyone I know or have heard of who was expecting longer timelines has updated significantly toward short timelines (<5 years). E.g. Ajeya’s median estimate is that 99% of fully-remote jobs will be automatable in roughly 6-8 years, 5+ years earlier than her 2023 estimate. On a quick look, prediction markets seem to have shifted to short timelines (e.g. Metaculus[1] & Manifold appear to have roughly 2030 median timelines to AGI, though haven’t moved dramatically in recent months). We’ve consistently seen performance on benchmarks far exceed what most predicted. Most recently, Epoch was surprised to see OpenAI’s o3 model achi
Dr Kassim
 ·  · 4m read
 · 
Hey everyone, I’ve been going through the EA Introductory Program, and I have to admit some of these ideas make sense, but others leave me with more questions than answers. I’m trying to wrap my head around certain core EA principles, and the more I think about them, the more I wonder: Am I misunderstanding, or are there blind spots in EA’s approach? I’d really love to hear what others think. Maybe you can help me clarify some of my doubts. Or maybe you share the same reservations? Let’s talk. Cause Prioritization. Does It Ignore Political and Social Reality? EA focuses on doing the most good per dollar, which makes sense in theory. But does it hold up when you apply it to real world contexts especially in countries like Uganda? Take malaria prevention. It’s a top EA cause because it’s highly cost effective $5,000 can save a life through bed nets (GiveWell, 2023). But what happens when government corruption or instability disrupts these programs? The Global Fund scandal in Uganda saw $1.6 million in malaria aid mismanaged (Global Fund Audit Report, 2016). If money isn’t reaching the people it’s meant to help, is it really the best use of resources? And what about leadership changes? Policies shift unpredictably here. A national animal welfare initiative I supported lost momentum when political priorities changed. How does EA factor in these uncertainties when prioritizing causes? It feels like EA assumes a stable world where money always achieves the intended impact. But what if that’s not the world we live in? Long termism. A Luxury When the Present Is in Crisis? I get why long termists argue that future people matter. But should we really prioritize them over people suffering today? Long termism tells us that existential risks like AI could wipe out trillions of future lives. But in Uganda, we’re losing lives now—1,500+ die from rabies annually (WHO, 2021), and 41% of children suffer from stunting due to malnutrition (UNICEF, 2022). These are preventable d
Rory Fenton
 ·  · 6m read
 · 
Cross-posted from my blog. Contrary to my carefully crafted brand as a weak nerd, I go to a local CrossFit gym a few times a week. Every year, the gym raises funds for a scholarship for teens from lower-income families to attend their summer camp program. I don’t know how many Crossfit-interested low-income teens there are in my small town, but I’ll guess there are perhaps 2 of them who would benefit from the scholarship. After all, CrossFit is pretty niche, and the town is small. Helping youngsters get swole in the Pacific Northwest is not exactly as cost-effective as preventing malaria in Malawi. But I notice I feel drawn to supporting the scholarship anyway. Every time it pops in my head I think, “My money could fully solve this problem”. The camp only costs a few hundred dollars per kid and if there are just 2 kids who need support, I could give $500 and there would no longer be teenagers in my town who want to go to a CrossFit summer camp but can’t. Thanks to me, the hero, this problem would be entirely solved. 100%. That is not how most nonprofit work feels to me. You are only ever making small dents in important problems I want to work on big problems. Global poverty. Malaria. Everyone not suddenly dying. But if I’m honest, what I really want is to solve those problems. Me, personally, solve them. This is a continued source of frustration and sadness because I absolutely cannot solve those problems. Consider what else my $500 CrossFit scholarship might do: * I want to save lives, and USAID suddenly stops giving $7 billion a year to PEPFAR. So I give $500 to the Rapid Response Fund. My donation solves 0.000001% of the problem and I feel like I have failed. * I want to solve climate change, and getting to net zero will require stopping or removing emissions of 1,500 billion tons of carbon dioxide. I give $500 to a policy nonprofit that reduces emissions, in expectation, by 50 tons. My donation solves 0.000000003% of the problem and I feel like I have f