Hey Lukas,

Thanks for the detailed reply. You raise a number of different interesting points and I’m not going to touch on all of them, given a lack of time but there are a few I want to highlight.

the discussion under "An outside view on having strong views" would benefit from discussing how much normative ethics is analogous to science and how much it is anologous to something more like personal career choice (which weaves together personal interests but still has objective components where research can be done -- see also my post on life goals).

While I can see how you might make this claim, I don’t really think ethics is very analogous to personal career choice. Analogies are always limited (more on this later) but I think this analogy probably implies too much “personal fit” in career choice which are often a lot about “well, what do you like to do?” so much as they are “this is what will happen if you do that?”. I think you’re largely making the case more for the former, with some part of the latter and for morality I might push for a different combination, even assuming a version of anti-realism. But perhaps all this breaks down on what you think of career choice, where I don’t have particularly strong takes.

I think anti-realism is obviously true, but I don't mean the "anything goes" type of anti-realism, so I'm not unsympathetic to your overall takeaway.

Still, even though I agree with your response to the "anything goes" type of anti-realism, I think you'd ideally want to engage more with metaethical uncertainty and how moral reflection works if (the more structure-containing) moral anti-realism is true.

You’re right I haven’t engaged here about what normative uncertainty means in that circumstance but I think, practically, it may look a lot like the type of bargaining and aggregation referenced in this post (and outlined elsewhere), just with a different reason for why people are engaged in that behavior. In one case, it’s largely because that’s how we’d come to the right answer but in other cases it would be because there’s no right answer to the matter and the only way to resolve disputes is through aggregating opinions across different people and belief systems.

That said, I believe–correct me if I’m wrong–your posts are arguing for a particularly narrow version of realism that is more constrained than typical and that there’s a tension between moral realism and moral uncertainty.

Stepping back a bit, I think a big thrust of my post is that you generally shouldn’t make statements like “anti-realism is obviously true” because the nature of evidence for that claim is pretty weak, even if the nature of the arguments for you reaching that conclusion were clear and are internally compelling to you. You’ve defined moral realism narrowly so perhaps this is neither here nor there but, as you may be aware, most English-speaking philosophers accept/lean towards moral realism despite you noting in this comment that many EAs who have been influential have been anti-realists (broadly defined). This isn’t compelling evidence, but it is evidence against the claim that anti-realism is "obviously correct” since you are at least implicitly claiming most philosophers are wrong about this issue.

What this means is that moral uncertainty almost by necessity (there's a trivial exception where your confidence in moral realism is based on updating to someone's else's expertise but they have not yet told you the true object-level morality that they believe in) implies either metaethical uncertainty (uncertainty between moral realism and moral anti-realism) or confident moral anti-realism.

I’ve read your post on moral uncertainty and moral realism being in tension (and the first post where you defined moral realism) and I’m not sold on the responses you provide to your challenge. Take this section:

Still, I think the notion of “forever inaccessible moral facts” is incomprehensible, not just pointless. Perhaps(?) we can meaningfully talk about “unreachable facts of unknown nature,” but it seems strange to speak of unreachable facts of some known nature (such as “moral” nature). By claiming that a fact is of some known nature, aren’t we (implicitly) saying that we know of a way to tell why that fact belongs to the category? If so, this means that the fact is knowable, at least in theory, since it belongs to a category of facts whose truth-making properties we understand. If some fact were truly “forever unknowable,” it seems like it would have to be a fact of a nature we don’t understand. Whatever those forever unknowable facts may be, they couldn’t have anything to do with concepts we already understand, such as our “moral concepts” of the form (e.g.,) “Torturing innocent children is wrong.”

I could retort here that it seems totally reasonable to argue that there’s a fact of the matter about what caused the Big Bang or how life on Earth began. What caused these could conceivably be totally inaccessible to us now but still related to known facts. Nothing about not knowing how these things started commits us to say–what I take to be the equivalent in this context–that the true nature of those situations has nothing to do with concepts we understand like biology or physics. Further, given what we know now in these domains, I think it’s fair to rule out a wide range of potential causes of them and constrain things to a reasonable set of targets that it may have caused them.

The analogy here seems reasonable enough with morality to me that you shouldn’t rule this type of response out.

Similarly, you say the following to branch two of possible responses to your claim:

To summarize, the issue with self-evident moral statements like “Torturing innocent children is wrong” is that they don’t provide any evidence for a moral reality that covers disagreements in population ethics or accounts of well-being. To be confident moral realists, we’d need other ways of attaining moral knowledge and ascertaining the parts of the moral reality beyond self-evident statements. In other words, we can’t be confident moral realists about a far-reaching, non-trivial, not-immediately-self-evident moral reality unless we already have a clear sense of what it looks like.

I don’t fully buy this argument for similar reasons to the above. This seems more like an argument that to be confident moral realists who assert correct answers to most/all the important questions we need strong evidence of moral realism in most/all domains than it is an argument that we can’t be moral realists at all. One way I might take this (not saying you’d agree) would be to say you think moral realism that isn’t action guiding on the contentious points isn’t moral realism worth the name because all the value of the name is in the contentious points (and this may be particularly true in EA). But if that phrasing of the problem is acceptable, then we may be basically only arguing about the definition of “moral realism” and not anything practically relevant. Or, one could say we can’t be confident moral realists given the uncertainty about what morality entails in a great many cases and I might retort “we don’t need to be confident in order to choose among the plausible options so long as we can whittle things down to restricted set of choices and everything isn’t up for grabs.” This would be for basically the same reasons a huge number of potential options aren’t relevant for settling on the correct theory of abiogenesis or taking the right scientific actions given the set of plausible theories.

But perhaps a broader issue is I, unlike many other effective altruists, am actually cool with (in your words) “minimalist moral realism” being fine and using aggregation methods like those mentioned above to come to final takes about what to do given the uncertainty. This is quite different from confidently stating “the correct answer is this precise version of utilitarianism, and here’s what it says we need to do…”. I don’t think what I’m comfortable saying obviously qualifies as an insignificant moral realism relative to such a utilitarian even if the reasons for reaching the suggested actions differed.

But stepping back, this back and forth looks like another example of the move I criticized above because you are making some analogies and arguing some conclusion follows from those analogies, I’m denying those analogies, and therefore denying the conclusion, and making different analogies. Neither of us has the kind of definitive evidence on their side that prevails in science domains here.

So, how confident am I that you’re wrong? Not super confident. If the version of moral anti-realism you say is true and it results in something like your life-goals framework as the best way to decide ethical matters, then so be it. But the question is what to do given uncertainty that this is the correct approach, and that assuming it’s the correct approach we know what it recommends differs from how we’d otherwise behave. I don’t think it’s clear to me meta-ethical uncertainty about realism or anti-realism is a highly relevant factor in deciding what to do unless, again, someone is embracing a “anything goes” kind of anti-realism which neither of us are endorsing.

Hey Saulius,

I’m very sorry that you felt that way – that wasn’t our intention. We aren’t going to get into the details of your resignation in public, but as you mention in your follow up comment, neither this incident, nor our disagreement over WAW views were the reason for your resignation.

As you recall, you did publish your views on wild animal welfare publicly. Because RP leadership was not convinced by the reasoning in your piece, we rejected your request to publish it under the RP byline as an RP article representative of an RP position. This decision was based on the work itself; OP was not at all a factor involved in this decision. Moreover, we made no attempt to censor your views or prevent them from being shared (indeed I personally encouraged you to publish the piece if you wanted).

To add some additional context without getting into the details of this specific scenario, we can share some general principles about how we approach donor engagement.

We have ~40 researchers working across a variety of areas. Many of them have views about what we should do and what research should be done. By no means do we expect our staff to publicly or privately agree with the views of leadership, let alone with our donors. Still, we have a donor engagement policy outlining how we like to handle communication with donors.

One relevant dimension is that we think that if one of our researchers, especially while representing RP, is sending something to a funder that has a plausible implication that one of the main funders of a department should seriously reduce or stop funding that department, we should know they are planning to do so before they do so, and roughly what is being said so that we can be prepared. While we don’t want to be seen as censoring our researchers, we do think it’s important to approach these sorts of things with clarity and tact.

There are also times when we think it is important for RP to speak with a unified voice to our most important donors and represent a broader, coordinated consensus on what we think. Or, if minority views of one of our researchers that RP leadership disagrees with are to be considered, this needs to be properly contextualized and coordinated so that we can interact with our donors with full knowledge of what is being shared with them (for example, we don’t want to accidentally convey that the view of a single member of staff represents RP’s overall position).

With regard to cause prioritization, funders don’t filter or factor into our views in any way. They haven’t been involved in any way with setting what we do or don’t say in our cause prioritization work. Further, as far as I’m aware, OP hasn’t adopted the kind of approach we’ve suggested on any of our major cause prioritization on moral weight or as seen in the CURVE sequence.

We mean to say that the ideas for these projects and the vast majority of the funding were ours, including the moral weight work. To be clear, these projects were the result of our own initiative. They wouldn't have gone ahead when they did without us insisting on their value.

For example, after our initial work on invertebrate sentience and moral weight in 2018-2020, in 2021 OP funded $315K to support this work. In 2023 they also funded $15K for the open access book rights to a forthcoming book based on the topic. In that period of 2021-2023, for public-facing work we spent another ~$603K on moral weight work with that money coming from individuals and RP's unrestricted funding.

Similarly, the CURVE sequence of WIT this year was our idea and we are on track to spend ~$900K against ~$210K funded by Open Phil on WIT. Of that $210K the first $152K was on projects related to Open Phil’s internal prioritization and not the public work of the CURVE sequence. The other $58K went towards the development of the CCM. So overall less than 10% of our costs for public WIT work this year was covered by OP (and no other institutional donors were covering it either).

Hey Vasco, thanks for the thoughtful reply.

I do find fanaticism problematic at a theoretical level since it suggests spending all your time and resources on quixotic quests. I would go one further and say I think if you have a series of axioms and it proposes something like fanaticism, this should at least potentially count against that combination of axioms. That said, I definitely think, as Hayden Wilkinson pointed out in his In Defence of Fanaticism paper, there are many weaknesses with alternatives to EV.

Also, the idea that fanaticism doesn’t come up in practice doesn’t seem quite right to me. On one level, yeah, I’ve not been approached by a wizard asking for my wallet and do not expect to be. But I'm also not actually likely going to be approached by anyone threatening to money-pump me (and even if I were I could reject the series of bets) and this is often held as a weakness to EV alternatives or certain sets of beliefs. On another level, in some sense to the extent I think we can say fanatical claims don’t come up in practice it is because we’ve already decided it’s not worth pursuing them and discount the possibility, including the possibility of going looking for actions that would be fanatical.* Within the logic of EV, even if you thought there weren’t any ways to get the fanatical result with ~99% certainty, it would seem you’d need to be ~100% certain to fully shut the door on at least expending resources seeing if it’s possible you could get the fanatical option. To the extent we don’t go around doing that I think it’s largely because we are practically rounding down those fanatical possibilities to 0 without consideration (to be clear, I think this is the right approach).

All the other problems attributed to expected utility maximisaton only show up if one postulates the possibility of unbounded or infite value, which I do not think makes sense

I don’t think this is true. As I said in response to Michael St. Jules in the comments, EV maximization (and EV with rounding down unless it’s modified here too) also argues for a kind of edge-case fanaticism, where provided a high enough EV if successful you are obligated to take an action that’s 50.000001% positive in expectation even if the downside is similarly massive.

It’s really not clear to me the rational thing to do is consistently bet on actions that would impact a lot of possible lives but, say ~0.0001% chance of making a difference and are net positive in expectation but have a ~49.999999% chance of causing lots of harm. This seems like a problem even within a finite and bounded utility function for pure EV.

I am confused about why RP is still planning to invest significant resources in global health and development… Maybe a significant fraction of RP's team believes non-hedonic benefits to be a major factor?

I’ve not polled internally but I don’t think non-hedonic benefits issue is a driving force inside RP. Speaking for myself, I do think hedonism is makes up for at least more than half of what makes things valuable at least in part for the reasons outlined in that post.

The reasons we work across areas in general are because of differences in the amount of money in the areas, the number of influenceable actors, the non-fungibility of the resources in the spaces (both money and talent), and moral and decision-theoretic uncertainty.

In this particular comparison case of GHD and AW, there’s hundreds of millions more of plausibly influenceable dollars in the GHD space than in the AW space. For example, GiveWell obviously isn’t going to shift their resources to animal welfare, but they still move a lot of money and could do so more effectively in certain cases. GiveWell alone is likely larger than all of the farm animal welfare spending in the world by non-governmental actors combined, and that includes a large number of animal actors I think it’s not plausible to affect with research. Further, I think most people who work in most spaces aren’t “cause neutral” and, for example, the counterfactual of all our GHD researchers isn’t being paid by RP to do AW research that influences even a fraction of the money they could influence in GHD.

Additionally, you highlight that AW looks more cost-effective than GHD but you did not note that AMF looked pretty robustly positive across different decision theories and this was not true, say, of any of the x-risk interventions we considered in the series and some of the animal interventions. So, one additional reason to do GHD work is the robustness of the value proposition.

Ultimately, though, I’m still unsure about what the right overall approach is to these types of trade-offs and I hope further work from WIT can help clarify how best to make these tradeoffs between areas.

*A different approach is to resist this conclusion is to assert a kind of claim that you must drop your probability in claims of astronomical value, and that this always balances out increases in claims of value such that it's never rational within EV to act on these claims. I'm not certain this is wrong but, like with other approaches to this issue, within the logic of EV it seems you need to be at ~100% certainty this is correct to not pursue fanatical claims anyway. You could say in reply the rules of EV reasoning don't apply to claims about how you should reason about EV itself, and maybe that's right and true. But these sure seem like patches on a theory with weaknesses, not clear truths anyone is compelled to accept at the pain of being irrational. Kludges and patches on theories are fine enough. It's just not clear to me this possible move is superior to, say, just biting that you need to do rounding down to avoid this type of outcome.

Thanks for the engagement, Michael.

I largely agree with your notes and caveats.

However, on this:

Expected utility maximization can be guaranteed to avoid fanaticism while satisfying the standard EUT axioms (and countable extensions), with a bounded utility function and the bounds small enough or marginal returns decreasing fast enough, in relative terms… In my view, expected utility with a bounded utility function (not difference-making) is the most instrumentally rational of the options, and it and boundedness with respect to differences seem the most promising, but have barely been discussed in the sequence (if it all?). I would recommend exploring these options more.

I’m definitely in for exploring a variety of more options. We didn’t explore all possible options in this series, and I think we could, in theory, spend a lot more time investigating possible options including some of the combinations of theories, and more edge case versions of particular views like WLU you lay out.

However, I think while it is plausible EV could avoid some version of fanaticism that way, it still seems vulnerable to a very related issue like the following.

It seems there are actually two places for EV where rounding down or bound setting needs to happen to avoid issues with particularly risky gambles. (1) For really low probabilities (i.e. 1 in 100 trillion) with really high outcomes and (2) around the 50% line distinguishing actions that lean net positive from those that are neutral or negative in expectation. Conceptually, these are very similar but practically there may be different implications for doing them.

While it seems a bounded EV function with a function that assigns marginal returns a really steep decline could avoid the fanaticism of (1) (though this itself creates counterintuitive results), it doesn’t seem like this type of solution alone would resolve the issue where the the decision point is whether something is lean net positive but possibly only barely of (2).That is, there are many choices about actions where the sign of the action is uncertain and this applies, among other things, to x-risk interventions that have the possibility of having a very large expected utility if the action succeeds. Practically, it seems these types of choices are likely very common for charitable actors.

If despite a really large expected utility in your bounded function, you don’t think we should always take an action that is only, say, 50.0001% positive in expectation you wind up in a very similar place with regard to being “mugged” by high value outcomes that are not just unlikely to pay out but almost equally as likely to cause harm, then you think something has gone awry in EV. And it doesn’t seem reasonable bounds designed for avoiding really low probabilities but high EV outcomes will help you avoid this.

To be clear, I haven’t reasoned this out entirely, and I will just preemptively grant it’s possible you could create a different “bound” that would act on not just small probabilities, but also on these edge-cases where EU suggests taking these types of gambles. But if you do that this looks a lot like what you are doing is introducing a difference-making criteria to your decision theory. To the extent you may think this type of modified EU is viable, it is because it mimics the aversion of these other theories to certain types of uncertainty.

Basically, I’m actually not confident that this type of modification should matter much for us. The axiom choices matter here for which theory to put the most weight in but I’m unsure this type of distinction is buying you much practically if, say, after you make them you still end up with a set of theoretical options that look in practice like pure EV vs EV with rounding down vs something like WLU vs something like REU.

EDIT: grammar fix.

In trying to convince people to support global health charities I don't think I've ever gotten the objection "but people in other countries don't matter" or "they matter far less than Americans", while I expect vegan advocates often hear that about animals.

I have gotten the latter one explicitly and the former implicitly, so I'm afraid you should get out more often :).

More generally, that foreigners and/or immigrants don't matter, or matter little compared to native born locals, is fundamental to political parties around the world. It's a banal take in international politics. Sure, some opposition to global health charities is an implied or explicit empirical claim about the role of government. But fundamentally, not all of it as a lot of people don't value the lives of the out-group and people not in your country are in the out-group (or at least not in the in-group) for much of the world's population.

First, I think GiveWell's research, say, is mostly consumed by people who agree people matter equally regardless of which country they live in.

GiveWell donors are not representative of all humans. I think a large fraction of humanity would select the "we're all equal" option on a survey but clearly don't actually believe it or act on it (which brings us back to revealed preferences in trades like those humans make about animal lives).

But even if none of that is true, were someone to make this argument about the value of the global poor, the best moral (I make no claims about what's empirically persuasive) response is "make a coherent and defensible argument against the equal moral worth of humans including the global poor", and not something like "most humans actually agree that the global poor have equal value so don't stray too far from equality in your assessment." If you do the latter, you are making a contingent claim based on a given population at a given time. To put it mildly, for most of human history I do not believe we even would have gotten people to half-heartedly select the "moral equality for all humans" option on a survey. For me at least, we aren't bound in our philosophical assessment of value by popular belief here or for animal welfare.

David's post is here: Perceived Moral Value of Animals and Cortical Neuron Count

What do you think of this rephrasing of your original argument:

I suspect people rarely get deeply interested in the the value of foreign aid unless they come in with an unusually high initial intuitive view that being human is what matters, not being in my country... If you somehow could convince a research group, not selected for caring non-Americans, to pursue this question in isolation, I'd predict they'd end up with far less foreign aid-friendly results.

I think this argument is very bad and I suspect you do too. You can rightfully point out that in this context someone starting out at the 5th percentile before going into a foreign aid investigation and then determining foreign aid is much more valuable than the general population thinks would be, in some sense, stronger evidence than if they had instead started at the 95th percentile. However, that seems not super relevant. What's relevant is whether it is defensible at all to norm to a population based on their work on a topic given a question of values like this (that or if there were some disanalogy between this and animals).

Generally, I think the typical American when faced with real tradeoffs (they actually are faced with these tradeoffs implicitly as part of a package vote) don't value the lives of the global poor equally to the lives of their fellow Americans. More importantly, I think you shouldn't norm where your values on global poverty end up after investigation back to what the typical American thinks. I think you should weigh the empirical and philosophical evidence about how to value the lives of the global poor directly and not do too much, if any, reference class checking about other people's views on the topic. The same argument holds for whether and how much we should value people 100 years from now after accounting for empirical uncertainty.

Fundamentally, the question isn't what people substantively do think (except for practical purposes), the question is what beliefs are defensible after weighing the evidence. I think it's fine to be surprised by what RP's moral weight work says on capacity for welfare, and I think there are still high uncertainty in this domain. I just don't think either of our priors, or the general population's priors, about the topic should be taken very seriously.

Maybe. We're a little unsure about this right now. The code base for this is part of the bigger Cross-Cause Cost-Effectiveness Model which we haven't made a final determination on whether we will release it.

Jeff, are you saying you think "an intuition that a human year was worth about 100-1000 times more than a chicken year" is a starting point of "unusually pro-animal views"?

In some sense, this seems true relative to most humans' implied views by their actions. But, as Wayne pointed out above, this same critique could apply to, say, the typical American's views about global health and development. Generally, it doesn't seem to buy much to frame things relative to people who've never thought about a given topic substantively and I don't think you'd think this would be a good critique of a foreign aid think tank looking into how much to value global health and development.

Maybe you are making a different point here?

Also, it would help more if you were being explicit about what you think a neutral baseline is. What would you consider more typical or standard views about animals from which to update? Moment to moment human experience is worth 10,000x that of a chicken conditional on chickens being sentient? 1,000,000x? And, whatever your position, why do you think that is a more reasonable starting point?

Thanks for the question, but unfortunately we can not share more about those involved or the total.

I can say we're confident this unlocked millions for something that otherwise wouldn't have happened. We think maybe half of the money moved would not have been spent, and some lesser amount would have been spent on less promising opportunities from an EA perspective.