This post continues the examination of the core claims of tobacco harm reduction (THR) advocates from an impact-oriented perspective. Next up on our list is the claim that consumers of tobacco and nicotine should be much more widely represented in both research and policy discussions than they currently are. As one advocate put it, “exclusion of the consumer voice has been one of the main reasons for the misinformation, disinformation, and failures of current tobacco control policy around nicotine.”
THR supporters often make this assertion on the basis of legitimacy, echoing the “nothing about us without us” slogan of the broader harm reduction movement. This series is concerned with impact, so rather than diving into the philosophical debate about paternalism (which I’ve explored in past posts), the aim here is to understand whether efforts to reduce smoking-related illness would be plausibly more effective if consumers were brought into the conversation more often. I think there are pretty convincing reasons to think they would.
The story of the PlayPump is a stock example in critiques of unreflective philanthropy. It’s the opening to Will MacAskill’s Doing Good Better, one of the most-read introductions to effective altruism. The idea was simple: a merry-go-round that pumps water as children play on it, so the time and energy that adults previously spent pumping by hand is saved. The project attracted lots of media attention and tens of millions of dollars in donations in the 1990s and 2000s, and more than 1,000 pumps were installed. However, shortly after the release of two critical evaluations by UNICEF and the Swiss Resource Centre and Consultancies for Development in the late 2000s, the US arm of PlayPumps International shut down and its main sponsor publicly recognized its failure.
A key mistake that contributed to the issues with PlayPump was the lack of thorough contact with the on-the-ground reality of the people it was meant to serve. The evaluations detailed a number of issues that users noticed early on, but the manufacturer never took into account. These included usage estimates wildly out of line with observed play, removal of existing handpumps that the locals preferred because they were much faster and easier to operate, and social factors that made people reluctant to use the device. UNICEF’s recommendation emphasized that the organization “must increase involvement of user communities in the management of the PlayPump water system.”
THR advocates claim that issues a lot like PlayPump plague their field. They cite examples not just from failed interventions, but more broadly across research, communication, and policymaking. At different times, information from consumers isn’t available, arrives too late, or is heard but given too little weight.
In January 2015, a letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that vapes with adjustable voltage used at higher settings produced formaldehyde concentrations implying a cancer risk 5 to 15 times that of the levels found in cigarette smoke. Mainstream media outlets like NPR, HealthDay, and MedCity News reported on the research, the last quoting one of the authors as saying they detected a “boatload” of the carcinogenic substance. A week later, six US senators cited the paper in a letter to the Food and Drug Administration urging it to finalize vaping regulations.
Despite the letter appearing in one of the world’s most prestigious medical journals, a problem that made it largely irrelevant to any real world scenario was one that a vaper would have quickly spotted: the conditions tested by the authors produced what users call a “dry puff.” With too little liquid reaching it, the atomizer’s coil overheats, producing a harsh, burnt taste that users find intolerable and immediately avoid. This was pointed out by an independent antismoking advocate within days of its publication, and experimentally demonstrated via a replication by another researcher two years later.
The episode wasn’t an isolated one. As a blunt assessment from an epidemiologist and harm reduction advocate put it: “Most papers about vaping could be vastly improved by simply soliciting the input of a few vapers.” A 2018 review found that of 32 vaping studies examined, the large majority never tested the conditions on human users to confirm that they resembled real world scenarios. A 2021 study from the Dutch government’s public health institute proposed a “human volunteer-validated” method for detecting dry puffs due to the “overestimation of toxicant levels” that would result if the issue wasn’t addressed.
If vapers had tested the device under the study’s conditions, this problem could have been avoided. The researchers could have adjusted the experiment to reflect more realistic use, and the headlines would have been far less alarming.
In the summer of 2019, a wave of cases of life-threatening lung illness appeared in the US with little warning. Thousands of people were hospitalized and dozens died. Practically all of them reported having vaped shortly before their symptoms began.
Consumer organizations, understandably concerned about the threat to their members, quickly mobilized to identify and communicate the cause. In August 2019, representatives from CASAA, the main US nicotine vaper association, and NORML, a cannabis advocacy group, both told the media that adulterants in the illicit THC supply chain were the likely cause, and emphasized the importance of avoiding illegal products of unknown origin. Initial reporting and a later detailed investigation by cannabis industry trade publication Leafly revealed that a specific adulterant, vitamin E acetate, was the likely culprit. This additive had recently been introduced into the black market THC oil supply chain by sellers looking to improve their profit margins by diluting their product. Leafly’s article identified both the people responsible and the mechanisms through which contaminated ingredients found their way to unsuspecting users.
At the same time and for months after these revelations, mainstream public health organizations issued communications implying the use of legal nicotine vapes could pose a similar risk and discouraging the public from using them. As late as November 2019, the US Centers for Disease Control recommended people “consider refraining from the use of all e-cigarette or vaping products” and continued to name the condition “e-cigarette or vaping product use-associated lung injury” despite no nicotine vaping product ever being implicated.
Shortly after vitamin E acetate was removed from the supply chain, hospitalizations fell steeply. The effect on policy and on public perceptions, however, was much larger and more lasting. While the CDC, in February 2020, advised adults who had switched from smoking to vaping not to switch back, a variety of restrictions on nicotine vapes instituted during the crisis remain in place in many jurisdictions. The proportion of people incorrectly perceiving vaping as more dangerous than smoking increased substantially, by about 16 percentage points in the US according to one study. Another analysis estimates that the use of vapes to quit smoking dropped by about 30%. A 2026 study indicates the rise in misperceptions caused by the episode persisted long past the time the cause was identified.
Bringing consumers more closely into both the investigation and the development of official advice could have avoided much of the confusion. Although information about the likely cause was already public, structured consultation with consumer groups could have helped agencies evaluate it and anticipate how smokers and vapers would interpret broad warnings. Having these communication channels could have prevented the worsening of mistaken risk perceptions.
One of the most common policy recommendations of tobacco control groups is to restrict or ban most flavoring additives in the e-liquid used in nicotine vapes. The World Health Organization has urged governments to make “all flavouring agents” illegal and a number of countries like the Netherlands, Finland, and China ban or severely limit the flavors that can be legally sold.
These restrictions are often presented as a straightforward and pragmatic measure that acknowledges the tradeoffs between avoiding youth initiation and helping adult smokers transition to something less harmful. Flavors, especially those designed to mimic fruit, candy, or desserts, are presented as primarily tools to make vapes appealing to young non-smokers, with little relevance to vaping as a cessation tool. The UK government’s recent fact sheet explains that “children are attracted to the fruit and sweet flavours of vapes.”
The reality is much messier. Consumer organizations repeatedly emphasize that flavors are much more important to successful switching for smokers than the advocates of restrictions present. They claim this is because of the associative learning experienced by those who switch from cigarettes. The reward of nicotine becomes attached to a new taste, and after a while, the taste of cigarette smoke becomes aversive, making a return to smoking much less likely.
The data are consistent with this. Studies of switching both in the US and in other countries show a significantly higher success rate for people who use non-tobacco flavors. The preference is expressed from the outset: as one of the authors of a 2023 investigation of the effect of flavor advice on switching success said, “less than a third of smokers in our study wanted something that tasted like tobacco.”
The majority of studies on flavor bans show that jurisdictions that implement them end up with more smoking than they would have if policy had been left unchanged. Some examples: a 2026 retail sales study in the US estimated 11-15 more cigarettes sold per flavored pod unsold due to the ban. A 2025 study comparing US states with flavor bans to those without them estimated that young adult smoking was several percentage points [[CHECK: the figure is 3.7 percentage points]] higher than the counterfactual. A 2024 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper concluded that statewide flavor bans “may have generated an unintended consequence by encouraging substitution towards traditional smoking.”
Involving consumers more thoroughly in the development of these policies could have corrected the assumption that flavors don’t matter to adults trying to quit. While the debate about flavors is partly a disagreement about values around how to weigh costs and benefits to different groups, closer attention to what adult smokers were saying about why vaping helped them stay off cigarettes would have turned the observed increases in smoking from an unintended consequence into an anticipated cost to be weighed.
There are structural reasons that the consumer perspective often seems to get lost. Some of the most impactful channels through which it could arrive tend to be closed off.
The most influential gathering in terms of direct impact on national policies is the Conference of the Parties of the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC COP), held every two years and bringing together representatives from more than 180 countries. This is the only global treaty body on tobacco, with its outputs treated as authoritative by courts and governments worldwide. FCTC COP assembles both government and non-government attendees. The latter go through a stringent screening process regulated by rules of procedure incorporating Article 5.3 of the treaty and must be international or regional organizations conforming with the “spirit, purpose and principles” of the convention.
In practice, no consumer organization has ever been approved for observer status at COP. The Bureau has repeatedly recommended rejecting the application of the International Network of Nicotine Consumer Organizations, and in 2021 gave the same response to a bid from the New Nicotine Alliance, a volunteer-run UK consumer group.
Other similar international bodies focused on global policy operate much more openly. For example, the COP organized around the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change admits organizations by default unless at least a third of parties objects, and admission implies invitation to future conferences unless someone actively raises an objection. The governing board of UNAIDS, the international health body focused on addressing HIV, deliberately includes an NGO delegation whose rules require at least three members living with HIV.
One other and less formal factor is stigma against people who smoke, which has grown not only as an organic response against the risks to third parties, but as a side effect of the deliberate strategy of “denormalization” developed by the antismoking movement in an attempt to reduce use. The idea originated in the late 1980s and was made explicit in California’s first statewide tobacco control program, later described by the government as seeking to “indirectly influence current and potential future tobacco users by creating a social milieu and legal climate in which tobacco becomes less desirable, less acceptable and less accessible.” Researchers acknowledged that these efforts “fostered a social transformation that involves the stigmatization of smokers” and that “stigmatization of smokers is an unrecognized force in the tobacco epidemic,” one they credited with helping increase quitting due to social pressure.
When the preferences of people who smoke are seen as less legitimate than those of people who don’t, it’s easier for both policymakers and researchers to give them less weight in their work. As the head of the FCTC Secretariat once said, approvingly quoting a statement by youth activists attending the COP: “The interests of the tobacco industry, or even of smokers, should never serve as justification for legitimizing products that could send even a single child down the path of addiction.”
The concerns motivating these barriers aren’t imaginary. While tacit knowledge can be both important and underappreciated, there are also reasons to be cautious about claims coming from consumers.
Members of consumer organizations represent a small and selected subset of people who’ve used safer nicotine products, predominantly those who feel they’ve benefited from harm reduction. People who didn’t manage to switch, developed more rather than less compulsive habits after switching, and those who experienced adverse effects, are much less likely to become advocates. Giving undue weight to the most enthusiastic users can bias data in unintended ways just like ignoring them would. More broadly, tobacco research and policy indirectly affects many people who don’t use the products at all. The public interest broadly construed may stand in tension with the policy that’s ideal for adult smokers looking to quit.
Organizations ostensibly advocating for consumers can also be captured, or deliberately started as astroturf campaigns. In fact, the tobacco industry has done exactly this — an organization called the National Smokers Alliance, created in the 1990s by a PR firm hired by Philip Morris, attempted to present itself as a grassroots organization and to influence policy in the company’s interests. This included urging its members to write letters to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to advocate against workplace smoking bans and attacking researchers publishing work on indoor smoke-free laws.
This makes the reflex of institutional exclusion in tobacco relative to other areas of research and policy more understandable. The FCTC’s Article 5.3 states: “In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.” The Guidelines for Implementation adopted by the COP in 2008 specify the intended stance even more starkly, stating that there is a “fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests” and that this extends beyond the industry to “those working to further its interests.”
Lived experience, while it can help identify blind spots, can also lead to conclusions that aren’t supported by the evidence. Light cigarettes were falsely marketed for decades by the industry as tools for harm reduction. A 2001 study found people who smoked thought these products were in fact less dangerous, partly because they felt less harsh. Expert measurements showed that deeper and more frequent puffing compensates for the tar reduction, leaving the health risks largely unchanged.
I think the examples above make a strong case that the advocates are directionally correct. Greater consumer involvement would help address important shortcomings and improve the field’s epistemics, strengthening efforts to reduce death and disease from smoking. People who use safer nicotine products know things that not enough people involved in the decision-making about them know. While the skeptics have a valid case about the risks, those working in the field have suggested a number of pragmatic measures that could lead to significant improvements while avoiding the most concerning downsides. Some promising approaches:
None of these changes completely solves all of the issues on its own. But each of them opens the door a bit more to evidence that’s currently being overlooked without inviting the tobacco industry to crash through it with misinformation. Like GiveWell updating its moral weights after surveying the people served by its top charities, tobacco control may find that asking more of the people it aims to help improves some of its answers.