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I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).

How others can help me

I am open to volunteering and paid work (I usually ask for 20 $/h). I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).

How I can help others

I can help with career advice, prioritisation, and quantitative analyses.

Comments
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Topic contributions
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Hi Buck. True. I still think the survey underestimates the variance in median AI timelines. Below are the results for the 2023 Expert Survey on Progress in AI (ESPAI). Half of the responses for the median date of full automation of tasks or occupations range from around 2045 to some date after 2120. In the survery of the post, half of the responses for the median date of AGI range from around 2032 to 2037. For the 25th percentile date of full automation, half of ESPAI's responses range from around 2030 to 2100. In the survey of the post, half of the responses for the 25th percentile date of AGI range from around 2028 to 2032. AGI in the survey of the post does not have the exact same meaning as full automation of taks or occupations, but I am pretty confident my broad point stands if I am reading the graph below correctly.

CDF of ESPAI survey showing median and central 50% of expert responses.

What is your probability of human extinction in the 10 years following the achievement of artificial superintelligence (ASI) as defined by AI Futures?

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Hi Michael.

(Or: Why I don't see how the probability of extinction could be less than 25% on the current trajectory)

Lesss than 25 % from now until when?

Thanks for the comment, titotal. I agree the survey underestimates the variance in AI timelines and risk.

The AI Futures, which is know for AI 2027, had super broad timelines for artificial superintelligence (ASI) timelines on January 26. The difference between the 90th and 10th percentile was 168 years for Daniel Kokotajlo (2027 to 2195), and 137 years for Eli Lifland (2028 to 2165).

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There is also huge variation in assessment of AI extinction risk. In the Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament (XPT), among domain experts and superforecasters, the 5th and 95th percentile AI extinction risk from 2023 to 2100 were 9.45*10^-7 and 37.0 % (excluding the 7 people who guessed a risk of exactly 0; here are the results).

No, I am not confident that biofuel subsidies decrease the population of invertebrates.

This makes sense to me, but I am not sure I fully understand why you describe biofuel subsidies as "quite appealing" for people who are "sufficiently suffering-focused". Maybe you believe that soil microarthropods are the most important to determine the expected change in welfare? In this case, I would agree that biofuel subsidies would be quite appealing because they seem to robustly decrease the population of microarthropods. However, I can easily see the welfare of soil macroarthropods or nematodes being much larger than that of soil microarthropods, and there is significant uncertainty about whether biofuel subsidies increase or decrease the population of soil macroarthropods/nematodes.

These are shallow investigations and I expect that additional research would change our minds about many of the conclusions that people reached.

This is why I like the intervention "Insecticides and insect welfare: a research agenda". It is explicitly about doing further research.

Thanks for the useful context, Bob. Is there any grant round on soil animals that you would be willing to run for less than 100 k$? It does not have to be about investigating sentience, or comparing the welfare of soil animals with that of humans, and it could be about soil ants or termites.

By "robustly increase welfare", I meant that welfare is expected to increase (under expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU); ignoring moral uncertainty), and this conclusion is not sensitive to close to arbitrary empirical assumptions (for example, whether invertebrates of some species have positive or negative lives). You do not think intervention 14 satisfies this?

Are you confident that biofuel subsidies decrease the population of invertebrates? From Table 1 of the report, accounting only for invertebrates with at least "2mm" (macrofauna), corn with 357 animals per m^2 (= 126 + 231) replaces grassland with 970 animals per m^2 (= 441 + 529), thus leading to 613 fewer animals per m^2 corn (= 970 - 357). However, from Table S4 of Rosenberg et al. (2023) (in the Supplementary Materials), replacing temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands with crops results in 598 more soil ants, termites, and other soil arthropods besides springtails and mites (macroarthropods) per m^2 (= (-1.06 + 1.66)*10^3 + 0.533). The change in the number of animals per m^2 is -1.06 k for soil ants, 1.66 k for soil termites, and 0.533 for soil arthropods besides springtails and mites. Adding up the lower/upper bounds of the 95 % confidence intervals (CIs) in Table S4, I conclude there are 900 to 6.4 k macroarthropods per m^2 in crops, and 172 to 7.00 k in temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands. There is significant overlap between these ranges. So it is unclear to me whether replacing temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands with crops increases or decreases the number of macroarthropods. The same goes for replacing grassland with crops in the United States (US)?

I also think it is worth looking into the effects of increasing cropland on the number of microarthropods and nematodes. I have see macroarthropods, microarthropods, nematodes, or any combination of these being the major driver of total welfare.

Replacing temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands with crops robustly decreases the number of soil springtails and mites (microarthropods) according to Table S4 of Rosenberg et al. (2023). Adding up the lower/upper bounds of the 95 % CIs, there are 11 k to 37 k soil microarthropods per m^2 in crops, and 70 k to 170 k in temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands. There is no overlap between these ranges.

However, I believe replacing crops with grassland may increase or decrease the number of soil animals accounting for all animals. The vast majority of soil animals are nematodes, and I am very uncertain about whether replacing crops with grassland increases or decreases the number of soil nematodes.

From Figure 1a of Li et al. (2022), which is below, it is unclear whether cropland has more or fewer soil nematodes than "primary habitat (undisturbed natural habitat)", or "secondary habitat (recovering, previously disturbed natural habitat)". For example, secondary habitat which is "unmanaged (no documented or observed direct human disturbance)" is estimated to have fewer soil nematodes than cropland and pasture which are unmanaged or "managed (more or less disturbed by various human activities like fertilization, tillage, grazing, logging, etc.)".

Figure 7 of the meta-analysis of Pothula et al. (2019), which is below, suggests it is very unclear whether agricultural land has more or fewer soil nematodes than natural or disturbed grassland, or forest.

White (2022) concludes "nematode abundance is higher in managed than unmanaged primary and secondary habitats", which is compatible with crops having more nematodes than grassland.

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