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tlevin

AI Governance Program Associate @ Open Philanthropy
1908 karmaJoined Working (0-5 years)

Bio

(Posting in a personal capacity unless stated otherwise.) I help allocate Open Phil's resources to improve the governance of AI with a focus on avoiding catastrophic outcomes. Formerly co-founder of the Cambridge Boston Alignment Initiative, which supports AI alignment/safety research and outreach programs at Harvard, MIT, and beyond, co-president of Harvard EA, Director of Governance Programs at the Harvard AI Safety Team and MIT AI Alignment, and occasional AI governance researcher. I'm also a proud GWWC pledger and vegan.

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Thanks, glad to hear it's helpful!

  • Re: more examples, I co-sign all of my teammates' AI examples here -- they're basically what I would've said. I'd probably add Tarbell as well.
  • Re: my personal donations, I'm saving for a bigger donation later; I encounter enough examples of very good stuff that Open Phil and other funders can't fund, or can't fund quickly enough, that I think there are good odds that I'll be able to make a really impactful five-figure donation over the next few years. If I were giving this year, I probably would've gone the route of political campaigns/PACs.
  • Re: sub-areas, there are some forms of policy advocacy and moral patienthood research for which small-to-medium-size donors could be very helpful. I don't have specific opportunities in mind that I feel like I can make a convincing public pitch for, but people can reach out if they're interested.

I hope to eventually/maybe soon write a longer post about this, but I feel pretty strongly that people underrate specialization at the personal level, even as there are lots of benefits to pluralization at the movement level and large-funder level. There are just really high returns to being at the frontier of a field. You can be epistemically modest about what cause or particular opportunity is the best, not burn bridges, etc, while still "making your bet" and specializing; in the limit, it seems really unlikely that e.g. having two 20 hr/wk jobs in different causes is a better path to impact than a single 40 hr/wk job.

I think this applies to individual donations as well; if you work in a field, you are a much better judge of giving opportunities in that field than if you don't, and you're more likely to come across such opportunities in the first place. I think this is a chronically underrated argument when it comes to allocating personal donations.

tlevin
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Thanks for running this survey. I find these results extremely implausibly bearish on public policy -- I do not think we should be even close to indifferent between improving the AI policy of the country that can make binding rules on all of the leading labs plus many key hardware inputs and has a $6 trillion budget and the most powerful military on earth by 5% and having $8.1 million more dollars for a good grantmaker, or having 32.5 "good video explainers," or having 13 technical AI academics. I'm biased, of course, but IMO the surveyed population is massively overrating the importance of the alignment community relative to the US government.

Fwiw, I think the main thing getting missed in this discourse is that even 3 out of your 50 speakers (especially if they're near the top of the bill) are mostly known for a cluster of edgy views that are not welcome in most similar spaces, people who really want to gather to discuss those edgy and typically unwelcome views will be a seriously disproportionate share of attendees, and this will have significant repercussions for the experience of the attendees who were primarily interested in the other 47 speakers.

I recommend the China sections of this recent CNAS report as a starting point for discussion (it's definitely from a relatively hawkish perspective, and I don't think of myself as having enough expertise to endorse it, but I did move in this direction after reading). 

From the executive summary:

Taken together, perhaps the most underappreciated feature of emerging catastrophic AI risks from this exploration is the outsized likelihood of AI catastrophes originating from China. There, a combination of the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to accelerate AI development, its track record of authoritarian crisis mismanagement, and its censorship of information on accidents all make catastrophic risks related to AI more acute.

From the "Deficient Safety Cultures" section:

While such an analysis is of relevance in a range of industry- and application-specific cultures, China’s AI sector is particularly worthy of attention and uniquely predisposed to exacerbate catastrophic AI risks [footnote]. China’s funding incentives around scientific and technological advancement generally lend themselves to risky approaches to new technologies, and AI leaders in China have long prided themselves on their government’s large appetite for risk—even if there are more recent signs of some budding AI safety consciousness in the country [footnote, footnote, footnote]. China’s society is the most optimistic in the world on the benefits and risks of AI technology, according to a 2022 survey by the multinational market research firm Institut Public de Sondage d’Opinion Secteur (Ipsos), despite the nation’s history of grisly industrial accidents and mismanaged crises—not least its handling of COVID-19 [footnote, footnote, footnote, footnote]. The government’s sprint to lead the world in AI by 2030 has unnerving resonances with prior grand, government-led attempts to accelerate industries that have ended in tragedy, as in the Great Leap Forward, the commercial satellite launch industry, and a variety of Belt and Road infrastructure projects [footnote, footnote, footnote]. China’s recent track record in other hightech sectors, including space and biotech, also suggests a much greater likelihood of catastrophic outcomes [footnote, footnote, footnote, footnote, footnote].

From "Further Considerations"

In addition to having to grapple with all the same safety challenges that other AI ecosystems must address, China’s broader tech culture is prone to crisis due to its government’s chronic mismanagement of disasters, censorship of information on accidents, and heavy-handed efforts to force technological breakthroughs. In AI, these dynamics are even more pronounced, buoyed by remarkably optimistic public perceptions of the technology and Beijing’s gigantic strategic gamble on boosting its AI sector to international preeminence. And while both the United States and China must reckon with the safety challenges that emerge from interstate technology competitions, historically, nations that perceive themselves to be slightly behind competitors are willing to absorb the greatest risks to catch up in tech races [footnote]. Thus, even while the United States’ AI edge over China may be a strategic advantage, Beijing’s self-perceived disadvantage could nonetheless exacerbate the overall risks of an AI catastrophe.

It seems like you might be under-weighing the cumulative amount of resources - even if you have some pretty heavy decay rate (which it's unclear you should -- usually we think of philanthropic investments compounding over time), avoiding nuclear war was a top global priority for decades, and it feels like we have a lot of intellectual and policy "legacy infrastructure" from that.

Yeah, this is all pretty compelling, thanks!

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I think some of the AI safety policy community has over-indexed on the visual model of the "Overton Window" and under-indexed on alternatives like the "ratchet effect," "poisoning the well," "clown attacks," and other models where proposing radical changes can make you, your allies, and your ideas look unreasonable.

I'm not familiar with a lot of systematic empirical evidence on either side, but it seems to me like the more effective actors in the DC establishment overall are much more in the habit of looking for small wins that are both good in themselves and shrink the size of the ask for their ideal policy than of pushing for their ideal vision and then making concessions. Possibly an ideal ecosystem has both strategies, but it seems possible that at least some versions of "Overton Window-moving" strategies executed in practice have larger negative effects via associating their "side" with unreasonable-sounding ideas in the minds of very bandwidth-constrained policymakers, who strongly lean on signals of credibility and consensus when quickly evaluating policy options, than the positive effects of increasing the odds of ideal policy and improving the framing for non-ideal but pretty good policies.

In theory, the Overton Window model is just a description of what ideas are taken seriously, so it can indeed accommodate backfire effects where you argue for an idea "outside the window" and this actually makes the window narrower. But I think the visual imagery of "windows" actually struggles to accommodate this -- when was the last time you tried to open a window and accidentally closed it instead? -- and as a result, people who rely on this model are more likely to underrate these kinds of consequences.

Would be interested in empirical evidence on this question (ideally actual studies from psych, political science, sociology, econ, etc literatures, rather than specific case studies due to reference class tennis type issues).

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