Bio

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I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).

How others can help me

I am open to volunteering and paid work (I usually ask for 20 $/h). I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).

How I can help others

I can help with career advice, prioritisation, and quantitative analyses.

Comments
2971

Topic contributions
40

Thanks for the helpful clarifications, Melanie. They made sense to me.

Hi Buck. True. I still think the survey underestimates the variance in median AI timelines. Below are the results for the 2023 Expert Survey on Progress in AI (ESPAI). Half of the responses for the median date of full automation of tasks or occupations range from around 2045 to some date after 2120. In the survery of the post, half of the responses for the median date of AGI range from around 2032 to 2037. For the 25th percentile date of full automation, half of ESPAI's responses range from around 2030 to 2100. In the survey of the post, half of the responses for the 25th percentile date of AGI range from around 2028 to 2032. AGI in the survey of the post does not have the exact same meaning as full automation of taks or occupations, but I am pretty confident my broad point stands if I am reading the graph below correctly.

CDF of ESPAI survey showing median and central 50% of expert responses.

What is your probability of human extinction in the 10 years following the achievement of artificial superintelligence (ASI) as defined by AI Futures?

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Hi Michael.

(Or: Why I don't see how the probability of extinction could be less than 25% on the current trajectory)

Lesss than 25 % from now until when?

Thanks for the comment, titotal. I agree the survey underestimates the variance in AI timelines and risk.

The AI Futures, which is know for AI 2027, had super broad timelines for artificial superintelligence (ASI) timelines on January 26. The difference between the 90th and 10th percentile was 168 years for Daniel Kokotajlo (2027 to 2195), and 137 years for Eli Lifland (2028 to 2165).

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There is also huge variation in assessment of AI extinction risk. In the Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament (XPT), among domain experts and superforecasters, the 5th and 95th percentile AI extinction risk from 2023 to 2100 were 9.45*10^-7 and 37.0 % (excluding the 7 people who guessed a risk of exactly 0; here are the results).

No, I am not confident that biofuel subsidies decrease the population of invertebrates.

This makes sense to me, but I am not sure I fully understand why you describe biofuel subsidies as "quite appealing" for people who are "sufficiently suffering-focused". Maybe you believe that soil microarthropods are the most important to determine the expected change in welfare? In this case, I would agree that biofuel subsidies would be quite appealing because they seem to robustly decrease the population of microarthropods. However, I can easily see the welfare of soil macroarthropods or nematodes being much larger than that of soil microarthropods, and there is significant uncertainty about whether biofuel subsidies increase or decrease the population of soil macroarthropods/nematodes.

These are shallow investigations and I expect that additional research would change our minds about many of the conclusions that people reached.

This is why I like the intervention "Insecticides and insect welfare: a research agenda". It is explicitly about doing further research.

Thanks for the useful context, Bob. Is there any grant round on soil animals that you would be willing to run for less than 100 k$? It does not have to be about investigating sentience, or comparing the welfare of soil animals with that of humans, and it could be about soil ants or termites.

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