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I thought this overview of 2024 from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists might be of interest to people[1]. You can read the full statement (with more detailed data) as a PDF here.

Some quotes:

In 2024, humanity edged ever closer to catastrophe. Trends that have deeply concerned the Science and Security Board continued, and despite unmistakable signs of danger, national leaders and their societies have failed to do what is needed to change course. Consequently, we now move the Doomsday Clock from 90 seconds to 89 seconds to midnight—the closest it has ever been to catastrophe. Our fervent hope is that leaders will recognize the world’s existential predicament and take bold action to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons, climate change, and the potential misuse of biological science and a variety of emerging technologies.

The countries that possess nuclear weapons are increasing the size and role of their arsenals, investing hundreds of billions of dollars in weapons that can destroy civilization. The nuclear arms control process is collapsing, and high-level contacts among nuclear powers are totally inadequate given the danger at hand. Alarmingly, it is no longer unusual for countries without nuclear weapons to consider developing arsenals of their own—actions that would undermine longstanding nonproliferation efforts and increase the ways in which nuclear war could start.

Daunting biological threats

The off-season appearance and in-season continuance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), its spread to farm animals and dairy products, and the occurrence of human cases have combined to create the possibility of a devastating human pandemic. Supposedly high-containment biological laboratories continue to be built throughout the world, but oversight regimes for them are not keeping pace, increasing the possibility that pathogens with pandemic potential may escape. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence have increased the risk that terrorists or countries may attain the capability of designing biological weapons for which countermeasures do not exist.

 

Leaders around the world could reduce the biological threats facing humanity, and thereby move the hands of the Doomsday Clock away from midnight, by:

  • Increasing surveillance of disease in humans, animals, and plants and sharing the results with all nations.
  • Establishing knowledgeable authorities and experts to provide trustworthy up-to-date information about diseases of concern and their movement throughout the world.
  • Increasing the reporting of changing disease patterns as the climate changes and updating preparedness, surveillance, response, recovery, and mitigation plans accordingly and immediately.
  • Slowing the proliferation of high-containment laboratories and establishing norms for the use and acquisition of biological material.
  • Dismantling active biological weapons programs.
  1. ^

    I'm no expert and I haven't fact checked any of this. Let us know if you think anything here is inaccurate or misleading!

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It would be useful if there was a clock / measure / indicator like this, but for AI risk. Seems like a good way to communicate hard-to-grasp existential risks to the general public.

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