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slg

Researcher @ MIT, SecureBio, Nucleic Acid Observatory
472 karmaJoined Mar 2020Pursuing a doctoral degree (e.g. PhD)Basel, Switzerland
simongrimm.com

Bio

Research associate at SecureBio, Research Affiliate at Kevin Esvelt's MIT research group Sculpting Evolution, physician. Thinking about ways to safeguard the world from bio. 

Comments
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Without saying much about the merits of various commenters' arguments, I wanted to check if this is a rhetorical question:

Is anyone on this forum in a better position than the Secretary-General of the UN to analyze, for example, the impact of Israel's actions on future, unrelated conflicts?

If so, this is an appeal to authority that isn't very helpful in advancing this discussion. If it's an actual question, never mind. 

What’s the lore behind that update? This was before I followed EA community stuff

Thanks for writing this up, I was skeptical about Scott‘s strong take but didn’t take the time to check the links he provided as proof.

That's a good pointer, thanks! I'll drop the reference to Diggans and Leproust for now.

slg
6mo11
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Thanks for the write-up. Just adding a note on how this distinction has practical implications for how to design databases containing hazardous sequences that are required for gene synthesis screening systems.

With gene synthesis screening, companies want to stop bad actors from getting access to the physical DNA or RNA of potential pandemic pathogens. Now, let's say researchers find the sequence of a novel pathogen that would likely spark a pandemic if released. Most would want this sequence to be added to synthesis screening databases. But some also want this database to be public. The information hazards involved in making such information publicly available could be large, especially if there is attached discussion of how exactly these sequences are dangerous.

I skimmed it, and it looks good to me. Thanks for the work! A separate post on this would be cool.

I set a reminder! Also, let me know if you do end up updating it.

Is there an updated version of this? E.g., GDP numbers have changed.

Flagging that I approve this post; I do believe that the relevant biosecurity actors within EA are thinking about this (though I'd love a more public write-up of this topic). Get in touch if you are thinking about this!

I'm excited that more people are looking into this area!

Flagging that I only read the intro and the conclusion, which might mean I missed something. 

High-skilled immigration

From my current understanding, high-skilled immigration reform seems promising not so much because of the effects on the migrants (though they are positive) but mostly due to the effect on the destination country's GDP and technological progress. The latter has sizeable positive spillover effects (that also accrue to poorer countries).

Advocacy for high-skilled immigration is less controversial and thus easier, which could make interventions in this area more valuable when compared to general immigration reform.

Then again, for the reasons above, more individuals are likely already working on improved high-skilled immigration. 

Malengo

Also, have you chatted with Johannes Haushofer? He knows EA and recently started Malengo, which wants to facilitate educational migration from low-income countries. I'd assume he has thought about these topics a bunch.

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