A motivating scenario could be: imagine you are trying to provide examples to help convince a skeptical friend that it is in fact possible to positively change the long-run future by actively seeking and pursuing opportunities to reduce existential risk.
Examples of things that are kind of close but miss the mark
- There are probably decent historical examples where people reduced existential risk but where thoes people didn't really have longtermist-EA-type motivations (maybe more "generally wanting to do good" plus "in the right place at the right time")
- There are probably meta-level things that longtermist EA community members can take credit for (e.g. "get lots of people to think seriously about reducing x risk"), but these aren't very object-level or concrete
I'm not sure how it's even theoretically possible to measure reductions in existential risk. An existential catastrophe is something that can only happen once. Without being able to observe a reduction in incidence of an event I don't think you can "measure" reduction in risk. I do on the other hand think it's fair to say that increasing awareness of existential risk reduces total existential risk, even if I'm not sure by how much exactly.
I'd imagine concrete/legible actions to reduce existential risk will probably come in the form of policy change and I don't think for the most part EAs have yet entered influential policy positions. Please do say what other actions you would consider to count under concrete/legible though as that is up for interpretation.
Sorry I'm not really sure what you're saying here.
This is a good question. I think the best arguments against longtermism are:
I don't mind admitting that it seems unlikely that I will change my mind on longtermism. If I do, I'd imagine it will be on account of one of the two arguments above.