All of RobertHarling's Comments + Replies

EA Oxford and Cambridge are looking for new full-time organisers!

We’re looking for motivated, self-driven individuals with excellent communication and interpersonal skills, the ability to manage multiple projects, and think deeply about community strategy. 

  • You’d lead a variety of projects, such as community retreats, large intro fellowships, and career support and mentorship for promising new group members. 
  • These roles are a great way to grow your leadership skills, build a portfolio of well-executed projects, and develop your own understanding o
... (read more)

ERA is hiring for an Ops Manager and multiple AI Techincal and Governance Research Managers - Remote or in Cambridge, Part and Full-time, ideally starting in March, apply by Feb 21.

The Existential Risk Alliance (ERA) is hiring for various roles for our flagship Summer Research Programme. This year, we will have a special focus on AI Safety and AI Governance. With the support of our networks, we will host ~30 ERA fellows, and you could be a part of the team making this happen!

Over the past 3 years, we have supported over 60 early career researchers fro... (read more)

TL;DR: A 'risky' career “failing” to have an impact doesn’t mean your career has “failed” in the conventional sense, and probably isn’t as bad it intuitively feels.

 

  • You can fail to have an impact with your career in many ways. One way to break it down might be:
    • The problem you were trying to address turns out to not be that important
    • Your method for addressing the problem turns out to not work
    • You don’t succeed in executing your plan
  • E.g. you could be aiming to have an impact by reducing the risk of future pandemics, and you do this by aiming to become a
... (read more)

Thanks for this post! I think I have a different intuition that there are important practical ways where longtermism and x-risk views can come apart.  I’m not really thinking about this from an outreach perspective, more from an internal prioritisation view. (Some of these points have been made in other comments also, and the cases I present are probably not as thoroughly argued as they could be).
 

  • Extinction versus Global Catastrophic Risks (GCRs)
    • It seems likely that a short-termist with the high estimates of risks that Scott describes would focu
... (read more)

To the extent that a short-termist framing views going from 80% to 81% population loss as equally as bad as 99% to 100%, it seems plausible to care less about e.g. refuges to evade pandemics. Other approaches like ALLFED and civilisational resilience work might look less effective on the short-termist framing also. Even if you also place some intrinsic weight on preventing extinction, this might not be enough to make these approaches look cost-effective.

ALLFED-type work is likely highly cost effective from the short-term perspective; see global and country... (read more)

Thanks for this interesting analysis! Do you have a link to  Foster's analysis of MindEase's impact?

How do you think the research on MindEase's impact compares to that of GiveWell's top charities? Based on your description of Hildebrandt's analysis for example, it seems less strong than e.g. the several randomized control trials supporting distributing bed nets.  Do you think discounting based on this could substantially effect the cost-effectiveness? (Given how much lower Foster's estimate of impact is though and that this is more heavily used in the overall cost-effectiveness, I would be interested to see whether this has a stronger evidence base?)

5
Brendon_Wong
2y
Hi Robert, Foster's analysis currently isn't publicly available, but more details from Foster's analysis are available in TPP's full report on Mind Ease. To my knowledge, it was not stronger evidence that resulted in a lower efficacy estimate from Foster's research, but skepticism of the longer-term persistence of effects from anxiety reduction methods as well as analyzing the Mind Ease app as it is in the present—not incorporating the potential emergence of stronger evidence of the app's efficacy, as well as future work on the app. As one would expect, Mind Ease plans on providing even stronger efficacy data and further developing its app as time goes on. As mentioned in our writeup, TPP used the lower estimate "because if Mind Ease still looks attractive in this "worst case," then it would definitely look attractive with weights that are less tilted towards Foster’s estimate," rather than skewing based on the strength of a particular estimate.  I think it's quite possible that Mind Ease's expected impact is considerably higher than the example conservative estimate shared in this writeup. Using different framings, such as the Happier Lives Institute's findings regarding the cost-effectiveness of mental health interventions, can also result in much higher estimates of Mind Ease's expected impact compared to GiveWell top charities. I personally haven't spent much time looking over GiveWell's evaluations, but Hauke's full report "avoid[s] looking at individual studies and focus[es] mostly on meta-analyses and systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials." I'd expect that someone's assessment of Mind Ease's impact will generally follow their opinion of how cost effective digital mental health interventions are compared to getting no treatment (Hauke's report mentions that most people suffering from depression and anxiety do not receive timely treatment or any treatment at all, particularly in developing countries).

Thanks for this post Jack, I found it really useful as I haven't got round yet to reading the updated paper. This break down in the cluelessness section was a new arrangement to me. Does anyone know if this break down has been used elsewhere? If not this seems like useful progress in better defining the cluelessness objections to longtermism. 

3
Jack Malde
3y
Thanks Robert. I've never seen this breakdown of cluelessness and it could be a useful way for further research to define the issue. The Global Priorities Institute raised the modelling of cluelessness in their research agenda and I'm looking forward to further work on this. If interested, see below for the two research questions related to cluelessness in the GPI research agenda. I have a feeling that there is still quite a bit of research that could be conducted in this area. ------------------ Forecasting the long-term effects of our actions often requires us to make difficult comparisons between complex and messy bodies of competing evidence, a situation Greaves (2016) calls “complex cluelessness”. We must also reckon with our own incomplete awareness, that is, the likelihood that the long-run future will be shaped by events we’ve never considered and perhaps can’t fully imagine. What is the appropriate response to this sort of epistemic situation? For instance, does rationality require us to adopt precise subjective probabilities concerning the very-long-run effects of our actions, imprecise probabilities (and if so, how imprecise?), or some other sort of doxastic state entirely? Faced with the task of comparing actions in terms of expected value, it often seems that the agent is ‘clueless’: that is, that the available empirical and theoretical evidence simply supplies too thin a basis for guiding decisions in any principled way (Lenman 2000; Greaves 2016; Mogensen 2020) (INFORMAL: Tomasik 2013; Askell 2018). How is this situation best modelled, and what is the rational way of making decisions when in this predicament? Does cluelessness systematically favour some types of action over others?

Thanks very much for your post! I think this a really interesting idea and it's really useful to learn from your experience in this area. 

What would you think of the concern that these types of ads would be a "low fidelity" way of spreading EA that could risk misinforming people about EA?   I think from my experience community building, it's really useful to be able to describe and discuss EA ideas in detail, and that there are risks to giving someone an incorrect view of EA. These risks include someone being critical of what they believe EA is, ... (read more)

Thanks so much for your thoughts Robert!
 

"What would you think of the concern that these types of ads would be a "low fidelity" way of spreading EA that could risk misinforming people about EA?   I think from my experience community building, it's really useful to be able to describe and discuss EA ideas in detail, and that there are risks to giving someone an incorrect view of EA. These risks include someone being critical of what they believe EA is, and spreading this critique, as well as discouraging them from getting involved when they may ha... (read more)

I think I would have some worry that if external evaluations of individual grant recipients became common, this could discourage people from applying from grants in future, for fear of being negatively judged should the project not work out. 

Potential grant recipients might worry that external evaluators may not have all the information about their project or the grant makers reasoning for awarding the grant. This lack of information could then lead to unfair or incorrect evaluations. This would be more a risk if it becomes common for people to write ... (read more)

Thanks for sharing this paper, I had not heard of it before and it sounds really interesting.

Thanks for your comment Jack, that's a really great point. I suppose that we would seek to influence AI slightly differently for each reason:

  1. Reduce chance of unaligned/uncontrolled AI
  2. Increase chance of useful AI
  3. Increase chance of exactly aligned AI

e.g. you could reduce the chance of AI risk by stopping all AI development but then lose the other two benefits, or you could create a practically useful AI but not one that would guide humanity towards an optimal future. That being said I reckon in practice a lot of work to improve the development of AI would hit all 3. Though maybe if you view one reason as much more important than the others then you focus on a specific type of AI work.

2
Jack Malde
3y
That makes sense. I'm no expert in AI but I would think: * Stopping AI development just isn't going to happen.  * Making useful AI isn't very neglected and progress here has certainly been quite impressive, so I'm optimistic for superintelligence at some point. * There probably isn't much (if any) difference between the work that is required to  make aligned AI and to make maximally-aligned AI. Would be interesting to know if anyone thinks I'm wrong on any one of these points.

Thank you very much for this post, I found it very interesting. I remember reading the original paper and feeling a bit confused by it. It's not too fresh in my mind so I don't feel too able to try to defend it. I appreciate you highlighting how the method they use to estimate f_l is unique and drives their main result.

A range of 0.01 to 1 for fl in your preferred model seems surprisingly high to me, though I don't understand the Lineweaver Davis paper well enough to really comment on its result which I think your range is based on.  I think they ment... (read more)

Thanks for your comment athowes. I appreciate your point that I could have done more in the post to justify this "binary" of good and optimal. 

Though the simulated minds scenario I described seems at first to be pretty much optimal, it could be much larger if you thought it would last for many more years. Given large enough uncertainty about future technology, maybe seeking to identify the optimal future is impossible.

I think your resources, value and efficiency model is really interesting. My intuition is that values is the limiting factor. I can bel... (read more)

Thanks again for creating this post Neel. I can confirm I managed to write and publish my post in time! 

I think without commiting to writing it here, my post would either have been made a few months later, or perhaps not been published at all.

Thanks for your comment!

I hadn't thought to think about selection effects, thanks for pointing that out. I suppose Bostrom actually describes black balls as technologies that cause catastrophe but doesn't set the bar as high as extinction. Then drawing a black ball doesn't affect future populations drastically, so perhaps selection effects don't apply?

Also, I think in The Precipice Toby Ord makes some inferences for natural extinction risk given the length of time humanity has existed for? Though I may not be remembering correctly. I think the logic was so... (read more)

Commitment: I commit to writing a post on a vague idea about where most of the value of the long term future is and how sensitive it is to different values by 7pm on 11th December.

Thanks for suggesting this Neel!

3
RobertHarling
3y
Thanks again for creating this post Neel. I can confirm I managed to write and publish my post in time!  I think without commiting to writing it here, my post would either have been made a few months later, or perhaps not been published at all.

Thanks for this post Akash, I found it really interesting to read. I definitely agree with your point about how friendly EAs can be when you reach out to them. I think this is something I've been aware of for a while, but it still takes me time to internalise and make myself more willing to reach out to people. But it's definitely something I want to push myself to do more, and encourage other people to do. No one is  going to be unhappy about someone showing an interest in their work and ideas!

This is a really interesting idea. I think I instinctively have a couple of concerns about such an idea

1) What is the benefit of such statements? Can we expect the opinion of the EA community to really carry much weight beyond relatively niche areas?

2) Can the EA community be sufficiently well defined to collect opinion? It is quite hard to work out who identifies as an EA, not least because some people are unsure themselves. I would worry any attempt to define the EA community too strictly (such as when surveying the community's opinion) could come across as exclusionary and discourage some people from getting involved.

Thanks for your response!

I definitely see your point on the value of information to the future civilisation. The technology required to reach the moon and find the cache is likely quite different to the level required to resurrect humanity from the cache so the information could still be very valuable.

An interesting consideration may be how we value a planet being under human control vs control of this new civilisation. We may think we cannot assume that the new civilisation would be doing valuable things but that a human planet would be quite valuable. ... (read more)

1
avturchin
4y
If they evolve, say, from cats, they will share the same type-values: power, sex, love to children as all mammals. By token-values will be different as they will like not human children but kittens etc. An advance non-human civilization may be more similar to ours than we-now to Ancient Egyptian, as it would have more rational world models.

Ah yes! Thanks for pointing that out!

Thanks for your comment, I found that paper really interesting and it was definitely an idea I'd not considered before.

My main two questions would be:

1) What is the main value of humanity being resurrected? - We could inherently value the preservation of humanity and it's culture. However, my intuition would be that humanity would be resurrected in small numbers and these humans might not even have very pleasant lives if they're being analysed or experimented on. Furthermore the resurrected humans are likely to have very little agency, being... (read more)

1
avturchin
4y
The article may reflect my immoralist view point that in almost all circumstances it is better to be alive than not. Future torture is useless and thus unlikely. Let's look on humanity: as we mature, we tend to care more about other species that lived on Earth and of minority cultures. Torture for fun or for experiment is only for those who don't know how to get information or pleasure in other ways. It is unlikely that advance civilization will deliberately torture humans. Even if resurrected humans will not have full agency, they may have much better live than most people on Earth have now. Reconstruction of the past is universally interesting. We have a mammoth resurrection project, a lot of archeological studies, Sentinel uncontacted tribe preservation program, etc - so we find a lot of value in studying past, preserving and reconstructing it, and I think it is natural for advanced civilizations. The x-risks information will be vital for them before they get superintelligence (but humans could be resurrected after it). Imagine that Apollo program would find some data storage on the Moon: it will be one of the biggest scientific discoveries of all times. Some information could be useful for end-of-20th-century humanity, like estimation of the probability of natural pandemics or nuclear wars. Past data is useful. Future civilization on Earth will get a lot of scientific data from other fields of knowledge: biology, geology, even some math problems may be solved by us which they still not solved. Moreover, they will get access to enormous amount of art, which may have fun value (or not). The resurrection (on good conditions) here is a part of an acasual deal from our side, similar to Parfit's hitchhiker. They may not take their side of the deal, so there is a risk. Or they may do it much later, after they advance to interstellar civilization and will know that there is a minimal risk and cost for them. For example, if they give 0.0001 of all their resources to

Thanks for your comment. "Caring about more" is quite a vague way of describing what I wanted to say. I think I was just trying to say that the risk of a true existential event from A is about 7 times greater than the risk from B (as 0.7/0.095 =~ 7.368) so it would be 7 times not 70 times?

1
Prabhat Soni
4y
Oh sorry, I must've misread! So the issue seems to be with the number 0.095%. The chance of a true existential event in B) would be 0.01% * 95% = 0.0095% (and not 0.095%). And, this leads us to 0.7/0.0095 =~ 73.68

Considering evolutionary timelines is definitely very hard because it's such a chaotic process. I don't have too much knowledge about evolutionary history and am hoping to research this more. I think after most human existential events, the complexity of the life that remains would be much greater than that for most of the history of the Earth. So although it took humans 4.6 billion years to evolve "from scratch", it could take significantly less time for intelligent life to re-evolve after an existential event as a lot of the hard evol... (read more)

I believe it is the probability that a nuclear war occurs AND leads to human extinction, as described in The Precipice. I think I would agree that if it was the just the probability of nuclear war, this would be too low, and a large reason the number is small is because of the difficulty for a nuclear war to cause human extinction.

Thanks for the elaboration. I haven't given much consideration to "desired dystopias" before and they are really interesting to consider.

Another dystopian scenario to consider could be one in which humanity "strands" itself on Earth through resource depletion. This could also prevent future life from achieving a grand future.

2
MichaelA
4y
I think that’d indeed probably prevent evolution of other intelligent life on Earth, or prevent it achieving a grand future. But at first glance, this looks to me like a “premature extinction” scenario, rather than a clear-cut “dystopia”. This is because humanity would still be wiped out (when the Earth becomes uninhabitable) earlier than the point at which extinction is inevitable no matter what we do (perhaps this point would be the heat death of the universe). But I’d also see it as fair enough if someone wanted to call that scenario more a “dystopia” than a standard “extinction event”. And I don’t think much turns on which label we choose, as long as we all know what we mean. (By the way, I take the term “desired dystopia” from The Precipice.)

That makes a lot of sense. If the probability of intelligent life re-evolving is low, or if the probability of it doing morally valuable things is low then this reduces the importance of considering the effect on other species.

Hi Michael, thanks for this comment!

This is a really good point and something I was briefly aware of when writing but did not take the time to consider fully. I've definitely conflated extinction risk with existential risk. I hope that when restricting everything I said just to extinction risk, the conclusion still holds.

A scenario where humanity establishes it's own dystopia definitely seems comparable to the misaligned AGI scenario. Any "locked-in" totalitarian regime would probably prevent the evolution of other intelligent life. This could cause us to increase the risk posed by such dystopian scenarios and weigh these risks more highly.

2
MichaelA
4y
I think the core points in your article work in relation to both extinction risk and existential risk. This is partly because extinction is one of the main types of existential catastrophe, and partly because some other existential catastrophes still theoretically allow for future evolution of intelligent life (just as some extinction scenarios would). So this doesn't undercut your post - I just wanted to raise the distinction as I think it's valuable to have in mind. This seems plausible. But it also seems plausible there could be future evolution of other intelligent life in a scenario where humanity sticks around. One reason is that these non-extinction lock-ins don't have to look like jack-booted horrible power-hungry totalitarians. It could be idyllic in many senses, or at least as far as the humans involved perceive it, and yet irreversibly prevent us achieving anything close to the best future possible. For a random, very speculative example, I wouldn't be insanely shocked if humanity ends up deciding that allowing nature to run its course is extremely valuable, so we lock-in some sort of situation of us being caretakers and causing minimal disruption, with this preventing us from ever expanding through the stars but allowing for whatever evolution might happen on Earth. This could perhaps be a "desired dystopia" (if we could otherwise have done something far better), even if all the humans involved are happy and stay around for a very very long time.

Thanks for your comment Matthew. This is definitely an interesting effect which I had not considered. I wonder whether though the absolute AI risk may increase, it would not affect our actions as we would have no way to affect the development of AI by future intelligent life as we would be extinct. The only way I could think of to affect the risk of AI from future life would be to create an aligned AGI ourselves before humanity goes extinct!

Hi Michael, thank you very much for your comment.

I was not aware of some of these posts and will definitely look into them, thanks for sharing! I also eagerly await a compilation of crucial questions for longtermists which sounds very interesting and useful.

I definitely agree that I have not given consideration to what moral views re-evolved life would have. This is definitely a big question. One assumption I may have implicitly used but not discussed is that

"While the probability of intelligent life re-evolving may be somewhat soluble and differ b... (read more)

2
MichaelA
4y
Glad the "crucial questions for longtermists" series sounds useful! We should hopefully publish the first post this month. This seems a reasonable assumption. And I think it would indeed mean that it's not worth paying much attention to differences between existential risks in how aligned with humanity any later intelligent life would be. But I was responding to claims from your original post like this: I do think that that is true, but I think how big that factor is might be decreased by possibility that a future influenced by (existentially secure) independently evolved intelligent life would be "less valuable" than a future influenced by (existentially secure) humans. For example, if Alice thinks that those independently evolving lifeforms would do things 100% as valuable as what humans would do, but Bob thinks they'd do things only 10% as valuable, Alice and Bob will differ on how much worse it is to wipe out all possible future intelligent life vs "just" wiping out humanity. And in the extreme, someone could even think that intelligent life would do completely valueless things, or things we would/should actively disvalue. (To be clear, I don't think that this undercuts your post, but I think it can influence precisely how important the consideration you raise is.)

Thanks for your comment! I'm very interested to hear about a modelling approach. I'll look at your model and will probably have questions in the near-future!

Hi, thanks for your questions!

(1) I definitely agree with P1. For P2, would it not be the case that the risk of extinction of humans is strictly greater than the the risk of extinction of humans and future possible intelligent life as the latter is a conjuction of the former? Perhaps a second premise could instead be

P2 The best approaches for reducing human existential risk are not necessarily the best approaches for reducing existential risk to humans and all future possible intelligent life

With a conclusion

C We should focus on the best methods of preve... (read more)

Hi Carl,

Thank you very much for your comment! I agree with your comment on the human extinction risks that 99% is probably not high enough to cause extinction. I think I wanted to provide examples of human extinction event, but should have been more careful on the exact values and situations I described.

On re-evolution after an asteroid impact, my understanding is that although species such as humans eventually evolved after the impact, had humanity existed at the time of the impact it would not have survived as nearly all land mammals over 25kg went ext... (read more)