I must study Politicks and War that my sons may have liberty to study Mathematicks and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Mathematicks and Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval Architecture, navigation, Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry and Porcelaine. - John Adams 1780.
In several discussions of deontic longtermism, within the book ‘Essays on Longtermism: Present Action for the Distant Future’ the quantity of future generations, described within Riedener in Chapter 9 as the hypothetical "quadrillion" which we must consider, is discussed as an element which negates all other concerns and discussions in a sense of absolutes which within this work we will consider as a concern but will ultimately come to an extent defend on grounds of moral discomfort over the overly numerical approach. The above quote necessitates a discussion also, which here we will cover but briefly to establish the author's opinion on the necessity of some level longtermism in the first place- it can be argued to be a necessity that we in fact hold not a duty towards progression, through our ability to affect their lives through our actions. The arc, as Martin Luther King refers to it, of human history, is long - but it must irrevocably bend towards the good, if we are to ensure our continuance as a species. In this respect, we can consider Adams' above quote as the blueprint by which we may consider why such actions that provide a benefit towards a structure of a practical application of longtermism may be taken and arguably, must morally be taken. As such a quote considers, perhaps the seemingly uncomfortable lessons and costs of, for example switching our energy production or a global focus on pathogen research to avoid the the risk of a pandemic that kills over 95% of the global population this century which the collective discussion digital platform Metaculus, currently puts at almost 1%, must be allowed for the sake of those to come being saved from such concerns. Necessarily therefore, we can establish to begin, that the author views longtermism as an act of sacrificial duty - facilitating existence for the populations which come after us.
We may now consider the status quo put forward by many of the authors within the work ‘Essays on Longtermism: Present Action for the Distant Future’ that the population size to come within future generations necessitates their prioritisation over the current global population. While this makes a undeniable level of logical sense if viewed from a consequentist moral stance, as seen in the utilitarian viewpoint introduced and criticised within Chapter 8 by Unruh. However we can critique this method along the following lines: uncertainty, powerlessness and immorality. To begin we can dicuss uncertainty: namely that under a more skeptical view of our understanding of the statistics involved, we can argue that we are under pains to [in fact] assess what we know for certain and are able to definitively positively benefit. If we consider for example, the Kardashev scale, as presented as a means of civilisation classification within it's inclusion in the paper "Transmission of Information by extraterrestrial civilisations" as published in 1964. We stand currently within this as a as estimated by the global scientific community as around a type 0.7, unable even to access the entirety of the energy of our own planet. Can we truly, within our discussion of longtermism, even fathom what may be helpful to a type 3 civilisation? Could we truly fathom, beyond what is considered to be our next achievable global project of a Dyson Sphere? In this respect therefore, is the case for strong deontic longtermism, as predicated on the numerical size of future civilisations truly valid? This may appear as a far fetched discussion, but it arguably must be considered within a discussion of far future populations, as such a population may simply be unaffected by what little work we would be able to do for their benefit now - or, just as likely, view our work as antiquated and unable to positively affect their society. Consider for example, the golden disk which we sent out on space flights, or the warning symbols which we are currently trying to extrapolate into several forms to symbolise danger of radiation to future populations of earth who may be unaware of where our nuclear waste has been placed. To elaborate; we can explore the golden disk example, in which NASA placed a 12-inch gold-plated copper disk which contained not only sounds, but also images which they had selected in an attempt to show the diversity existence on Earth. It contains instructions on the sleeve for how it was to be played - but this in itself is arguably optimistic beyond reason. Would the children of today understand how to use a record? Let alone a child in a hundred years, or a thousand. A child of the far future would no more think to heed the love of the present population than a child of the present would to read a passage of the Proto-Elamite script, now indecipherable to human minds. Would our problems today, of concerns over AI for example, one day be as alien to us as the scripts of the ancient world are today? We can extrapolate from the feasible length of human history, around 6 million years, as well as the time left afforded to us as a species of about. Thus, if we can establish the level of disconnection between generations may, fundamentally be too great for us to grasp - how can we allow ourselves to neglect the current population out of a utilitarian belief for a greatest number, a greatest number that we cannot effect. In this respect we are both powerless and truly uncertain in our ability to help the far future populations of earth - does this not negate our prioritisation of them? Can we not argue that it should be weighted as heavily as the numerical difference?
Similarly then, we can question this view through a lens of apparent immorality in which we can argue, that the prioritisation of the greatest number of people being in the far future is neglectful of the pressing matters of the world, and that to an extreme we may argue the it tangibly connects to an overtly privileged position of the “world’s greater good” with the “necessary cost” consistently being given to be the loss or suffering of the vulnerable populations of the present population. For example, as with the Chapter 9 example which discusses whether the US government should focus on the development of AI or on assisting the Ukrainian population, it is suggested to us that from a longtermist view we must necessarily view the development of AI as a priority due the far future population’s reliance on this, something which is then developed to be the correct method through the author’s suggestion that the numerically higher future population must take present due to the higher possible number of people benefited. While the conceptual framework here makes logistical sense and the statistical evidence certainly aids the conclusion, we can argue there is some valid level of moral discomfort within this argument. The approach could be compared appropriately for example, with modern discussion of climate change and industrial development in [Lower/Middle income country] LMIC. It is, considered on a global stage, a necessary consideration within academic and social spheres to acknowledge simultaneous ideas: both that climate change is being worsened by the industrial development of LMIC countries (while countries like the U.K., which operate with a more tertiary and quaternary economic structure are less statically integrated into the environmental cost) and that LMIC cannot morally be asked to live in poverty due to a prevention of economic and industrial progress. In this respect we could view the "greatest good for the greatest number" utilitarian style approach critcised in Chapter 8, as a similarly logically sound but with the moral obligation to make certain moral caveats within our discussion to ensure that we do not fail in our attempt to care for the vulnerable members of the current population within our ends in longtermism. This is arguably not a true criticism of the outright utilitarian argument however, but instead forms a linguistic and cultural conversational convention which we should consider within our discussion of utilitarianistic views within deontic longtermism.
Now, it is possible that within this work we may have neglected to clarify or diligently consider thus far the relevance of the argument within the utilitarian sense which we have thus far criticised within this work.It must be acknowledged that this is a necessary inclusion within a discussion of the theories of longtermism. The only idea in fact, that we can have of the far future peoples of Earth's hypothetical apparent existence and their hypothetical population size if our estimations hold any value. This discrepancy in how much we know and understand about present vs. future populations on earth lends strength to the discrepancy within our arguments for longtermism based upon our current observations. To an extent we can successfully defend this hypothesis to the criticisms discussed above.
In conclusion therefore, much as it might appear to be a simple solution to a defence of deontic strong longtermism there are several considerations which need to be given their due diligence and consideration in order that we may continue to argue for this claim.
