Forewarning: I have not read your post (yet).
I argue that moral offsetting is not inherently immoral
(I'm probably just responding to a literal interpretation of what you wrote rather than the intended meaning, but just in case and to provide clarity:) I'm not aware of anyone who argues that offsetting itself is immoral (though EAs have pointed out Ethical offsetting is antithetical to EA).
Rather, the claim that I've seen some people make is that (some subset of) the actions that would normally be impermissible (like buying factory farmed animal products or hiring an assassin) can be permissible if the person doing the action engages in the right kind of offsetting behavior, such as donating money to prevent factory farmed animal suffering or preventing an assassination.
I bring up the assassination example because we'd pretty much all agree that that hiring an assassin is impermissible regardless of what offsetting behavior one does to try to right this wrong. For people who agree that hiring an assassin is wrong regardless of any offsetting behavior, but think there are some other kinds of generally impermissible actions (e.g. buying animal products) that become permissible when one engages in a certain offsetting behavior, I'd be interested in hearing what you think the difference is that makes it apply to the one behavior but not to the hiring of the assassin. (If this is what the OP blog post does, let me know and I'll give it a read.)
I'm also curious if there are less controversial examples than buying animal products where most people agree that offsetting behavior is sufficient to make a generally impermissible action permissible.
Interesting article - thanks for sharing. My main problem with it has to do with the moral psychology piece. You write that:
It's "disgusting and counterintuitive" for most people to imagine offsetting murder.
and
"Most of us still live in extremely carnist cultures and are bombarded with burger ads and sights of people enjoying meat next to us all the time like it is perfectly harmless."
In my opinion, these two arguments together make meat offsets a bad idea. People are opposed to murder offsets (no matter how theoretically effectively they may be) because murder feels like a deeply immoral thing to do. However, most people feel that eating meat is not deeply immoral - most people do it every day. I'd imagine folks react the same way to meat offsets as they do to carbon offsets. They think, "well I know I probably shouldn't eat so much meat / consume so much carbon, but I'm not gonna stop, so this offset makes some sense". But this is the wrong way to think about eating meat (and perhaps consuming carbon, too, but that's beside the point). We want people to feel that eating meat is immoral; we want them to feel that it's a form of killing a sentient being. And the availability of an offset trivializes the consumption.
I'm on board with your consequentialist reasoning here, but I'm worried the availability meat offsets may cause people's moral opinion on animal ethics to regress.