Summary
- I agree there are pains which feel qualitatively different in the sense of having distinct properties. For example, annoying and excruciating pain as defined by the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI).
- Some think there are pains whose intensity is incomparably/qualitatively worse than others. For instance, some believe averting an arbitrarily short time of excruciating pain in humans is better than averting an arbitrarily long time of annoying pain in humans. In contrast, I would prefer warming up slightly cold patches of soil for sufficiently many nematodes over averting 1 trillion human-years of extreme torture.
- Consider a human body as described by the state of all of its fundamental particles. Are there any 2 states which are only infinitesimally different whose pain intensities are not quantitatively comparable? I do not see how this could be possible. So I conclude the pain intensities for any 2 states of a human body are quantitatively comparable.
Pains can feel qualitatively different, and still have quantitatively comparable intensities
I agree there are pains which feel qualitatively different in the sense of having distinct properties. For example, annoying and excruciating pain as defined by WFI. Annoying pain “should not deter individuals from enjoying pleasant experiences with no short-term function (e.g., play) and positive social interactions”. “Sufferers can ignore this sensation most of the time”. In contrast, excruciating pain “would mark the threshold of Pain under which many people choose to take their lives rather than endure the Pain”. “Concealment of Pain is not possible”.
However, pains can have different properties, and still have quantitatively comparable intensities. Ice and liquid water have different properties, but their mass and temperature can still be quantitatively compared. Losing 1 s of life is qualitatively different from dying, but the loss of living time is still quantitatively comparable. For an alternative time until death of 50 years, dying would correspond to a loss of 1.58 billion s (= 50*365.25*24*60^2). I suspect the intensity of excruciating pain feels incomparably/qualitatively worse than that of annoying pain simply because it is way higher.
Warming up nematodes vs averting extreme torture in humans
Some think there are pains whose intensity is incomparably/qualitatively worse than others. For instance, some believe averting an arbitrarily short time of excruciating pain in humans is better than averting an arbitrarily long time of annoying pain in humans.
In contrast, I would say averting a sufficiently long time of a pain with an arbitrarily low intensity is better than averting an arbitrarily long time of a pain with an arbitrarily high intensity. As an extreme example, I would prefer warming up slightly cold patches of soil for sufficiently many nematodes over averting 1 trillion human-years of extreme torture.
Why I think all pains have quantitatively comparable intensities
Consider an experiment where someone keeps their hand in hot water for a given duration. Is there a temperature T for which the pain at temperature T + 10^-100 ºC is incomparably/qualitatively worse than the pain for temperature T? 10^-100 is 0.000…1 with 100 digits after the decimal point. The higher temperature could feel incomparably/qualitatively worse for a sufficiently large difference in temperature. For instance, 5 s at 100 ºC would certainly feel incomparably/qualitatively worse than 5 s at 50 ºC. Yet, the pain would feel practically the same for a super tiny difference in temperature like 10^-100 ºC. In this case, it is clear to me that the pain intensities would be quantitatively comparable, and practically feel the same. Moreover, this would hold across the whole spectrum of temperature. So I conclude the pain intensities for any 2 temperatures are quantitatively comparable.
Generalising, consider a human body as described by the state of all of its fundamental particles. Are there any 2 states which are only infinitesimally different whose pain intensities are not quantitatively comparable? I do not see how this could be possible. For example, it feels super counterintuitive to me that moving an electron by 10^-100 m could prevent the pains from being quantitatively comparable. There is lots of empirical evidence for practically negligible effects on subjective experiences for much larger changes. So I conclude the pain intensities for any 2 states of a human body are quantitatively comparable.
Furthermore, I think pain intensities are comparable across all organisms. It is “widely accepted by biochemists” that all life on Earth descended from a common ancestral cell population. So I assume one can go from any human state to any state of any other organism via a huge number of very small changes.
Generalising even further, I would say any 2 states of the universe are quantitatively comparable with respect to their expected total hedonistic welfare.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Anonymous Person for a discussion which led me to publish this post. The views expressed in the post are my own.
Fwiw, one can very well agree that all pains are comparable in theory, but that the difference between a pinprick and genuine torture is so large that, in practice, the latter will often dominate. I find this harder to "debunk" than antiaggregationism.
Given our deep uncertainty on i) how many pinpricks outweigh torture and ii) moral weights and welfare ranges,[1]I certainly don't find it implausible that nematodes, shrimp, or even chickens have experiences that are too mild, relative to other beings, to dominate EV calculations---despite their high numbers and assuming aggregationism.[2]
So sure, maybe, in principle, there is a number of warmed up nematodes that outbalances 1 trillion human-years of extreme torture. But this says nothing about tradeoffs we can(not) make between humans and nematodes in the real world.
Well, (i) is relevant only insofar as it is relevant to (ii), here, but I thought I'd acknowledge (i) separately, still.
And you said things that suggests you agree in this recent interview. You seemed to have deviated from your previous "nematodes (almost) surely dominate" view. Or did I miss something?