Comments
When Local Terror Reveals Global Risk: Biosecurity Lessons from Jos
3 min readApr 9
10
A recent terror attack in Jos highlights deeper failures in state capacity—specifically the inability to detect, track, and regulate sophisticated threats. These same institutional weaknesses extend to biosecurity: Nigeria lacks robust oversight of high-risk research, gene synthesis, and emerging biotechnologies. As AI lowers the barriers to biological innovation, the combination of low governance + rising capability creates a credible global risk. Biosecurity is only as strong as its weakest links, and without serious investment in surveillance, regulation, and field-building in the global South, localized vulnerabilities could scale into global catastrophic threats
On Palm Sunday, something happened in Jos that left me so afraid and with lots of questions for biosecurity. A terror attack happened in my community. This is not the first time Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, has experienced a terror attack, though; you can find a chronology of attacks here.
What made this particular attack different was the way and manner it occurred, and the fact that till date no arrests have been made. This shows weak government capability to track and hunt down bad actors in Nigeria. The use of drones and other sophisticated weapons is increasingly being used in their activities. These attacks have increasingly been linked to international collaborations. Suggesting that actors are not only evolving tactically but may also be benefiting from cross-border networks and knowledge transfer. What appears local may, in fact, be embedded in broader global systems. This then means that what may appear to be a local problem to Jos or Nigeria might actually be a small part of a global agenda. The same institutional weaknesses that allow violent actors to evade detection could also enable the misuse of biological tools. This raises an underexplored question: What happens when the same institutional weaknesses intersect with rapidly advancing biological and technological capabilities?
As a microbiologist working in Nigeria with interests in biosecurity and AI, I see a concerning gap. Nigeria, and many countries in the global South, currently lack the following:
Robust biosecurity governance frameworks
Effective monitoring of high-risk research activities
Regulatory oversight for emerging biotechnologies, including gene synthesis.
There is a huge gap in policies and efforts that can keep bad actors from developing and deploying harmful technologies in Nigeria. Nigeria is vulnerable to bioterrorism owing to a lack of detection mechanisms. Also, our laboratories do not have sufficient regulations as to what kinds of research are allowed in the lab. For example, the US congress has a policy on gain-of-function research in the labs. In Nigeria, however, our labs are not regulated; anyone can fund you to do any research. In practice, this means that research direction can be influenced with minimal scrutiny, and detection mechanisms for misuse are weak.
Advances in AI are lowering the barriers to biological design, experimental planning, and knowledge acquisition. This combination, low oversight + increasing capability, creates a non-trivial risk environment. While a lot of efforts are concentrated in the global north on biosecurity, frameworks in the global south are weak and do not support global efforts.
Global catastrophic biological risks are not constrained by geography. Risk is determined not by the strongest systems but by the weakest regulatory and surveillance environments. A failure in one region can propagate globally. Yet, most biosecurity investments, talent pipelines, and governance frameworks remain concentrated in the global North.
Increase field-building efforts to bring more people into the field of biosecurity in the global south. Building field-building efforts among university students would be an impactful pathway.
Increase disease surveillance efforts. Metagenomics efforts can be ramped up
Increase countermeasures efforts such as far-UVC, PPEs, stockpiling of antivirals, and diagnostic testing.
Increase policies that can regulate research in our universities.
Global catastrophic biological risks are only as contained as the weakest regulatory environments. We must work together to strengthen our weakest links as we push forward to building a sustainable future.
Global catastrophic biological risks are only as contained as the weakest regulatory environments. We must work together to strengthen our weakest links as we push forward to build a sustainable future. If advanced biological risks are to be managed effectively, global coordination must include meaningful capacity-building in regions currently under-regulated. Otherwise, we risk building highly secure systems in some parts of the world while leaving others structurally exposed. And in a domain like biosecurity, exposure anywhere is exposure everywhere.
