TL;DR: The explore-exploit tradeoff for causes is impossible if you don't know how far exploration could take you - how good the best causes may be.
Recently, I found out that Centre for Exploratory Altruism Research (CEARCH) estimates, with a high confidence level, that advocacy for top sodium reduction policies is around 100x as cost-effective as top GiveWell charities, in terms of DALYs. This made me feel like a sucker, for having donated to GiveWell.
You see, when I'm donating, I think of myself as buying a product - good for others. The hundreds of dollars I donated to GiveWell could've probably been replaced with a couple of dollars to this more effective cause. That means that I wasted hundreds of dollars, that could've done much more good.
But let's use milk as an analogy. GiveWell is the equivalent of buying a liter of milk for 200$. If that happened with a product I wanted to buy for myself, I would probably feel scammed. A literal lifetime of donations to GiveWell might be replaced with 6 months of donating to this cause. I'm not saying I got scammed, but thinking about it from the perspective of buying good intuitively helps. Nowadays I don't donate to GiveWell anyways, but it sucks.
This - being a sucker who pays too much for doing good - is really bad. It's exactly what we try to avoid in EA. It can decrease our impact by orders of magnitude.
And that's not even the end. CEARCH also estimated (although with a low level of certainty) that nuclear arsenal limitation could be 5000x cost-effective as top GiveWell charities. If they're wrong by an order of magnitude, that's still 5x times better then even the hypertension work. Now donating to GiveWell is like buying a liter of milk for 1000$. And who's to say that there's nothing 50x more effective than the nuclear cause?
At some point, you might consider to stop buying milk for the moment, and looking around for the cheapest prices. And you'll probably not get the cheapest, but you might be able to figure a reasonable estimate of them, and buy at a rate close to it.
So this situation made me think - can we put a reasonable limit to the maximum cost-effectiveness of our money and time? Within a 50% CI? 80 CI? 99% CI... And can we have a reasonable estimate for the time it will be reached?
For someone extremely risk-averse it's probably easy, as there are only so much RCTs in our world. And it's seems likely that GiveWell is within a close range. But for anyone that's risk-neutral, I can't think of a good way. So I've come to ask you wonderful people - what do you think?
The end result I'm thinking of is something like:
"The maximum cost-effectiveness we can expect is 500x-50,000x that of GiveWell (95% CI). The year we expect to find a cause within an order of magnitude of that cost-effectiveness is 2035-2050 (50% CI)".
But of course any input will be interesting.
Things that could potentially limit cost-effectiveness, off the top of my head:
- A weak form of the 'stable market hypothesis' for doing good.
- Hedonic adaptation - people adapt to better circumstances. The amount of good we can induce in anyone's lives is thus limited.
- Caps on the amount of humans & other beings that are likely to ever live.
Note: I'm emotionally content with my past donations to GiveWell, don't worry. Also, this is not a diss on GiveWell, they're doing a great job for their goals.
I think we agree on somewhat more than it seems at first glance. I don't think the current GiveWell top charities are the pinnacle of cost-effectiveness, support further cause exploration and incubating the most promising ideas into charities, and think it's quite possible for EA funders to miss important stuff.
The crux is that I don't think it's warranted to directly compare cost-effectiveness analyses conducted on a few weeks of desktop research, expert interviews and commissioning of surveys and quantitative modelling to evaluations of specific charities at scale and in action, and I think your original post did that with allusions to scamming, GiveWell charities as $1000 liters of milk, and being a sucker.
Although CEARCH is too young to us retrospectively compare its analyses to the cost-effectiveness of launched charities, I think something like drug development is a good analogy. Lots of stuff looks great on paper, in situ, or even in animal models, only to fall apart entirely in the multi-phase human clinical trial process on the way to full approval. Comparing how a drug does in limited animal models to how another drug does in Phase III trials is comparing apples to oranges. Moreover, "risk the model/drug will fall apart in later phases" is distinct from "risk after Phase III trials that the model/drug will not work in a specific country/patient."
To be very clear, this is not a criticism of CEARCH -- as I see it, its job is to screen candidate interventions, not to bring them up to the level of mature, shovel-ready interventions. The next step would be either incubation or a deep dive on a specific target charity already doing this work. I would expect to see a ton of false positives, just as I would expect that from the earliest phases of drug development. It's worth it to find the next ten-figure drug / blockbuster EA intervention.
I think this should make you question your assumptions to some extent. GiveWell has evaluated tons of interventions for a number of years, and made significant grants for a number of them. If CEARCH has come up with 4 causes that are 10X top charities in ~ a year with 2 FTEs, while GiveWell hasn't come up with anything better than 1x in many years with lots more FTEs, what conclusion do we draw from that? I think it more likely that CEARCH is applying more generous assumptions than that GiveWell is badly screwing up its analysis of intervention after intervention. (And no one else, e.g., Founders' Pledge, has been able to come up with clearly better interventions either, at least based on neartermist global health priorities.)
More generous assumptions come with the territory of early-stage CEAs, so I am not suggesting that is problematic given CEARCH's mission. But I think its analysis supports a conclusion of "we should incubate a charity pursuing this intervention," not "we should conclude that our GiveWell donations were very poor value and immediately divert tens of millions of dollars into sodium-reduction policy." In my view, your original post was relatively closer to the later than your reply comment.
As for CE, it estimates that "starting a high-impact charity has the same impact as donating $200,000 to the most effective NGOs every year." That doesn't suggest a belief that a lot of its incubated charities are 10x+ GiveWell and able to absorb significant funding.
GiveWell has shown a willingness to fund policy work out of its All Grants Fund where it thinks the cost-effectiveness is there (cf. $7MM to the Centre for Pesticide Suicide Prevention for general support in January 2021, also for work on alcohol policy). So a general antipathy toward policy/lobbying work doesn't seem to explain what is going on here. Rather, I think there's a fundamental, difficult-to-resolve disagreement about the EV of lobbying/policy work. It's certainly possible that I -- and it seems, most EA funders -- are simply wrong in our estimation on that point. But I don't think referring to the criterion standard non-policy interventions as $1000 liters of milk acknowledges that disagreement and the reasons for it.
I think this is predominately about the donor's values and ethical framework (e.g., the relative value of human vs. animal welfare, the extent to which future lives matter), although there are some strategic elements as well. I'm not aware of any reason to think the people who donate to global health are hostile to lobbying efforts if that is the most effective approach.