All of Will Aldred's Comments + Replies

Perhaps this old comment from Rohin Shah could serve as the standard link?

(Note that it’s on the particular case of recommending people do/don’t work at a given org, rather than the general case of praise/criticism, but I don’t think this changes the structure of the argument other than maybe making point 1 less salient.)

Excerpting the relevant part:

On recommendations: Fwiw I also make unconditional recommendations in private. I don't think this is unusual, e.g. I think many people make unconditional recommendations not to go into academia (though I d

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2
Habryka
3d
Yeah, that's a decent link. I do think this comment is more about whether anti-recommendations for organizations should be held to a similar standard. My comment also included some criticisms of Sean personally, which I think do also make sense to treat separately, though at least I definitely intend to also try to debias my statements about individuals after my experiences with SBF in-particular on this dimension.

Thanks, I found this post helpful, especially the diagram.

What (if any) is the overlap of cooperative AI […] and AI safety?

One thing I’ve thought about a little is the possiblility of there being a tension wherein making AIs more cooperative in certain ways might raise the chance that advanced collusion between AIs breaks an alignment scheme that would otherwise work.[1]

  1. ^

    I’ve not written anything up on this and likely never will; I figure here is as good a place as any to leave a quick comment pointing to the potential problem, appreciating that it’s

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Hard to tell from the information given. Two sources saying an unknown number of people are threatening to resign could just mean that two people are disgruntled and might themselves resign.

Hmm, okay, so it sounds like you’re arguing that even if we measure the curvature of our observable universe to be negative, it could still be the case that the overall universe is positively curved and therefore finite? But surely your argument should be symmetric, such that you should also believe that if we measure the curvature of our observable universe to be positive, it could still be the case that the overall universe is negatively curved and thus infinite?

2
Vasco Grilo
2mo
My answer to both questions would be yes. In other words, whether the entire universe is finite or infinite is not a meaningful question to ask because we will never be able to gather empirical evidence to study it.

Thanks for replying, I think I now understand your position a bit better. Okay, so if your concern is around measurements only being finitely precise, then my exactly-zero example is not a great one, because I agree that it’s impossible to measure the universe as being exactly flat.

Maybe a better example: if the universe’s large-scale curvature is either zero or negative, then it necessarily follows that it’s infinite.

—(I didn’t give this example originally because of the somewhat annoying caveats one needs to add. Firstly, in the flat case, that the ... (read more)

2
Vasco Grilo
2mo
Thanks for elaborating! I agree it makes sense to have some probability mass on the universe having null or negative local curvature. However, I think there is no empirical evidence supporting a null or negative global curvature: * One can gather empirical evidence that the observable universe has a topology which, if applicable to the entire universe, would imply an infinite universe. * Yet, by definition, it is impossible to get empirical evidence that the topology of the entire universe matches that of the observable universe. * Inferring an infinite universe based on properties of the observable universe seems somewhat analogous to deducing an infite flat Earth based on the obervable ocean around someone in the sea being pretty flat. Wikipedia's page seems to be in agreement with my 2nd point (emphasis mine): I guess cosmologists may want to assume the properties of the observable universe match those of the entire universe in agreement with the cosmological principle. However, this has only proved to be useful to make predictions in the observable universe, so extending it to the entire universe would not be empirically justifiable. As a result, I get the impression the hypothesis of an infinite universe is not falsifiable, such that it cannot meaningly be true or false.

Hi Vasco, I’m having trouble parsing your comment. For example, if the universe’s large-scale curvature is exactly zero (and the universe is simply connected), then by definition it’s infinite, and I’m confused as to why you think it could still be finite (if this is what you’re saying; apologies if I’m misinterpreting you).

I’m not sure what kind of a background you already have in this domain, but if you’re interested in reading more, I’d recommend first going to the “Shape of the universe” Wikipedia page, and then, depending on your mileage, lecture... (read more)

2
Vasco Grilo
2mo
Thanks for following up, Will! I agree. However, my understanding is that it is impossible to get empirical evidence supporting exactly zero curvature, because all measurements have finite sensitivity. I guess the same applies to the question of whether the universe is simply connected. In general, I assume zeros and infinities do not exist in the real world, even though they are useful in maths and physics to think about limiting processes. Thanks for the links. I had skimmed that Wikipedia page.

I’m confused about why you think forecasting orgs should be trying to acquire commercial clients.[1] How do you see this as being on the necessary path for forecasting initiatives to reduce x-risk, contribute to positive trajectory change, etc.? Perhaps you could elaborate on what you mean by “real-world impact”?

COI note: I work for Metaculus.

  1. ^

    The main exception that comes to mind, for me, is AI labs. But I don’t think you’re talking about AI labs in particular as the commercial clients forecasting orgs should be aiming for?

4
SuperDuperForecasting
2mo
MW Story already said what I wanted to say in response to this, but it should be pretty obvious. If people think of something as more than just a cool parlor trick, but instead regard as useful and actionable, they should be willing to pay hand over fist for it at proper big boy consultancy rates. If they aren't, that strongly suggests that they just don't regard what you're producing as useful.  And to be honest it often isn't very useful. Tell someone "our forecasters think there's a 26% chance Putin is out of power in 2 years" and the response will often be "so what?" That by itself doesn't tell anything about what Putin leaving power might mean for Russia or Ukraine, which is almost certainly what we actually care about (or nuclear war risk, if we're thinking X-risk). The same is true, to a degree, for all these forecasts about AI or pandemics or whatever: they often aren't sharp enough and don't cut to the meat of actual impacts in the real world. But since you're here, perhaps you can answer my question about your clients, or lack thereof? If I were funding Metaculus, I would definitely want it to be more than a cool science project.
8
MWStory
2mo
What better test of the claim "we are producing useful/actionable information about the future, and/or developing workable processes for others to do the same" do we have than some of the thousands of organisations whose survival depends on this kind of information being willing to pay for it? 

What you describe in your first paragraph sounds to me like a good updating strategy, except I would say that you’re not updating your “natural independent opinion,” you’re updating your all-things-considered belief.

Related short posts I recommend—the first explains the distinction I’m pointing at, and the second shows how things can go wrong if people don’t track it:

Fair point, I’ve added a footnote to make this clearer.

AI x-risk is unique because humans would be replaced by other beings, rather than completely dying out. This means you can't simply apply a naive argument that AI threatens total extinction of value

Paul Christiano wrote a piece a few years ago about ensuring that misaligned ASI is a “good successor” (in the moral value sense),[1] as a plan B to alignment (Medium versionLW version). I agree it’s odd that there hasn’t been more discussion since.[2]

Here's a non-exhaustive list of guesses for why I think EAs haven't historically been sympathetic [.

... (read more)
3
Ryan Greenblatt
3mo
It's worth emphasizing that moral welfare of digital minds is quite a different (though related) topic to whether AIs are good successors.

Individually, altruists [...] can make a habit of asking themselves and others what risks they may be overlooking, dismissing, or downplaying.

Institutionally, we can rearrange organizational structures to take these individual tendencies into account, for example by creating positions dedicated to or focused on managing risk.

I’ve been surprised by how this seems to be a bit of a blind spot in our community.[1] I’ve previously written a couple of comments—excerpted below—on this theme, about the state of community building. These garnered a decent numb... (read more)

(Fwiw, the Forum moderation team does this for many of our cases.)

Objection 1: It is unlikely that there will be a point at which a unified agent will be able to take over the world, given the existence of competing AIs with comparable power

For what it’s worth, the Metaculus crowd forecast for the question “Will transformative AI result in a singleton (as opposed to a multipolar world)?” is currently “60%”. That is, forecasters believe it’s more likely than not that there won’t be competing AIs with comparable power, which runs counter to your claim.

(I bring this up seeing as you make a forecasting-based argument for your claim.)

Following on from your saner world illustration, I’d be curious to hear what kind of a call to action you might endorse in our current world.

I personally find your writings on metaphilosophy, and the closely related problem of ensuring AI philosophical competence, persuasive. In other words, I think this area has been overlooked, and that more people should be working in it given the current margin in AI safety work. But I also have a hard time imagining anyone pivoting into this area, at present, given that:[1]

  1. There’s no research agenda wit
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  1. Just talking more about this problem would be a start. It would attract more attention and potentially resources to the topic, and make people who are trying to solve it feel more appreciated and less lonely. I'm just constantly confused why I'm the only person who frequently talks about it in public, given how obvious and serious the problem seems to me. It was more understandable before ChatGPT put AI on everyone's radar, but now it's just totally baffling. And I appreciate you writing this comment. My posts on the topic usually get voted up, but with f
... (read more)

Yes, this is a fair point; Holden has discussed these dangers a little in “Digital People Would Be An Even Bigger Deal”. My bottom-line belief, though, is that mind uploads are still significantly more likely to be safe than ML-derived ASI, since uploaded minds would presumably work, and act, much more similarly to (biological) human minds. My impression is that others also hold this view? I’d be interested if you disagree.

To be clear, I rank moratorium > mind uploads > ML-derived ASI, but I think it’s plausible that our strategy portfolio shoul... (read more)

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Greg_Colbourn
3mo
I agree that they would most likely be safer than ML-derived ASI. What I'm saying is that they still won't be safe enough to prevent an existential catastrophe. It might buy us a bit more time (if uploads happen before ASI), but that might only be measured in years. Moratorium >> mind uploads > ML-derived ASI.

Hmm, based on what you’ve said here—and I acknowledge that what you’ve said is a highly compressed version of your experience, thus I may well be failing to understand you (and I apologize in advance if I mischaracterize your experience)—I think I’m not quite seeing how this refutes my framing? I accept that my type-A/B framing rounds off a bunch of nuance, but to me, within that framing, it sounds like you’re type-A?

Like, I’m not sure how long the transition period was for you, and I expect different people’s transition periods will vary considerably, but... (read more)

-3
Guy Raveh
4mo
Sorry, I originally commented with a much more detailed account but decided I didn't want so much personal info on the forum. On my first attempt at vegetarianism I failed after about a week, and after that I decided to start with avoiding meat at home and at uni. The transition to being fully vegan took about 2.5 years. I was a picky eater so I had a lot of foods and ingredients to get used to. I also improved my cooking abilities a lot during this time. Edit: it's true that I'm now in a phase where it is almost costless for me to be vegan, and I've been in that state for years. My point is rather that I didn't start off like that.

Thanks for your comments, both. I agree that the personal versus universal statements distinction is noteworthy (and missing from my take above).

Shower thought: A lot of the talking past each other that happens between vegan and non-vegan[1] EAs[2] might come from selection effects plus typical mind fallacy.[3]

Let’s say there are two types of people: type-A, for whom a vegan diet imposes little or no costs, and type-B, for whom a vegan diet imposes substantial costs (in things like health, productivity,[4] social life). My hunch is that most long-time vegans are type-A, while most type-B people who try going vegan bounce.

Now, to a type-A vegan who doesn’t realize type-B is a thing, t... (read more)

3
Brad West
3mo
I agree with you that the degree of difficulty in going vegan is personal and quite variable. This is one of the reasons I have thought developing an easy way of offsetting through animal welfare donations for meat consumption could be a very effective program.
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Guy Raveh
4mo
FWIW my personal experience doesn't square with this. It was initially hard for me but after a transition period where I got accustomed to new foods, it got much easier. For most people - those who are medically able to do it - I think this would be the case.

This doesn't super resonate with my experience. I haven't really seen anyone argue for "veganism is costly for everyone". I feel like the debate has always been between "for some people veganism is very costly" and "veganism is very cheap for everyone (if they just try properly)". 

Like, it's not like anyone is arguing that there should be no vegan food at EAG, or that all EAs should be carnivores. Maybe I am missing something here and there are places where people are talking past each other in the way you describe, but e.g. recent conversations with ... (read more)

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Karthik Tadepalli
4mo
Probably right, and also applies to "high-donating" vs "low-donating" EAs.

Just to give your final point some context: the average in-depth research project by Rethink Priorities reportedly costs $70K-$100K. So, if this AI Impacts survey cost $138K in participant compensation, plus some additional amount for things like researcher time, then it looks like this survey was two or three times more expensive than the average research project in its approximate reference class.

I haven’t thought hard about whether the costs of EA-funded research make sense in general, but I thought I’d leave this comment so that readers don’t go a... (read more)

I’m curious, since it sounds like MIRI folks may have thought about this, if you have takes on how best to allocate marginal effort between pushing for cooperation-to-halt-AI-progress on the one hand, and accelerating cognitive enhancement (e.g., mind uploading) on the other?[1]

Like, I see that you list promoting cooperation as a priority, but to me, based on your footnote 3, it doesn’t seem obvious that promoting cooperation to buy ourselves time is a better strategy at the margin than simply working on mind uploading.[2] (At least, I don’t see this ... (read more)

1
Greg_Colbourn
3mo
I think there is an unstated assumption here that uploading is safe. And by safe, I mean existentially safe for humanity[1]. If in addition to being uploaded, a human is uplifted to superintelligence, would they -- indeed any given human in such a state -- be aligned enough with humanity as a whole to not cause an existential disaster? Arguably humans right now are only relatively existentially safe because power imbalances between them are limited. Even the nicest human could accidentally obliterate the rest of us if uplifted to superintelligence and left running for subjective millions of years (years of our time). "Whoops, I didn't expect that to happen from my little physics experiment"; "Uploading everyone into a hive mind is what my extrapolations suggested was for the best (and it was just so boring talking to you all at one word per week of my time)". 1. ^ Although safety for the individual being uploaded would be far from guaranteed either. 
0
Hayven Frienby
4mo
Thank you for this well-sourced comment. I'm not affiliated with MIRI, so I can't answer the questions directed to the OP. With that said, I did have a small question to ask you. What would be your issue with simply accepting human fragility and limits? Does the fact that we don't and can't know everything, live no more than a century, and are at risk for disease and early death mean that we should fundamentally alter our nature?  I think the best antidote to the present moment's dangerous dance with AI isn't mind uploading or transhumanism, but acceptance. We can accept that we are animals, that we will not live forever, and that any ultimate bliss or salvation won't come via silicon. We can design policies that ensure these principles are always upheld. 
9
Geoffrey Miller
4mo
Will - we seem to be many decades away from being able to do 'mind uploading' or serious levels of cognitive enhancement, but we're probably only a few years away from extremely dangerous AI.  I don't think that betting on mind uploading or cognitive enhancement is a winning strategy, compared to pausing, heavily regulating, and morally stigmatizing AI development. (Yes, given a few generations of iterated embryo selection for cognitive ability, we could probably breed much smarter people within a century or two. But they'd still run a million times slower than machine intelligences. As for mind uploading, we have nowhere near the brain imaging abilities required to do whole-brain emulations of the sort envisioned by Robin Hanson)

Also, I’m pretty sure that octopuses do play? A quick search appears to confirm this: “Octopuses like to play” (BBC).

I mention this in response to the part of the post that reads: “Other animals like fish, reptiles, and octopuses do not engage in sensation-seeking or play and so do not have those internal conscious experiences.”

(ETA: I see that in their closing section, OP acknowledges some uncertainty here, listing as a question for further investigation: “Is it really true that fish, shrimp, octopuses, and other animals of particular concern do not engag... (read more)

9
MichaelStJules
4mo
EDIT: I don't think I had the right idea of what sensory play is. Sensory play seems to be a kind of exploratory play directed at things with novel or unusual sensory properties, like sand, bubbles, squishy things, different sounds, different smells, etc.. This and this, where fish are thrown into the water and come back and thrown again, also looks like sensory play (unless I've misunderstood what Humphrey meant). But, there might be other explanations, e.g. maybe the fish aren't coming back to be thrown again, but because they've been trained to, or because they want something else. It doesn't seem like something they'd specifically have been evolved to be motivated by this, given how unnatural it is.   There's also this study of ball-rolling in bumble bees that the authors conclude meets the criteria for play:   Rethink Priorities collected some evidence of play behaviour across species. From their Welfare Range Table (EA Forum post):    
5
ben.smith
4mo
Actually, I have to correct my earlier reply. Iirc the argument is that all conscious animals engage in physical play, not necessarily that all playful animals are conscious. On the other hand, Humphrey does say that all animals engaging in pure sensation-seeking type play are conscious, so that's probably the sort of play he'd need to bring him around on octopuses.
6
ben.smith
4mo
Humphrey spent a lot of time saying that authors like Peter Godfrey-Smith (whose book on octopus sociality and consciousness I have read, and also recommend) are wrong or not particularly serious when they argue that octopus behavior is play, because there are more mundane explanations for play-like behavior. I can't recall too much detail here because I no longer have Humphrey's book in my possession. In any case I think if you convinced him octopuses do play he would probably change his mind on octopuses without needing to modify any aspects of the overall theory. He'd just need to concede that the way consciousness developed in warm blooded creatures is not the only way it has developed in evolutionary history.

Upvoted because I’m a fan of people summarizing and signal-boosting literature that bears on EA priorities. Disagree-voted because I’m not convinced that any of the observations or considerations put forward support the headline claim that only mammals and birds are sentient.

Also, I’m pretty sure that octopuses do play? A quick search appears to confirm this: “Octopuses like to play” (BBC).

I mention this in response to the part of the post that reads: “Other animals like fish, reptiles, and octopuses do not engage in sensation-seeking or play and so do not have those internal conscious experiences.”

(ETA: I see that in their closing section, OP acknowledges some uncertainty here, listing as a question for further investigation: “Is it really true that fish, shrimp, octopuses, and other animals of particular concern do not engag... (read more)

I'm sure ~everyone involved considers nuclear war a negative-sum game. (They likely still think it's preferable to win a nuclear war than to lose it, but they presumably think the "winner" doesn't gain as much as the "loser" loses.)

On top of this, I imagine most involved view not fighting a nuclear war as preferable to fighting and winning. (In other words, a nuclear war is not only negative on net, but negative for everyone.)[1]

Yeah, my sense is multiple countries will upgrade their arsenals soon. I'm legitimately uncertain whether this will on net increa

... (read more)

Writing in a personal capacity.

Hi Geoffrey, I think you raise a very reasonable point.

There’s some unfortunate timing at play here: 3/7 of the active mod team—Lizka, Toby, and JP—have been away at a CEA retreat for the past ~week, and have thus mostly been offline. In my view, we would have ideally issued a proper update by now on the earlier notice: “For the time being, please do not post personal information that would deanonymize Alice or Chloe.”

In lieu of that, I’ll instead publish one of my comments from the moderators’ Slack thread, along w... (read more)

I think what this comes down to for me is: If Kat Woods’ Forum username was pseudonymous, would we have taken down Ben’s post? (Or otherwise removed all references to Kat by her real name?)

If the answer to this is “yes,” then I don’t think Alice+Chloe should be deanonymized.

 

I do not like the incentive structure that this would create if adopted. Kat did not get to look at this particular drama and decide whether she wanted it discussed under a real or pseudonymous username. Her decision point was when she created her forum account however many years ... (read more)

Will - thanks very much for sharing your views, and some of the discussion amongst the EA Forum moderators.

These are tricky issues, and I'm glad to see that they're getting some serious attention, in terms of the relative costs, benefits, and risks of different possible politicies.

I'm also concerned about 'setting a precedent of first-mover advantage'. A blanket policy of first-mover (or first-accuser) anonymity would incentivize EAs to make lots of allegations before the people they're accusing could make counter-allegations. That seems likely to create massive problems, conflicts, toxicity, and schisms within EA. 

Thanks for sharing this!

I had a bunch of thoughts on this situation, enough that I wrote them up as a post. Unfortunately your response came out while I was writing and I didn't see it, but I think doesn't change much?

In addition to your three paths forward, I see a fourth one: you extend the policy to have the moderators (or another widely-trusted entity) make decisions on when there should be exceptions in cases like this, and write a bit about how you'll make those decisions.

9
Jason
4mo
I wouldn't classify Ben's post as containing fully anonymous allegations. There was a named community member who implicitly vouched for the allegations having enough substance to lay before the Forum community. That means there was someone in a position to accept social and legal fallout if the decision to post those allegations is proven to have been foolhardy. That seems to be a substantial safeguard against the posting of spurious nonsense. Maybe having such a person identified didn't work out here, but I think it's worth distinguishing between this case and a truly anonymous situation (e.g., burner account registered with throwaway account doing business via Tor, with low likelihood that even the legal system could identify the actual poster for imposition of consequences). That could be a feature rather than a bug for reasons similar to those described above. Deanonymizing someone who claims to be a whistleblower is a big deal -- and arguably we should require an identified poster to accept the potential social and legal fallout if that decision wasn't warranted, as a way of discouraging inappropriate deanonymization. 

(I only came across this post because I saw your comment; agree that it's breathtakingly moving :')  If the author sees this: I appreciate you, and I too would definitely subscribe.)

Writing in a personal capacity.

An update to our policies on revealing personal information on the Forum” covers some of what you’re asking about, I think, although the framing there is more about revealing private vs public info than about “How substantiated is substantiated enough?” The most relevant part:

  1. We think a very good norm is to check unverified rumors or claims before sharing them — especially if they might be damaging or if they relate to sensitive or stigmatized topics.
    1. If you’re not sure whether you should check something (or how to check
... (read more)

Yeah, this is a reasonable thing to ask. So, the “if we have reason to believe that someone is violating norms around voting” clause is intentionally vague, I believe, because if we gave more detail on the kinds of checks/algorithms we have in place for flagging potential violations, then this could help would-be miscreants commit violations that slip past our checks.

(I’m a bit sad that the framing here is adversarial, and that we can’t give users like you more clarification, but I think this state of play is the reality of running an online forum.)

If it helps, though, the bar for looking into a user’s voting history is high. Like, on average I don’t think we do this more than once or twice per month.

4
lilly
4mo
Thanks, this is also helpful! One thing to think about (and no need to tell me), is whether making the checks public could effectively disincentivize the bad behavior (like how warnings about speed cameras may as effectively disincentivize speeding as the cameras do themselves). But if there are easy workarounds, I can see why this wouldn’t be viable.

Writing in a personal capacity; I haven't run this by other mods.

Hi, just responding to these parts of your comment:

I think people might reasonably (though wrongly) assume that forum mods are not monitoring accounts at this level of granularity, and thus believe that their voting behavior is private.

...

Frankly, I don’t love that mods are monitoring accounts at this level of granularity. (For instance, knowing this would make me less inclined to put remotely sensitive info in a forum dm.)

We include some detail on what would lead moderators to look into a us... (read more)

6
lilly
4mo
Thanks; this is helpful and reassuring, especially re: the DMs. I had read this section of the norms page, and it struck me that the “if we have reason to believe that someone is violating norms around voting” clause was doing a lot of work. I would appreciate more clarification about what would lead mods to believe something like this (and maybe some examples of how you’ve come to have such beliefs). But this is not urgent, and thanks for the clarification you’ve already provided.
8
Lorenzo Buonanno
4mo
Also writing in a personal capacity. Thanks for writing this! To clarify a few points even more: I confirm this, and just want to highlight that 1. this is pretty rare; we have a high bar before asking developers to look into patterns 2. usually, one developer looks into things, and shares anonymized data with moderators, who then decide whether it needs to be investigated more deeply 3. If so, a subset of moderators gets access to deanonymized data to make a decision and contact/warn/ban the user(s) On I confirm this, but I want to highlight that messages on the forum are not end-to-end encrypted and are, by default, sent via email as well (i.e. when you get a message on the forum you also get an email with the message). So forum developers and people who have or will have access to the recipient's email inbox, or the forum's email delivery service, can see the messages. For very private communications, I would recommend using privacy-first end-to-end encrypted platforms like Signal.
Will Aldred
4moModerator Comment132
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Pinned by Will Aldred

Hey folks, a reminder to please be thoughtful as you comment.

The previous Nonlinear thread received almost 500 comments; many of these were productive, but there were also some more heated exchanges. Following Forum norms—in a nutshell: be kind, stay on topic, be honest—is probably even more important than usual in charged situations like these.

Discussion here could end up warped towards aggression and confusion for a few reasons, even if commenters are generally well intentioned:

  • Some of the allegations this post responds to, and the new all
... (read more)
-8
Kerry_Vaughan
4mo
-12[anonymous]4mo

Edited to add: My objection to John’s comment in what I write below lies with the “deranged” part. If John had instead said something like “unnecessary” or “overly escalatory/ad hominem,” then I would not have responded. But “deranged” — dictionary definition: “completely unable to think clearly or behave in a controlled way, especially because of mental illness” (source) — which I take as John implying that the direction Kat has gone in is so completely nonsensical that there can’t possibly be a reasonable explanation, struck me as sufficiently inaccurate... (read more)

Retaliation is bad. If you think doing X is bad, then you shouldn't do X, even if you're 'only doing it to make the point that doing X is bad'.

-69[anonymous]4mo

the actions he [SBF] was convicted of are nearly universally condemned by the EA community

I don’t think that observing lots of condemnation and little support is all that much evidence for the premise you take as given—that SBF’s actions were near-universally condemned by the EA community—compared to meaningfully different hypotheses like “50% of EAs condemned SBF’s actions.”

There was, and still is, a strong incentive to hide any opinion other than condemnation (e.g., support, genuine uncertainty) over SBF’s fraud-for-good ideology, out of legiti... (read more)

4
David Mathers
4mo
'By the law of prevalence, I therefore expect the number of EAs who don’t fully condemn SBF’s actions to be far greater than the number who publicly express opinions other than full condemnation.' It seems like you can always use this to claim "sure, everyone says they don't think X, but they could be lying for reputational purposes" whenever X is taboo, but some (most!) taboo things are genuinely unpopular.  That seems dangerously unfalsifiable. Of course, the actual conclusion of "more people believe taboo things than will admit to it" is true in almost all cases. But if almost no one will admit to having an opinion, the real prevalence can still be low even if higher than the visible prevalence. 

I notice I’m confused by what Anders says about the offence-defence balance.

The argument, as I understand it, is that in the far future there’ll be a lot of space—lightyears, perhaps—between warring factions/civilizations. Offensive attacks therefore won’t work well because, with all the distance the offensive weapons need to cover, the defenders will have plenty of time to block or move out of the way.

But… this relies on the defenders seeing the weapons approaching, no? And I would expect weapons of the far future to travel at or very close to the speed o... (read more)

This isn’t an isolated incident either, by the way. See my write-up on the errors in the math in the quantum physics sequences

The average physics textbook contains multiple errors of the order, “forgot to include the normalization term.”[1] To me it seems incorrect to bring up Eliezer's error as strong evidence that he doesn't know what he's talking about, without acknowledging the base rate of similar errors.

(I recognize that you also point to Eliezer's economics errors. I haven't read Inadequate Equilibria or the post critiquing it, so I can't comme... (read more)

Importance of the digital minds stuff compared to regular AI safety; how many early-career EAs should be going into this niche? What needs to happen between now and the arrival of digital minds? In other words, what kind of a plan does Carl have in mind for making the arrival go well? Also, since Carl clearly has well-developed takes on moral status, what criteria he thinks could determine whether an AI system deserves moral status, and to what extent.

Additionally—and this one's fueled more by personal curiosity than by impact—Carl's beliefs on consciousne... (read more)

It took me just under 5 minutes.

The percentages I inputted were best guesses based on my qualitative impressions. If I'd been more quantitative about it, then I expect my allocations would have been better—i.e., closer to what I'd endorse on reflection. But I didn't want to spend long on this, and figured that adding imperfect info to the commons would be better than adding no info.

Thank you for engaging. I don’t disagree with what you’ve written; I think you have interpreted me as implying something stronger than what I intended, and so I’ll now attempt to add some colour.

That Emily and other relevant people at OP have not fully adopted Rethink’s moral weights does not puzzle me. As you say, to expect that is to apply an unreasonably high funding bar. I am, however, puzzled that Emily and co. appear to have not updated at all towards Rethink’s numbers. At least, that’s the way I read:

  • We don’t use Rethink’s moral weights.
    • Our cur
... (read more)

Fair points, Carl. Thanks for elaborating, Will!

  • We don’t use Rethink’s moral weights.
    • Our current moral weights, based in part on Luke Muehlhauser’s past work, are lower. We may update them in the future; if we do, we’ll consider work from many sources, including the arguments made in this post.

Interestingly and confusingly, fitting distributions to Luke's 2018 guesses for the 80 % prediction intervals of the moral weight of various species, one gets mean moral weights close to or larger than 1:

It is also worth noting that Luke seemed very much willing... (read more)

Here, you say, “Several of the grants we’ve made to Rethink Priorities funded research related to moral weights.” Yet in your initial response, you said, “We don’t use Rethink’s moral weights.” I respect your tapping out of this discussion, but at the same time I’d like to express my puzzlement as to why Open Phil would fund work on moral weights to inform grantmaking allocation, and then not take that work into account.

One can value research and find it informative or worth doing without being convinced of every view of a given researcher or team.  Open Philanthropy also sponsored a contest to surface novel considerations that could affect its views on AI timelines and risk. The winners mostly present conclusions or considerations on which AI would be a lower priority, but that doesn't imply that the judges or the institution changed their views very much in that direction.

At large scale, Information can be valuable enough to buy even if it only modestly adjusts pro... (read more)

The "EA movement", however you define it, doesn't get to control the money and there are good reasons for this.

I disagree, for the same reasons as those given in the critique to the post you cite. Tl;dr: Trades have happened in EA where many people have cast aside careers with high earning potential to work on object-level problems. I think these people should get a say over where EA money goes.

I think the 20% figure, albeit a step in the right direction, is in reality a lot less impressive than it first sounds. From OpenAI's "Introducing Superalignment" post:

We are dedicating 20% of the compute we’ve secured to date over the next four years to solving the problem of superintelligence alignment.

I expect that 20% of OpenAI's 2023 compute will be but a tiny fraction of their 2027 compute, given that training compute has been growing by something like 4.2x/year.

If you go to “Account settings”—which is the second from bottom item when you hover over your user avatar in the top right—then go to “Notifications” then “Private messages,” you can make it so that you’ll receive an email when someone messages you on this forum, to whichever email you used to sign up. (This is in fact the default setting, I believe.) I think as long as you don’t deactivate your account, you can thus ensure that you’ll be notified if someone tries to contact you in the future, even if you’re not actively monitoring your account.

I sometimes post (narrow) reading lists on the forum. Are those actually helpful to anyone?

For what it's worth, I found your "AI policy ideas: Reading list" and "Ideas for AI labs: Reading list" helpful,[1] and I've recommended the former to three or four people. My guess would be that these reading lists have been very helpful to a couple or a few people rather than quite helpful to lots of people, but I'd also guess that's the right thing to be aiming for given the overall landscape.

Why don't there exist better reading lists / syllabi, especially be

... (read more)

For anyone interested in watching a dramatic reconstruction of this incident, go to timestamp 43:30–47:05 of The Man Who Saved The World. (I recommend watching at 1.5x speed.)

On the last point: I take this potassium iodide supplement, which I recommend. (I take one capsule every two days.)

I looked into iodine supplements a while ago—the two main forms are potassium iodide and seaweed/kelp. Two or three legit-looking articles I found said that seaweed/kelp-based iodine supplements can contain very different amounts of iodine to what they say on their labels, which seems like a good reason to be wary. (Additionally, a couple other articles claimed that seaweed/kelp supplements contain high levels of toxic heavy metals, but the ve... (read more)

According to the debate week announcement, Scott Alexander will be writing a summary/conclusion post.

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jacquesthibs
7mo
Perfect, thanks!

One thing the AI Pause Debate Week has made salient to me: there appears to be a mismatch between the kind of slowing that on-the-ground AI policy folks talk about, versus the type that AI policy researchers and technical alignment people talk about.

My impression from talking to policy folks who are in or close to government—admittedly a sample of only five or so—is that the main[1] coordination problem for reducing AI x-risk is about ensuring the so-called alignment tax gets paid (i.e., ensuring that all the big labs put some time/money/effort i... (read more)

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trevor1
7mo
I think it's valuable to note that the type of people who do well in government are a specific type of person with a specific type of approach to reality, and they are spending many hours of the day in a completely different mindset (buried in a less-nerdy, more toxic environment) than most people in and around EA (buried in a more-nerdy, less toxic environment). A culture of futility is very pervasive in government and possibly important in order to do well at all. People in government roles are pretty far out-of-distribution relative to EA as a whole and possibly also potentially have a biased view of government as well due to higher access to jobs in parts of government with higher turnover and lower patriotism, even if those specific parts aren't very representative of the parts that matter. Of course, it's also possible that they got where they are mostly because they're just that good. Such a gap would unambiguously be worth analyzing, but probably not in a public forum post imo (especially because it's probably already being done by people privately).
Will Aldred
7moModerator Comment12
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We're issuing a warning for this comment for breaking our Forum norm on civility. We don't think it was meant to be insulting, based on Linch's previous Twitter poll (created months ago) and the fact that he himself is not a native speaker. However, we think the stark difference between the Twitter poll and responses here shows that this comment was widely taken as insulting, even if that wasn't the intent. (I certainly saw it that way before reading the Twitter poll.)

A subsequent comment ("I at least made an effort to understand the language when I immigr... (read more)

Directionally, I agree with your points. On the last one, I'll note that counting person-years (or animal-years) falls naturally out of empty individualism as well as open individualism, and so the point goes through under the (substantively) weaker claim of “either open or empty individualism is true”.[1]

(You may be interested in David Pearce's take on closed, empty, and open individualism.)

  1. ^

    For the casual reader: The three candidate theories of personal identity are empty, open, and closed individualism. Closed is the common sense view, but most people w

... (read more)
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Greg_Colbourn
7mo
Agree. I find Empty Individualism pretty depressing to think about though. And Open Individualism seems more natural, from (my) subjective experience. 

The problem with this position is that the Black Hole Era—at least, the way the “Five Ages of the Universe” article you link to defines it—only starts after proton decay has run to (effective) completion,[1] which means that all matter will be in black holes, which means that conscious beings will not exist to farm black holes for their energy. (If do, however, agree that life is in theory not dependent on luminous stars, and so life could continue beyond the Stelliferous Era and into the Degenerate Era, which adds many years.)

  1. ^

    Whether proton decay wi

... (read more)
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Arepo
7mo
As you say, whether proton decay will happen seems to be an open question. If you're feeling highly confident you could knock off another couple of zeroes to represent that credence and still end up with a number that eclipses everything else.

I just came across this old comment by Wei Dai which has aged well, for unfortunate reasons.

I think a healthy dose of moral uncertainty (and normative uncertainty in general) is really important to have, because it seems pretty easy for any ethical/social movement to become fanatical or to incur a radical element, and end up doing damage to itself, its members, or society at large. (“The road to hell is paved with good intentions” and all that.)

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Lukas_Gloor
7mo
I think there's something off about the view that we need to be uncertain about morality to not become fanatic maniacs who are a danger to other people. It's perfectly possible to have firm/confident moral views that are respectful of other people having different life goals from one's own. Just don't be a moral realist utilitarian. The problem is moral realism + utilitarianism, not having confident takes on your morality. Another way to say this is that it seems dangerously fragile if the only reason one doesn't become a maniac is moral uncertainty. What if you feel like you're becoming increasingly confident about some moral view? It tends to happen to people.
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