Longtermism is defined as holding that "what most matters about our actions is their very long term effects". What does this mean, formally? Below I set up a model of a social planner maximizing social welfare over all generations. With this model, we can give a precise definition of longtermism.
A model of a longtermist social planner
Consider an infinitely-lived representative agent with population size . In each period there is a risk of extinction via an extinction rate .
The basic idea is that economic growth is a double-edged sword: it increases our wealth, but also increases the risk of extinction. In particular, 'consumption research' develops new technologies , and these technologies increase both consumption and extinction risk.
Here are the production functions for consumption and consumption technologies:
However, we can also develop safety technologies to reduce extinction risk. Safety research produces new safety technologies , which are used to produce 'safety goods' .
Specifically,
The extinction rate is , where the number of consumption technologies directly increases risk, and the number of safety goods directly reduces it.
Let .
Now we can set up the social planner problem: choose the number of scientists (vs workers), the number of safety scientists (vs consumption scientists), and the number of safety workers (vs consumption workers) to maximize social welfare. That is, the planner is choosing an allocation of workers for all generations:
The social welfare function is:
The planner maximizes utility over all generations (), weighting by population size , and accounting for extinction risk via . The optimal allocation is the allocation that maximizes social welfare.
The planner discounts using (the Ramsey equation), where we have the discount rate , the exogenous extinction risk , risk-aversion (i.e., diminishing marginal utility), and the growth rate . (Note that could be time-varying.)
Here there is no pure time preference; the planner values all generations equally. Weighting by population size means that this is a total utilitarian planner.
Defining longtermism
With the model set up, now we can define longtermism formally. Recall the informal definition that "what most matters about our actions is their very long term effects". Here are two ways that I think longtermism can be formalized in the model:
(1) The optimal allocation in our generation, , should be focused on safety work: the majority (or at least a sizeable fraction) of workers should be in safety research of production, and only a minority in consumption research or production. (Or, for small values of (say ) to capture that the next few generations need to work on safety.) This is saying that our time has high hingeyness due to existential risks. It's also saying that safety work is currently uncrowded and tractable.
(2) Small deviations from (the optimal allocation in our generation) will produce large decreases in total social welfare , driven by generations (or some large number). In other words, our actions today have very large effects on the long-term future. We could plot against for and some suboptimal alternative , and show that is much smaller than in the tail.
While longtermism has an intuitive foundation (being intergenerationally neutral or having zero pure time preference), the commonly-used definition makes strong assumptions about tractability and hingeyness.
Further thoughts
This model focuses on extinction risk; another approach would look at trajectory changes.
Also, it might be interesting to incorporate Phil Trammell's work on optimal timing/giving-now vs giving-later. Eg, maybe the optimal solution involves the planner saving resources to be invested in safety work in the future.
I haven't read most of GPI's stuff on defining longtermism, but here are my thoughts. I think (2) is close to what I'd want for a definition of very strong longtermism - "the view on which long-run outcomes are of overwhelming importance"
I think we should be able to model longtermism using a simpler model than yours. Suppose you're taking a one-off action d∈D, and then you get (discounted) reward r1(d),r2(d),… Then I'd say very strong longtermism is true iff the impact of each decisions depends overwhelmingly on their long-term impact.
∀d∈D,∑∞t=0rt(d)≈∑∞t=t′rt(d) where t′ is some large number.
You could stipulate that the discounted utility of the distant future has to be within a factor (1−ϵ)∑∞t=0rt(d)<∑∞t=t′rt(d)<(1+ϵ)∑∞t=0rt(d) , where ϵ∈(0,1). If you preferred, you could talk about the differences between utilities for all pairs of decisions, rather than the utility of each individual decision. Or small deviations from optimal. Or you could consider sequential decision-making, assuming that later decisions are made optimally. Or you assumed a distribution over D (e.g. the distribution of actual human decisions), and talk about the amount of variance in total utility explained by their long-term impact. But these are philosophical details - overall, we should land somewhere near your (2).
It's not super clear to me that we want to formalise longtermism - "the ethical view that is particularly concerned with ensuring long-run outcomes go well". If we did, it might say that sometimes ∑∞t=t′rt(d)−∑∞t=t′rt(d′) is big, or that it can sometimes outweigh other considerations.
Your (1) is interesting, but it doesn't seem like a definition of longtermism. I'd call it something like safety investment is optimal, because it pertains to practical concerns about how to attain long-term utility.
Rather, I think it'd be more interesting to try to prove that follows from longtermism, given certain model assumptions (such as yours). To see what I have in mind, we could elaborate my setup. Setup: let the decision space be d∈[0,1] , where d represents the fraction of resources you invest in the long-term. Each rt,t≥t′ is an increasing function of d and each rt,t<t′ is a decreasing function of d. Then we could have a conjecture: Conjecture: if strong longtermism is true (for some t′ and ϵ), then the optimal action will be d=1 (or d>f(ϵ)), some function of ϵ). Proof: since we assume that only long-term impact matters, then the action with the best longterm impact d=1 is best overall.
Perhaps a weaker version could be proved in an economic model.
Not inconsistent, but I think Will's criteria are just one of many possible reasons that this might be the case.