Quick takes

EU opportunities for early-career EAs: quick overview from someone who applied broadly I applied to several EU entry programmes to test the waters, and I wanted to share what worked, what didn’t, and what I'm still uncertain about, hoping to get some insights. Quick note: I'm a nurse, currently finishing a Master of Public Health, and trying to contribute as best I can to reducing biological risks. My specialisation is in Governance and Leadership in European Public Health, which explains my interest in EU career paths. I don’t necessarily think the EU is the best option for everyone. I just happen to be exploring it seriously at the moment and wanted to share what I’ve learned in case it’s useful to others. ⌨️ What I applied to & how it went * Blue Book traineeship – got it (starting October at HERA.04, Emergency Office of DG HERA) * European Committee of the Regions traineeship – rejected in pre-selection * European Economic & Social Committee traineeship – same * Eurofound traineeship – no response * EMA traineeship (2 applications: Training Content and Vaccine Outreach) – no response * Center for Democracy & Technology internship – no response * Schuman traineeship (Parliament) – no response * EFSA traineeship – interview but no feedback (I indicated HERA preference, so not surprised) If anyone needed a reminder: rejection is normal and to be expected, not a sign of your inadequacy. It only takes one “yes.” 📄 Key EA Forum posts that informed and inspired me * “EAs interested in EU policy: Consider applying for the European Commission’s Blue Book Traineeship” * “What I learned from a week in the EU policy bubble” – excellent perspective on the EU policymaking environment 🔍 Where to find EU traineeships All together here: 🔗 https://eu-careers.europa.eu/en/job-opportunities/traineeships?institution=All Includes Blue Book, Schuman, and agency-specific roles (EMA, EFSA, ECDC...). Traineeships are just traineeships: don’t underestimate what

AIxBio looks pretty bad and it would be great to see more people work on it * We're pretty close to having a country of virologists in a data center with AI models that can give detailed and accurate instructions for all steps of a biological attack — with recent reasoning models, we might have this already * These models have safeguards but they're trivial to overcome — Pliny the Liberator manages to jailbreak every new model within 24 hours and open sources the jailbreaks * Open source will continue to be just a few months behind the frontier given distillation and amplification, and these can be fine-tuned to remove safeguards in minutes for less than $50 * People say it's hard to actually execute the biology work, but I don't see any bottlenecks to bioweapon production that can't be done by a bio undergrad with limitless scientific knowledge; on my current understanding, the bottlenecks are not manual dexterity bottlenecks like playing a violin which require years of practice, they are knowledge bottlenecks * Bio supply chain controls that make it harder to get ingredients aren't working and aren't on track to work * So it seems like we're very close to democratizing (even bespoke) bioweapons. When I talk to bio experts about this they often reassure me that few people want to conduct a biological attack, but I haven't seen much analysis on this and it seems hard to be highly confident. While we gear up for a bioweapon democracy it seems that there are very few people working on worst-case bio, and most of the people working on it are working on access controls and evaluations. But I don't expect access controls to succeed, and I expect evaluations to mostly be useful for scaring politicians, due in part to the open source issue meaning we just can't give frontier models robust safeguards. The most likely thing to actually work is biodefense. I suspect that too many people working on GCR have moved into working on AI alignment and reliability issues and

Striking paper by Anant Sudarshan and Eyal Frank (via Dylan Matthews at Vox Future Perfect) on the importance of vultures as a keystone species.  To quote the paper and newsletter — the basic story is that vultures are extraordinarily efficient scavengers, eating nearly all of a carcass less than an hour after finding it, and farmers in India historically relied on them to quickly remove livestock carcasses, so they functioned as a natural sanitation system in helping to control diseases that could otherwise be spread through the carcasses they consume. In 1994, farmers began using diclofenac to treat their livestock, due to the expiry of a patent long held by Novartis leading to the entry of cheap generic brands made by Indian companies. Diclofenac is a common painkiller, harmless to humans, but vultures develop kidney failure and die within weeks of digesting carrion with even small residues of it. Unfortunately this only came to light via research published a decade later in 2004, by which time the number of Indian vultures in the wild had tragically plummeted from tens of millions to just a few thousands today, the fastest for a bird species in recorded history and the largest in magnitude since the extinction of the passenger pigeon.  When the vultures died out, far more dead animals lay around rotting, transmitting pathogens to other scavengers like dogs and rats and entering the water supply. Dogs and rats are less efficient than vultures at fully eliminating flesh from carcasses, leading to a higher incidence of human contact with infected remains, and they're also more likely to transmit diseases like anthrax and rabies to people. Sudarshan and Frank estimate that this led to ~100,000(!) additional deaths each year from 2000-05 due to a +4.2%(!) increase in all-cause mortality among the 430 million people living in districts that once had a lot of vultures, which is staggering; this is e.g. more than the death toll in 2001 from HIV/AIDS (92,000), malaria

It would be awesome if someone made an updated version of the biosecurity landscape map. Lmk if you are thinking of doing this. 

Trump recently said in an interview (https://time.com/6972973/biden-trump-bird-flu-covid/) that he would seek to disband the White House office for pandemic preparedness. Given that he usually doesn't give specifics on his policy positions, this seems like something he is particularly interested in. I know politics is discouraged on the EA forum, but I thought I would post this to say: EA should really be preparing for a Trump presidency. He's up in the polls and IMO has a >50% chance of winning the election. Right now politicians seem relatively receptive to EA ideas, this may change under a Trump administration.

Longtermist shower thought: what if we had a campaign to install Far-UVC in poultry farms? Seems like it could: 1. Reduce a bunch of diseases in the birds, which is good for: a. the birds’ welfare; b. the workers’ welfare; c. Therefore maybe the farmers’ bottom line?; d. Preventing/suppressing human pandemics (eg avian flu) 2. Would hopefully drive down the cost curve of Far-UVC 3. May also generate safety data in chickens, which could be helpful for derisking it for humans Insofar as one of the main obstacles is humans' concerns for health effects, this would at least only raise these for a small group of workers.

The Trump administration has indefinitely paused NIH grant review meetings, effectively halting US-government-funded biomedical research. There are good criticisms of the NIH, but we are kidding ourselves if we believe that this is to do with anything but vindictiveness over COVID-19, or at best, a loss of public trust in health institutions from a minority of the US public. But this action will not rectify that. Instead of one public health institution with valid flaws that a minority of the public distrust, we have none now. Clinical trials have been paused too, so it’s likely that people will die from this. I don’t have a great sense of what to do other than lament. Thankfully, there are good research funders globally—in my case, a lot of the research Kaya Guides relies on is funded by the WHO (😔) or the EU. We’re still waiting to see how the WHO withdrawal will affect us, but we’re lucky that there are other global leaders willing to pick up the slack. I hope that US philanthropic funding also doesn’t dry up over the coming years…

Quick Take: In most educational settings or even healthcare campaigns for the general public, the only mosquito-borne disease highlighted prominently in the UK tends to be malaria, and most mosquito-borne diseases may be non-domestic in countries we'd consider HICs and with healthcare infrastructure, and yet turns out quite a few are considered now natively established in regions such as Spain, France, US, Croatia. Currently doing a lit review on different methods of reducing populations, transmission or exposure to bites to control mosquito borne diseases, and that has more context, information and sources, but if anyone was considering doing some cause prio on types/vectors of disease we may want to work on/should consider, then here are some key mosquito-borne diseases that I feel get mentioned less. Working on a longer write up but if it helps anyone considering wrapping their head around mosquito borne diseases, here is a short list of the most prominent diseases in terms of the burden of morbidity and mortality from worldwide disease, with a mention of endemic to HICs diseases: Malaria * Protist Plasmodium spread by female Anopheles mosquitos * Spread directly during bites, minority spread through contaminated needles with infected blood and congenital in utero * Agnostic to most innate risk factors but sickle cell uni-recessive carriers appear to be immune, and external factors are mainly climatic region (living in endemic countries, near equator, international travel), malnutrition, working outdoors especially during evenings, working with animals * children or elderly are more susceptible * 90% of malarial deaths occur in Africa south of the Sahara and most are in children under 5 * Testing is recommended after suspected bites or during local outbreaks, through microscopic blood smears or RDTs (expensive but can detect small pieces of malarial parasites), or lab PCR testing (most accurate especially to determine species but highly rare, specialis