I think an argument by Johannes is very likely overstated, and perhaps also quite wrong:

That seems more true to me based on what I read about political culture and looking at those things, and also looking at the fact that solar and wind are cheap now, marginal-cost-wise, but they’re very far from an optimal energy technology.

The alternative that seems most promising today is Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). However, I would be quite surprised if these managed to beat solar and wind on cost as SMRs are nothing like solar cells, and also quite far away from even the largest wind turbines - wind and solar are extremely modular and easy to fabricate and assemble! One point that illustrates this is that current SMR (I do not mean to strawman by using SMRs as an example, I honestly think these are the strongest contender to solar and wind) construction projects take on the order of years to assemble on site. In contrast, I would be surprised if the first wind turbine or solar panel to be erected took more than a couple of months (it might actually just have taken days!). Nuclear waste projects are also part of the nuclear story and often ignored by proponents of SMRs. These projects are the worst projects of all megaprojects in terms of cost overruns and scheduling delays (or a close contender to Olympic Games). This part of the nuclear industry seems less likely to be modularized.

There is also references in the podcast to intermittency but this argument is misleading (I realize that perhaps there was not enough time to expand on it in the podcast). One can do a few things to make renewables much less intermittent from a consumer perspective, and this is being done currently at scale:
 

1. Overbuild and curtail
2. Batteries for solar, transmission for wind
3. [addition 27APR] Demand response, especially industrial demand response
    

This will in most places get one to ~90% wind and solar. The rest is really not that important in terms of emissions or cost as one has already cleaned up 90% of the power supply with surprisingly cheap generation. Ideally one could close the gap with hydro, bio, SMRs and the like, or just run some fossil plants and do carbon capture.

That said, there might be something more optimal than solar and hydro, but after decades of research it does not really seem to be any strong contenders, even in early stages of R&D. To say that solar and wind are "very far" from being optimal seems wrong. If the statement instead had been "there might be something more optimal than solar or wind, but this is speculation" I think this would have been a more true statement. That said, I definitely buy the argument that politically favorable conditions have helped wind and solar get to the prices they have today, it might not have been possible without. But I very much doubt that we would have as cheap, carbon free electricity today if we had used that political capital on a different technology.

Disclaimer: I have worked in wind energy for over a decade and am biased. But I have also followed cost trends across a range of technologies quite closely.

Also, I really enjoyed the rest of the podcast and changed my views on some aspects on marginal effectiveness in the climate space. So I do not mean my criticism to detract from the overall argument put forward - a lot of the content seemed very sensible.

I found myself strongly aligned with the opinions expressed in this podcast. I strongly agree with Johannes’ opinion on personal emissions reduction, pro-nuclear, funding in high growth, large population countries, governmental advocacy and almost everything else said. So the following isn’t meant to be a broad critique.

I was confused about a small section that had several layered points that I didn’t really agree with after a whole podcast of opinions that aligned with mine. The comments around the idea that indirect effects of climate change leading to higher conflict are predicated on severe climate impacts. From the podcast:

"And then there is a, from my perspective, really plausible critique of [the report], which is saying that we’re having a lot of indirect unforeseeable effects and generally a situation of decreasing political stability feedback loops.

The thing I would say there, though, is that all of that kind of requires pretty severe climate impacts still. So, the fact that the climate picture overall has been getting so much better makes all of those things less likely, and we should be honest about that.”

• Indirect effects kick in at much lower temperature thresholds

I guess it largely depends on what is meant by “pretty severe” but the following sentiment about the climate picture getting better had me thinking that what was meant was a world of >4 °C or another future world that is considered unlikely even in business-as-usual scenarios. I have always pictured severe climate impacts (in the sense of significant pressure on governments and populations) at much lower, even on a +2 °C pathway.

• The climate picture overall has been getting worse

In terms of government responses to climate change, public perception, scientific understanding there have been many positive events in the last 10 years but nowhere near the requirement to avoid significant harm. The picture on climate effects at different temperatures appears to be getting worse, such as Thwaites, ocean circulation slowdown and extreme temperature anomalies all of which are way outside of predictions for this temperature. We have also made slow progress on understanding and incorporating feedback loops in models and planning. So with effects being worse at different temperatures the expected instability is also worse.

I may just be misunderstanding what was meant as there are a few plausible interpretations, but those are my thoughts from what I understood. As said slightly earlier:

“Increasing conflict is kind of the reason mostly to prioritise climate from a longtermist perspective.”

So I think it’s an important point.

Great podcast!

One point of disagreement: I don't think you are correct in dismissing personal lifestyle change, or in being concerned that it will crowd out political/collective action (unintended consequences). There is beginning to emerge some experimental evidence, and so far it does not seem like it crowds out collective behavior. See here for a recent study: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629622003784?casa_token=Jp_mgkE8mkUAAAAA:oUltc3n4ndueQHddP6iTKRtB2U7Rru1W7RsTWOFWtPXSDQSoENdOZrI-pVs8PAQxGGI0DIdBh8Q

From a more historical perspective, which is more difficult to investigate causally of course, it also doesn't seem like social movements which emphasize the personal and lifestyle change stop being political or set themselves up for failure. Look at the Christian right in the US: very personal and very political at the same time. There is evidence that the cultivation of a certain lifestyle and culture has even been important for the long-term success of some movements, such as the NRA. See here: The Political Weaponization of Gun Owners: The National Rifle Association’s Cultivation, Dissemination, and Use of a Group Social Identity | The Journal of Politics: Vol 81, No 4 (uchicago.edu)

So I, for one, think that lifestyle interventions which link changes in lifestyle to political and collective goals, may actually be under-utilized and effective form of intervention.