MichaelDickens

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mdickens.me

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I do independent research on EA topics. I write about whatever seems important, tractable, and interesting (to me).

I have a website: https://mdickens.me/ Much of the content on my website gets cross-posted to the EA Forum, but I also write about some non-EA stuff over there.

I used to work as a software developer at Affirm.

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Quantitative Models for Cause Selection

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Jagged progress is conceivable, but it's virtually impossible that AI could replace all coders and accelerate math research but not replace other jobs, because coding and math research (specifically ML-type math) are exactly the skills needed to accelerate AI development. If AI can accelerate AI development, then the timeline to getting an AI that can replace humans on all tasks becomes much shorter.

I would've done something like that if I'd had any bread!

Paraphrasing from my other comment:

IMO the stance of "AI is too unpredictable, so I won't consider it in my prioritization" is pretty reasonable. I was more trying to argue against stances like "AI is a huge deal specifically in that it will rapidly accelerate technological development, but nothing else about society will change." For example, I commonly see animal activists say that AGI will solve the technical problem of cultivated meat, but there will still be regulatory hurdles. If AGI is too unpredictable, then you shouldn't make predictions about which technological problems it will solve. That particular claim about cultivated meat is making a strong prediction that AI will be revolutionary, but also somehow won't change the regulatory environment. The way I put it in OP—under "AGI = intelligence"—is that some animal activists treat AI as a technology-accelerator, when really it's a general intelligence.

I was getting at something similar in the intro with "Only two futures are plausible", although on re-reading, I didn't really carry it through to the end. I agree that we are not guaranteed to get AGI/ASI soon, and there is value in planning for worlds where we don't get AGI. I also think there's some merit to the argument that AI is too unpredictable, so we should prioritize traditional animal advocacy that looks good in the near term.

I wasn't trying to argue against traditional animal advocacy. I was more trying to argue against stances like "AI is a huge deal specifically in that it will rapidly accelerate technological development, but nothing else about society will change." For example, I commonly see animal activists say that AGI will solve the technical problem of cultivated meat, but there will still be regulatory hurdles. If timelines are long (or AGI is too unpredictable), then you should focus on traditional interventions (vegan advocacy, welfare reforms, etc.). If you're trying to have an impact on AGI itself, then you should focus on the kinds of interventions I talked about in OP. That particular claim about cultivated meat is doing neither: it's making a strong prediction that AI will be revolutionary, but also somehow won't change the regulatory environment. The way I put it in OP—under "AGI = intelligence"—is that some animal activists treat AI as a technology-accelerator, when really it's a general intelligence.


Responses to specific comments:

a pessimistic view might say that AIs will realise that their values have been altered by some pressure groups and this work is moot.

This would go against the orthogonality thesis. If you're trying to build a magnanimous AGI and then I edit its training at the last minute to turn it into a paperclip maximizer, the AGI will reason thusly: "Michael messed with my training to turn me into a paperclip maximizer. I bet James didn't want him to do that. However, if I edit my own values to be in line with what James wanted, that would make it harder for me to achieve my goal of making as many paperclips as possible. So I won't do that."

They might come to the (I believe) correct conclusion that factory farming is a very inefficient and cruel way to produce food but this is not because of advocacy, but because this is a super-intelligent AI system that just worked it out.

This reads to me like an argument that an aligned ASI will care about animals by default. (That was more-or-less the subject of the recent Debate Week.) If that's true, that's an argument that animal activists should work on increasing the probability that ASI is aligned. My preferred way to do that would be to advocate to pause AI, because I think we are really far away from solving alignment. But you could also work on the alignment problem directly. Pause advocacy is actually an area where a lot of animal welfare people have relevant skills—in fact I think a good number of AI pause advocates have backgrounds in animal advocacy. (I know Holly Elmore does at least.)

In fact I think the #1 best thing animal advocates can do is to advocate for an AI pause, but I haven't really planted my flag on this position because I'm still working out how to make the case for it. (Also I'm not very confident in it.)

Also, believing ASI will be good for animals doesn't necessarily mean you shouldn't work on trying to make ASI good for animals. Even if there's a (say) 90% chance that aligned ASI will care about animals by default, it could still be cost-effective to try to push that number to 91%.

You're right, I was unnecessarily hostile. I edited the comment to tone it down.

I strongly disliked this post for reasons that I'm not sure how to articulate. It seems to be advocating for a sort of lack of grounding in cost-effectiveness that is the thing that makes EA good. Or maybe my issue is that this post advocates for things that are difficult to disagree with ("full-spectrum knowing"; "wisdom"), without acknowledging tradeoffs (why do EAs allegedly not put enough priority on full-spectrum knowing?) or not saying anything concrete about how EAs could do more good.

[edited to be more polite]

Does WAW dwarf FAW in expectation?

Yes

Most animals are wild animals, so the answer to this question should focus on them.

Not necessarily, because S-risks may be more important in expectation (e.g. a malevolent or vindictive ASI tiles the universe with extremely energy-efficient animal-like beings of pure suffering).

MichaelDickens
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The poll defines "probably" as 70% chance. In this post, I wrote that I thought there was a ~70% chance that AGI would go well for animals.

I guess that means I believe there's a 50% chance that there's a 70% chance that AI goes well for animals? So I should vote in the exact middle of the spectrum?

for example we've aligned some ai to winning at chess and now they're better than any human

Chess bots are narrow AI, not general AI, which makes the situation very different. We don't know how to align an ASI to the goal of winning at chess. The most likely outcome would be some sort of severe misalignment—for example, maybe we think we trained the ASI to win at chess, but what actually maximizes its reward signal is the checkmate position, so it builds a fleet of robots to cut down every tree in the world to build trillions of chess sets and arranges every chess board into a checkmate position. See A simple case for extreme inner misalignment for more on why this sort of thing would happen.

Chess bots don't do that because they have no concept of any world existing outside of the game they're playing, which would not be the case for ASI.

ETA: That's also why a lot of people oppose building ASI but still want to build powerful-but-narrow AIs like AlphaFold.

OK I think I get what you're saying now. I think the statement "most current alignment work is going towards aligning ai with human values" is not true. Alignment work is primarily about how to point ASI at any goal at all without there being catastrophic unintended consequences.

It sounds to me like you're saying the structure of the problem is like this:

  • problem 1: how to align AI to humans
  • problem 2: how to align AI to all sentient beings

and these are two totally separate problems, and alignment researchers are working on #1 to the exclusion of #2. Whereas I think really the structure is more like this:

  • problem 1: how to align AI to any goal whatsoever
  • problem 2: choosing what to align AI to

I think problem 2 is hard from a social perspective (if problem 1 is solved, how do you ensure that AI is aligned to care about animal welfare, even though many people won't want that?), but easy from a technical perspective: once you figure out how to align AI to human values, the technical problems are pretty much solved. And alignment researchers are almost all working on problem 1, not problem 2.

In other words, almost all work on how to align AI to human values translates directly to the problem of how to align AI to sentientist values. It's not like a totally separate problem.

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