The UX has so much improvement since the 2022 version of this :-) It feels concise and the scrolling to each new graph makes it interesting to learn each new thing. Kudos to whoever designed it this way!

Just to play devil's advocate (without harmful intentions :-), what are the largest limitations or disclaimers that we should keep in mind regarding your results or methods?

Sorry if I missed this in your post, but how many policies did you analyse that were passed via referendum vs. by legislation? How many at the state level vs. federal US vs. international?

@trevor1 Thank you for the detailed response!

RE: Crossposting to LessWrong

• I've crossposted it now. If there are other forums relevant to cybersecurity topics in EA in particular, I'd appreciate suggestions :-)

RE: Personal Cybersecurity and IoT

• Yes, I agree that the best way to improve cybersecurity with personal IoT devices is to avoid them. I'll update the wording to be more clear about that. 

Here's a summary of the report from Claude-1 if someone's looking for an 'abstract':

There are several common misconceptions about biological weapons that contribute to underestimating the threat they pose. These include seeing them as strategically irrational, not tactically useful, and too risky for countries to pursue.

In reality, biological weapons have served strategic goals for countries in the past like deterrence and intimidation. Their use could also provide tactical advantages in conflicts.

Countries have historically taken on substantial risks in pursuing risky weapons programs when they believe the strategic benefits outweigh the costs. Accidents and blowback would not necessarily deter programs.

Decisions around biological weapons activities are not always top-down and known to all national leaders. Bureaucratic and individual interests can influence programs apart from formal policy.

International norms and laws alone are insufficient to deter or discover clandestine biological weapons work given lack of verification. COVID has shown existing vulnerabilities.

Dispelling these misconceptions is important for strengthening defenses against the real biological weapons threat, which pandemic has shown remains serious despite decades of effort. More investment is needed. 

"There are many other things that could have been done to prevent Russia’s unprovoked, illegal attack on Ukraine. Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons is not one of them."

• Could you explain your thinking more for those not familiar with the military strategy involved? What about having nuclear weapons makes an invasion more viable? Which specific alternatives would be more useful in preventing the attacks and why?

Context: I'm hoping to learn lessons in nuclear security that are transferable to AI safety and biosecurity. 

Question: Would you have any case studies or advice to share on how regulatory capture and lobbying was mitigated in US nuclear security regulations and enforcement?

Are there any misconceptions, stereotypes, or tropes that you commonly see in academic literature around nuclear security or biosecurity that you could correct given your perspective inside government?

Could you share the top 3 constraints and benefits you had in improving global nuclear security while you were working for the US DoD compared to now, when you're working as an academic?  

Context: I'm hoping to find lessons from nuclear security that are transferable to the security of bioweapons and transformative AI. 

Question: Are there specific reports you could recommend on prevening these nuclear security risks:

• Insider threats (including corporate/foreign espionage)
• Cyberattacks
• Arms races
• Illicit / black market proliferation
• Fog of war