A global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR) is a global catastrophic risk that is biological in nature.^[1][2]

Existential risks from biotechnology

Biotechnology offers potentially exciting ways to make people much better off, to find new ways to tackle disease, and to address climate change. However, because many biological systems are at least in principle self-replicating, significant modifications of some kinds could also pose serious risks.

A life-sciences area which currently receives attention from risk experts is gain-of-function (GOF) research, in which particularly concerning pathogens like H5N1 influenza are modified to increase their virulence or transmissibility. Researchers are divided as to whether the benefits of such experiments are worth the risks that come from either accidental release of pathogens or the misuse of discoveries by malicious actors.^[3][4] In the near term, such pathogens probably pose a non-existential global catastrophic risk, but there is some chance that related life-sciences work might one day pose an existential risk.

Evaluation

80,000 Hours rates reducing global catastrophic biological risks a "highest priority area": a problem at the top of their ranking of global issues assessed by importance, tractability and neglectedness.^[5]

Recommendations

In The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Toby Ord offers several policy and research recommendations for handling risks from engineered pandemics:^[6]

• Bring the Biological Weapons Convention into line with the Chemical Weapons Convention: taking its budget from $1.4 million up to $80 million, increasing its staff commensurately, and granting the power to investigate suspected breaches.
• Strengthen the WHO’s ability to respond to emerging pandemics through rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis and control. This involves increasing its funding and powers, as well as R&D on the requisite technologies.
• Ensure that all DNA synthesis is screened for dangerous pathogens. If full coverage can’t be achieved through self-regulation by synthesis companies, then some form of international regulation will be needed.
• Increase transparency around accidents in BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories.
• Develop standards for dealing with information hazards, and incorporate these into existing review processes.
• Run scenario-planning exercises for severe engineered pandemics.