This is part 2 of a two-part post, part 1 here.

In a previous post, I argued that quantum technologies might deserve some attention in the EA community (I recommend reading it first if you are not already familiar with the topic). I think that risks related to great power competition and technological bifurcation in quantum are especially important (and very neglected). Here is why.

Imagine the following (sensationalist) scenario: What would happen if, say around 2035, significant breakthroughs in quantum computing were made in China? Due to bifurcated supply chains and betting on “different tech trees,” this leads to an asymmetric capability advance. Chaos ensues, as widely deployed cryptography–from smart cars to enterprise networks, all not yet transitioned to quantum-safe alternatives–is about to be rendered insecure. Politicians are under pressure but lack reliable assessments. Keen to be first to gain economic advantages, quantum computing capabilities are widely deployed on the cloud, despite researchers warning about artificial design risks. International coordination is urgently needed, but no one even knows who to reach out to “on the other side” for dialogues.

Now assume the following are plausible: (1) Quantum technologies will be important, (2) China will be at the forefront of the field, and we are heading towards some form of (3) West-China bifurcation in quantum.

I believe that under such conditions, as in the imagination above, regulating dangerous applications and unexpected developments in quantum technologies would face large challenges. Bifurcation could lead to asymmetric capability gaps, information failures, and a dangerous race that would hinder responsible governance. A lack of interoperability and interdependence could cause unforeseen harm.

I argued in a previous post that (1) could be plausible, I will argue for (2) and (3) below.

Neglectedness

I mentioned some organisations looking at governance and responsible development here.  However, from my personal experience, the “Quantum, China, Bifurcation” framing I outline in this post is nearly completely neglected. While the number of people looking at quantum from a governance/policy perspective is increasing, I have not yet met anyone talking about these issues in a West x China context outside of the framing “competition vs. benefits of collaboration.” Furthermore, I have the impression that a lot of public English-language reporting on quantum (in China) is not very high quality (sensationalist/shallow).

Why China matters in quantum

China and the United States are the world's leading nations in quantum, with cutting-edge research across nearly all verticals of the field. Broadly, the U.S. is considered ahead in quantum computing, China in quantum communications, and the situation is less clear in quantum sensing. In metrics such as number of scientific publications, citations or patents, aggregate quantum output in China is often close to or surpassing that of the U.S. Some of the most famous quantum experiments in recent years, such as the Micius satellite or the world’s second “quantum advantage” quantum computing experiment were realised by Chinese researchers.

To give an example, I had the chance to visit and talk to some people in Hefei, which, besides Beijing and Shanghai, is very significant for China’s quantum efforts. It may have the highest concentration of quantum researchers in the world, hosting the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) and multiple dedicated quantum laboratories. It is also the founding place for some of China’s leading quantum start-ups in its “quantum avenue”, part of supposedly 60 upstream and downstream companies in the quantum industry chain (this definition is likely quite broad).

In the early development of quantum technologies, China is already a near-peer of the U.S. and I consider it likely that China will play an important role in the future development of the technology.

[Useful references: A good starter for quantum in China is this report by ChinaPower, an excellent (although dated–2020) comparison of the U.S.–China industrial bases in quantum technology published by the RAND Institute, and a great Chinese overview of the field is published yearly by the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, 量子信息技术发展与应用研究报告(2023).]

Are we on a trajectory of technology bifurcation in quantum?

Quantum technologies are already part of the broader technology competition between China and the West. In the U.S., National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan talks about shifting the goal of export controls from maintaining a “relative advantage” to the “largest possible lead” in foundational technologies, explicitly including quantum in one of three categories of important foundational technologies (computing, biotech, and new energy tech).

Indeed, significant technological controls on quantum were recently enacted by the U.S. and other Western countries. I published an article on these controls (which includes some similar ideas as this post). In summary, controls on quantum include: Coordinated export controls among multiple Western countries on quantum computing^[1], addition of quantum-related academic institutes and companies to the U.S. entity list, import, investment, and visa restrictions.

On the Chinese side, while the attraction of foreign talents and investments in sci-tech still seem encouraged^[2], policies towards “indigenous innovation” and “technological self-sufficiency” also push against globalised technology development. Public Chinese commentators on quantum often stress the need to overcome international sanctions on key equipment and create an independent ecosystem.

Academic research in quantum is still relatively international (although less in China than in the U.S.). Yet, international collaborations are becoming more difficult, not just in quantum: Overall research collaborations between China and the U.S. have recently decreased. Talking to international researchers, the quantum technology ecosystem in China has already been described as “somewhat of a black box”. This can have many reasons (language barriers, many groups being recently established, systemic differences and of course political reasons), but falling exchange will exacerbate it.

Less exchange and transparency among quantum technology practitioners in China and the West seem likely going forward. Given the early development stage of the technology and relatively comprehensive export restrictions already now, it appears plausible that largely independent technological supply chains emerge in the field. Academia could also become much less open, especially where it relies on controlled technology. It then stands to question whether this will also lead to a divergence in standards, lack of interoperability and “betting on different branches of the tech tree.” I find the latter particularly interesting because of the many fundamentally different approaches that can, in theory, realise a quantum computer. There are also indications that for one of the more mature quantum technologies, quantum cryptography (QKD), the U.S. and China already have quite different priorities (with China heavily investing while the NSA cautions against its use).

In short, given significant export controls and hurdles to the exchange of ideas at an early stage in the technology development, we could be heading towards technological bifurcation: Independent quantum supply chains and possibly different “quantum tech trees” in China and the West.

Potential issues

The general argument

Given the three assumptions mentioned above–namely: (1) quantum will be a foundational technology for future information infrastructure, (2) China will be at the forefront, and (3) we are heading towards bifurcation–I see the following general issues:

• How do we ensure that dangerous applications (cryptography, artificial design) are responsibly regulated and not proliferated (to third actors)? Especially given limited mutual insight into hardware developments and little mutual leverage due to bifurcated supply chains.
• If unexpected issues arise, how do we establish awareness and safety dialogues? With little awareness of who the relevant respective stakeholders are (which already seems to be an issue for AI), practitioners on both sides might not be tuned into the safety dialogues and governance discussions on the other side.
• What happens if bifurcated supply chains and different tech trajectories lead to sudden capability gaps / one-sided vulnerabilities?
• How do we ensure interoperability–or: what are possible secondary effects if foundational information technology diverges?

I think now could be a particularly important time to work on these issues, as the opportunity window to recognize them as joint issues might be closing. Today, it still seems possible to establish, and structurally lock-in, global dialogues and responsible governance initiatives. This might be much more difficult 5 years down the road when researchers could be less connected across geo-political fault lines and more technology development takes place outside of academia.

Examples

Take the issues outlined in my first post as more specific examples of how bifurcation could exacerbate problems:

• Quantum computing’s threat to cryptography: A, presumed or real, cryptographically relevant quantum computer in either China or the West could be highly destabilising due to the sudden change in the power balance (information advantage, ability to cause disruption in cyberspace, coercion …). If the development of quantum computers will increasingly happen in secrecy, are communication channels needed to avoid any party being completely blindsided? How to de-escalate and credibly install guardrails if needed? A cryptographically relevant quantum computer would be much more disruptive if developed in secrecy than if its arrival is anticipated by the public. Arguments that such secret development is unlikely only partially apply to China. Decryption capabilities in both parties could currently lead to “mutually assured disruption” – how could this be responsibly governed? (Jointly agreed usage restrictions? How to prevent the proliferation of decryption capability to third parties? Who may access these devices and how to guard against abuse?)
• Quantum (computing) as an enabler of WMDs: Limiting the proliferation of dangerous uses (e.g. cryptography, chemical-, bio- and nuclear engineering) of quantum technologies would benefit from coordination among the leading developers, especially in cases where awareness of dual-use might be lacking among the domain experts. (More on regulating the use of quantum computing in the section on tractability)
• Great power competition paired with technological bifurcation: If, one day, national-security relevant quantum applications are seen on the immediate horizon, this could lead to race dynamics with both Western and Chinese entities aiming to be first in obtaining disruptive capabilities. This reminds of the current AI race, with some important differences: Less mutual insight and exchange among the practitioners (given some form of bifurcation) and possibly a much closer race, especially in terms of hardware. This could lead to misinformation or intelligence failure (no one knows what is really going on in the labs on the “other side”). Furthermore, less interdependence could lead to less restraint and “betting on different tech trees” to asymmetric step changes in capability. These step changes can happen both in capability increases, e.g. the development of a fault-tolerant quantum computer, as well as vulnerabilities, imagine new quantum attacks on post-quantum cryptography algorithms standardised by NIST or implementation vulnerabilities in China’s QKD network. Such race dynamics could heighten the risk of great power conflict. They could also stand in the way of the responsible governance of quantum technologies.

Tractability

First, I outline two possible goals–limiting bifurcation and collaboration on responsible governance–that work in this area could aim for. Then, my ideas to work on this as well as potential pitfalls.

Limit bifurcation

Many (but not all) of the issues raised above are premised on bifurcation in quantum technology. However, I do not think that many people are actively aiming at bifurcation. Rather, individual actions aimed at gaining competitive advantages, reacting to (perceived) adversarial behaviour or simply minimising risks to personal interests are jointly leading us in this direction. Therefore, I think much can be gained from highlighting the long-term risks of bifurcation and exploring different options to address valid concerns. For example, I recently framed quantum technology controls as motivated by an access asymmetry and argued that instead of only reducing Chinese access to Western S&T, policymakers should also consider actions aimed at increasing Western access to Chinese S&T.

I am unsure about the feasibility or tradeoffs of bringing these ideas to the attention of policymakers.^[3] Regardless, I think there are low-hanging fruits in bringing awareness of bifurcation risks to practitioners of the field and in advocating for academic exchange as well as for collaboration on education, capacity building in developing countries and responsible governance. I also believe that open source efforts (such as by Open Quantum Design) and standardisation bodies could be immensely helpful in avoiding bifurcation.

Collaborate on responsible governance

Multiple initiatives towards some form of responsible governance of quantum technologies, especially quantum computers, have appeared in recent years (listed in previous post). However, to my knowledge, these initiatives lack meaningful Chinese participation and the issues raised above only play a marginal role in their work.

I think there are governance questions on which collaboration is needed already today. As an example, let’s consider the question of how to regulate the use of quantum computers. Currently, on-site quantum computers are largely restricted to research labs, deep tech start-ups, supercomputing centres and cloud providers. Due to potentially dangerous applications, controlling who can access and more importantly, what can be done with quantum computers will become important with further advancements in hardware and algorithms.

What are and how do we classify dangerous applications? How can we control the abuse of quantum computing resources through cloud access? Such discussions have already started in the U.S.^[4]

Detecting dangerous algorithms might be a futile endeavour from a technical standpoint.^[5] Limiting low-level hardware access and requiring end-user verification could be alternatives, and multilaterally coordinated export controls could actually help here. 

Involving both Western and Chinese experts is important not just to find solutions to these questions, but also to assure that where quantum computers are available, the awareness and capability exists to regulate them responsibly. I don’t see many downsides in engaging experts from both sides in international dialogues, conferences and initiatives on the responsible use of quantum computers, and easing travel restrictions for such cases.

Ideally, multilateral agreements to limit the export and use of quantum computers could involve all leading developers of the technology. Commitments to limit the use of cryptographically relevant quantum computers, transparency and verification measures could also take some heat from the race dynamics. I am sure there are existing multilateral control regimes on which such efforts could be built.

Besides regulating the use of quantum computing, the worldwide transition to quantum-safe cryptography should be an area where, if not in the technology development itself, responsible actors should collaborate on regulation and standardisation.

How to work on this

Career choices to mitigate the issues mentioned in this post could include

• Prioritisation research; for example, I am planning to do further research on the likelihood/current state of bifurcation in quantum; it could also be worthwhile to explore if issues raised in this post apply to other emerging technologies
• Technical research; for example on quantum-safe cryptography or in leading (Chinese/Western) organisations developing quantum technologies; due to being neglected, I believe that studying quantum science in China as a Western student could also be a promising choice for some (e.g. majors in Physics, CS, EE and focussing on quantum)

• Contribute to the transfer of ideas and more transparency between China and the West; this could be by organising exchanges or conferences, but also through writing^[6]

• Build awareness on the issues; for example through publications and science journalism
• Work in government/think tanks or in standardisation bodies on issues such as responsible quantum computing or international quantum standards

Possible pitfalls

Given the political situation, as a citizen of a Western country (especially the U.S.), calling for more coordination with China on quantum, enabling exchange or even doing technical research in China could harm career prospects and credibility. There could also be risks of running afoul of restrictions or enabling unlawful behaviour, indirectly causing further measures towards bifurcation. Finally, one’s level of (dis-)belief that technological leadership of Western democracies over China is important by itself adds an additional dimension to the evaluation of the issues raised in this post.

Disclaimer: I used to do quantum research and am now doing a China Studies master's, researching the bifurcation issue outlined below. If you want to get in touch, you can also find me on LinkedIn.

Appendix

Some (hopefully) useful references

Feel free to suggest more in the comments and I will add.

Quantum in China: A good starter for quantum in China is this report by ChinaPower, an excellent (although dated–2020) comparison of the U.S.–China industrial bases in quantum technology published by the RAND Institute, and a great Chinese overview of the field is published yearly by the China Academy of Communications Technology, 量子信息技术发展与应用研究报告(2023).

Intelligence Report on Quantum Diplomacy by the Open Quantum Institute: https://open-quantum-institute.cern/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GESDA_OQI_Intelligence-Report-2024_Final.pdf 

The references listed in my previous post here.

1. ^{^}

    With a notable exception for foreign nationals working inside the U.S. on the development of the technology

2. ^{^}

    The only exception that I am aware of in quantum is quantum cryptography, which is export controlled

3. ^{^}

    But I would expect it to be more feasible in Europe than in the U.S.

4. ^{^}

    See e.g. WS on Cybersecurity of Quantum Computing (“Ensuring that quantum algorithms do not enable undesired capabilities or behaviours”)

5. ^{^}

    Any sophisticated actor can likely get around automated detection systems and future quantum networking opens possibilities such as homomorphic-encrypted quantum computing or even blind quantum computing

6. ^{^}

    For example, QuantumChina (量子盒) publishes Chinese-language articles about international quantum developments, but I do not know of any equivalent English language platform reporting on the developments in China