This paper was published as a GPI working paper in January 2025.

Abstract

I argue for a pluralist theory of moral standing, on which both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status. I argue that autonomy doesn’t entail welfare subjectivity, but can ground moral standing in its absence. Although I highlight the existence of plausible views on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness, I primarily emphasize the need for philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing to engage with neglected questions about the nature of autonomy and its possible links to consciousness, especially if we’re to face up to the ethical challenges future AI systems may pose.

Introduction

Some things matter morally in their own right and for their own sake. That includes you and me. We aren’t mere things. We merit concern and respect. If you prick us, not only do we bleed; we are wronged. We have moral standing (or moral status^[1]).

What does it take to have moral standing? Many think the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary (Singer 1993; Korsgaard 2018; Nussbaum 2022). To have moral standing, they think, there needs to be something it’s like to be you. However, not everyone is convinced, and the dissenters appear to be growing their ranks (Levy 2014b; Kagan 2019; Bradford 2022; Shepherd 2024). Who is in the right?

Most of the recent discussion of this issue focuses on the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and being a welfare subject. Roughly speaking, a welfare subject is a being whose life can go better or worse for them. It’s plausible that being a welfare subject is sufficient for moral standing. Is it also necessary? If not, we might be missing an important piece of the puzzle.

On its face, not all the obligations we owe to other people aim at promoting their welfare. Quinn (1984) distinguishes between the morality of respect and the morality of humanity. These aren’t rival moral theories. Instead, they are partially overlapping systems of obligation that respond to different morally significant properties of humans and non-human animals. In this context, ‘humanity’ denotes the virtue of being humane or beneficent. The morality of humanity is thus concerned with promoting others’ welfare; not just human welfare, but welfare more broadly. The morality of respect instead involves constraints on our behaviour that stem from recognition of the authority of rational agents to direct their own lives, even if they do so imprudently.

Suppose we grant that there are these two distinct dimensions to morality. It’s plausible that there are morally statused beings, including many non-human animals, who fall outside the scope of the morality of respect and are protected only by the morality of humanity (Quinn 1984: 51; McMahan 2002: 245–246). Are there also metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect – individuals whose autonomy merits respect but who are not welfare subjects? If so, what does this imply about the relationship between moral standing and consciousness?

These are the questions I’ll address in this paper, arguing that there are indeed possible individuals who are protected only by the morality of respect, and exploring the potential implications for what we should think about the link between consciousness and moral status. Here’s the plan. In section 2, I outline a collection of conditions that I take to be jointly sufficient for an agent to be autonomous. In section 3, I argue that being a welfare subject isn’t necessary to satisfy those conditions. In section 4, I argue that welfare subjectivity is also unnecessary for someone’s autonomy to merit respect. In section 5, I outline the potential implications of my argument for the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing. Finally, in section 6, I summarize my conclusions and discuss their practical significance.

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