It seems extremely clear that working with the existing field is necessary to have any idea what to do about nuclear risk. That said, being a field specialist seems like a surprisingly small factor in forecasting accuracy, so I’m surprised by that being the focus of criticism.

I was interested in the criticism (32:02), so I transcribed it here:

Jeffrey Lewis: By the way, we have a second problem that arises, which I think Wizards really helps explain: this is why our field can’t get any money.

Aaron Stein: That’s true.

Jeffrey Lewis: Because it’s extremely hard to explain to people who are not already deep in this field how these deterrence concepts work, because they don’t get it. Like if you look at the work that the effective altruism community does on nuclear risk, it’s as misguided as SAC’s original, you know, approach to nuclear weapons, and you would need an entire RAND-sized outreach effort. And there are some people who’ve tried to do this. Peter Scoblic, who is fundamentally a member of that community, wrote a really nice piece responding to some of the like not great effective altruism assessments of nuclear risk in Ukraine. So I don’t want to, you know, criticise the entire community, but… I experience this at a cocktail party. Once I start talking to someone about nuclear weapons and deterrence… if they don’t do this stuff full-time, the popular ideas they have about this are… (a) they might be super bored, but if they are willing to listen, the popular ideas they have about it are so misguided, that it becomes impossible to make enough progress in a reasonable time. And that’s death when you’re asking someone to make you a big cheque. That’s much harder than ‘hi, I want to buy some mosquito nets to prevent malaria deaths’. That’s really straightforward. This… this is complex.

It’s a shame that this doesn’t identify any specific errors, although that is consistent with Lewis’ view that the errors can’t be explained in minutes, perhaps even in years.

Speaking for myself, I agree with Lewis that popular ideas about nuclear weapons can be wildly, bizarrely wrong. That said, I’m surprised he highlights effective altruism as a community he’s pessimistic about being able to teach. The normal ‘cocktail party’ level of discourse includes alluring claims like ‘XYZ policy is totally obvious; we just have to implement it’, and the effective altruism people I’ve spoken to on nuclear issues are generally way less credulous than this, and hence more interested in understanding how things actually work.

Speaking as someone who 1) has never been prompted to make any career or philanthropic decisions regarding nuclear risk reduction (and therefore not been motivated to think very rigorously about the subject), 2) may not have had a good sample/exposure to nuclear risk reduction advocacy (although I have had very little interaction with e.g., ICAN, which is a plus) 3) does not have formal academic or career experience in the nuclear realm; but 4) has been exposed to nuclear risk and strategy more so than the average person through personal research/curiosity, listening to podcasts on the subject, discussing the topic briefly with friends, and a summer position at the Center for Global Security Research:

I have long been skeptical of making serious net positive progress in the nuclear security realm, and every time I’ve tried to be open-minded about the idea of devoting lots of attention and resources to the subject, I’ve come away with equally if not more pessimistic views on the field. It often gives me the surface level feeling of watching people trying to kick down a brick wall, insisting that “it’s going to work, we just need more funding and time.” People like the NTI’s director get asked a straight question: “What are we going to do to reduce nuclear risk,” and she can’t seem to give a straight or compelling answer, just vague goal-wishing (vs. policy proposals, let alone compelling advocacy strategies) or policy proposals which seem like they may even introduce some risks (even if not adding risk on balance and possibly even reducing it)—assuming that the policy proposals were even politically tractable. Of course, much of this might not be so problematic, but then you hit a foundational issue: it seems very, very unlikely that we will face extinction due to nuclear war, whereas the probability of risks from alternative sources (e.g., engineered pandemics, unaligned AI) are much greater (at least in magnitude terms).

So, perhaps I don’t understand their perspective, as Dr. Lewis suggests in the podcast. However, when I have tried to understand their perspective—including by listening to hours of videos (talks) and podcasts by people in the nuclear risk field and reading various Bulletin/UCS articles—I haven’t seen a compelling case made by the traditional figures in the field. That’s not to say the field is hopeless, but I am fairly skeptical of many of the existing approaches’ likelihood of having much positive expected value if scaled. Perhaps it would have helped if Dr. Lewis made clear what EA doesn’t get, but I either missed it or he didn’t specify… (reinforcing my skepticism)

That was a lot of bottled up negativity and skepticism, but I’m happy that people are working on risk reduction as opposed to ~95% of other policy fields, I just want to see the work be more efficacy-oriented rather than prinicipalistic (among other desires).

I really appreciate many of the points mentioned herein, and understand/share some of the skepticism and concern.  These comments by Jeffrey:

$Mycommunityfindsthisuncomfortableforthesamereasonthatdinosaursdo{n}^{\prime }tlikeasteroids.$

and Harrison 

are interrelated to me & relevant to whether and how these communities get more involved with each other. There is much promising work to do, yet our field also needs to evolve. Perhaps we can create more nuclear expert/EA engagement opportunities. From the policy wonk side, we need to do so in open-minded and genuine ways if so. (FWIW, I think Jeffrey is a top-notch expert for such dialogue.) I'm at the start of a 2-week EA coworking experience, and the mutual benefits and learning were clear within the first hours of my time here.