The discussion of AI risk is only recently mainstream and therefore amateurs made contributions within the past decade. I think this experience exacerbates the self-assuredness of nuke risk amateurs and leads them to not bother researching the expertise of the nuke community.
For decades, many experts have worked on nuke strategy, and have come up with at least a few risk-reducing paradigms:
- Arms control can work, and nations can achieve their achievable nuke goals (eg deterrence and maybe compellance) despite lower nuke counts and can save money doing so.
- Counterforce is (arguably) better than countervalue
- Escalation is arguably a ladder, not a binary on/off switch
Based on its history of at least partial risk-reducing success, academically rigorous argument, and the sheer number of thoughtful hours spent, the establishment nuke community has probably done a decent job and improvements are probably hard to find. One place to start is the book Wizards of Armageddon by Fred Kaplan. It isn't the best book on nuke strategy generally, but it focuses on the history of the nuke community, so it will hopefully engender at least some respect for the nuke community and inspire further reading.
I think that in a field as well-established as nuke risk, improvements are more likely to be made on top of the existing field rather than by trying to re-invent the field.
Post-script: The EA community is criticized as unusefully amateurish in a recent podcast by a nuke professional https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1216048/the-wizards-of-armageddon/ but he does mention some positive work by Peter Scoblic, which I believe is https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/W8dpCJGkwrwn7BfLk/nuclear-expert-comment-on-samotsvety-nuclear-risk-forecast-2
I am skeptical of attempts to gatekeep here. E.g. I found Scoblic's response to Samotsvety's forecast less persuasive than their post, and I am concerned here that "amateurish" might just be being used as a scold because the numbers someone came up with are too low for someone else's liking, or they don't like putting numbers on things at all and feel it gives a false sense of precision.
That isn't to say this is the only criticism that has been made, but just to highlight one I found unpersuasive.
I am not an expert, but personally I see the current crop of nuke experts as primarily "evangelizers of the wisdom of the past". The nuke experts of the past, such as Tom Schelling, are more impressive (and more mathematical). If a better approach to nuke risk was easy to find, it would have probably already been found by one of the many geniuses of the 20th century who looked at nuke risk. If so, the best place to make a marginal contribution to nuke risk is by evangelizing the wisdom of the past: this can help avoid backsliding on things like arms contro... (read more)