Hide table of contents

What needs to be true for an estimate to be reasonable?

Pure Earth is a GiveWell grantee that works to reduce lead and mercury exposure. In an August 2023 post, they provided a "preliminary analysis" suggesting that their lead reduction program in Bangladesh "can avert an equivalent DALY for just under $1." By contrast, they estimate that GiveDirectly "has a cost-effectiveness of approximately $836 per DALY-equivalent averted." 

About 86% of the money GiveDirectly spends goes directly to recipients, so an $836 donation to GiveDirectly results in about $719 going directly to a very poor person. In effect, Pure Earth is claiming that either GiveDirectly can give a person in poverty $719, or Pure Earth can spend $1 helping people in Bangladesh, and these would be about equally good for human welfare.

Pure Earth calls this an "extraordinary result" and forthrightly identifies places where their analysis might go wrong. But what I'm missing is a sense of why their analysis might be right: a story about why this extraordinary opportunity exists. In other words, theory.

I find this to be a pretty common lacuna in effective altruist CEAs.[1] Our explanations tend to be technical but not contextual. They enumerate our assumptions about the world at large but lack granularity about social and political conditions. 

For my tastes, any claim that that boils down to 'we can help poor people more effectively than they can help themselves' requires theoretical buttressing in the form of a plausible and specific story.

What kinds of theories might suffice?

 For public health interventions in general, six types of story come to mind.

  1. Experts have a comparative advantage at helping poor people manage their affairs. (Here is some evidence against this theory.[1])
  2. There is extraordinary political gridlock that an external organization is especially well-suited to solving. (Pure Earth says that the "project’s impact lies not in identifying and enforcing food safety regulations, but rather in expediting its implementation by several years.")
  3. There is a narrow opportunity for positive impact stemming from deep insight about a particular context.
  4. There is a market failure, e.g. a collective action problem, where a push from an NGO can create a self-sustaining equilibrium.
  5. There is a cognitive bias and/or cultural failure that leads people to undervalue something that is good, or overvalue something that is bad, and they need a push in the right direction.
  6. Unconditional cash transfers engender negative spillovers, whereas public health interventions typically have positive spillovers.

The story will vary from case to case. For New Incentives, I assume it's some version of theories 4, 5, and 6. For anti-malarial interventions, I am not sure (and am generally a skeptic). For Pure Earth, I am also not sure, because I am not an expert. The supporting story would need to be extraordinary, because the claim is. I can potentially back that story out of a spreadsheet. But I'd prefer to hear it directly. 

 

  1. ^ I use Pure Earth to illustrate because their CEA was on the far tail of the distribution, so it stuck in my memory, but this point could be made about many CEAs on the forum. As far as I can tell, Pure Earth is doing great work on an important, neglected, and tractable issue.
  2. ^ Framed differently, what would it take for you to accept the same thing for yourself -- that an organization is hundreds of times better at helping you than you are at helping yourself?
     

55

1
1

Reactions

1
1

More posts like this

Comments13


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

Poor people are generally bad at managing their own affairs and need external guidance

That seems like a particularly cynical way of describing this argument. Another description might be: Individuals are on average fine at identifying ways to improve their lives, and if you think life improvements are heavy tailed, this implies that individual will perform much less well than experts who aim to find the positive tail interventions. 

Here's a similar situation: A high school student is given 2 hours with no distractions and told they should study for a test. How do you think their study method of choice would compare to if a professional tutor designs a studying curriculum for them to follow? My guess is that the tutor designed curriculum is somewhere between 20% and 200% better, depending on the student. Now that's still really far from 719x, but I think it's fine for building the intuition. I wouldn't necessarily say the student is "bad at managing their own affairs", in fact they might be solidly average for students, but I would say they're not an expert at studying, and like other domains, studying benefits from expertise. 

Sure, there are more reasonable ways to express the argument, all of which boil down to “experts have a comparative advantage at producing welfare gains.” And the people don’t need to be poor for this theory to be in vogue, e.g. American public health officials giving very nuanced guidance about masks in March-April 2020 because they were looking to achieve a second-order effect (proper distribution). I think my broader point, however, about the necessity for such a theory, regardless of how it is expressed, holds. I went with a cynical version in part because I was trying to make a point that a theory can be a ‘folk theory’ and therefore impolite, but elucidating that was out of scope for the text.

I amended the text to be less inflammatory

Most of the interventions from Pure Earth is political, right? So I'd guess that #4 is correct. I think it should be relatively straightforward why rational selfish actors are not incentivized to make political interventions for their own interests: 

  • Suppose you have V voters. As V increases, the total benefit of a good political intervention grows proportionally.
  • However, the benefit to each voter for the intervention succeeding remains constant, regardless of V.
  • The probability of an individual vote changing the outcome decreases as V increases (roughly 1/V).
  • From a selfish standpoint, as V grows larger, the incentive for an individual to be well-informed decreases.

Sure, there is an intuitive plausibility to this. But how extraordinary must the political dysfunction be for no one within Bangladesh to be capable of solving this themselves through political agitation without NGO support? If the DALY calculations are to be believed, the potential gains are enormous and comparatively cheap. As an outsider to the situation, I am looking for context on why this hasn't happened yet. A good theory in the social sciences will abstract from specifics of the situation, or map a theory onto specific things that have happened (or that haven't), rather than making the general observation that collective action problems cause some public goods to be underprovisioned.

You might find this article helpful for context: https://undark.org/2023/07/19/the-vice-of-spice-confronting-lead-tainted-turmeric/

Fwiw I’m sympathetic to your general point

Thanks, I think this was featured on Marginal Revolution last year — definitely good background.

Hmm I guess I wouldn't be that surprised if we observed similar levels of what you call "dysfunction" in the US. Earlier you asked:

Framed differently, what would it take for you to accept the same thing for yourself -- that an organization is hundreds of times better at helping you than you are at helping yourself?

I guess the intuitive plausibility of this is rather low (or perhaps I have an overly high opinion of myself) if the problem is framed as one of my own rationality, but I can much more easily buy that there are collective action problems that benefit "people like me" at >100x the costs. 

Hi Seth,

GiveWell's 2021 analysis of Pure Earth links to a sheet according to which its cost-effectiveveness is 18 times that of unconditional cash transfers.

Pure Earth is a GiveWell grantee that works to reduce lead and mercury exposure. In an August 2023 post, they provided a "preliminary analysis" suggesting that their lead reduction program in Bangladesh "can avert an equivalent DALY for just under $1."

I estimated corporate campaigns for chicken welfare have a cost-effectiveness of 15.0 DALY/$.

Thank you for the additional context!

re: Pure Earth: GiveWell notes that its Pure Earth estimates are "substantially less rigorous than both our top charity cost-effectiveness estimates," so I don't want to read too much into it. However, a claim that an intervention is merely 18X better at helping poor people than they are at helping themselves still strikes me as extraordinary, albeit in a way that we become acclimated to over time. 

As to what good social theory would look like here, there is some nice work in sociology on the causes and consequences of lead exposure in America (see Muller, Sampson, and Winter 2018 for a review). I don't expect EA orgs to produce this level of granularity when justifying their work, but some theory about why an opportunity exist would be very much appreciated, at least by me.

I've followed your work a bit w.r.t. animal welfare. That's 15 chicken DALYs right? That seems plausible to me. The theory I would construct for this would start with the fact that there are probably more chickens living on factory farms at this moment than there are humans alive. Costco alone facilitates the slaughter of ~100M chickens/year. If you improve the welfare of just the Costco chickens by just 1% of a DALY per chicken, that's 1M DALYs. I could very much believe that a corporate campaign of that magnitude might cost about $66K (approximately 1M/15). So I find this claim much less extraordinary.

You are welcome!

re: Pure Earth: GiveWell notes that its Pure Earth estimates are "substantially less rigorous than both our top charity cost-effectiveness estimates," so I don't want to read too much into it. However, a claim that an intervention is merely 18X better at helping poor people than they are at helping themselves still strikes me as extraordinary, albeit in a way that we become acclimated to over time.

For reference, Pure Earth's estimate of 1 DALY/$ is 5.59 (= 1/(18*0.00994)) times GiveWell's estimate.

I've followed your work a bit w.r.t. animal welfare.

Thanks!

That's 15 chicken DALYs right?

No, it is 15.0 "normal" DALY/$, i.e. 1.51 k times (= ) as cost-effective as GiveWell's top charities.

Thanks for clarifying. That inevitably rests on a strong assumption about the relative importance of chicken welfare to human welfare, and it looks like your work builds on Bob Fischer’s estimates for conversion. That’s a fine starting point but for my tastes, this is a truly hard problem where the right answer is probably not knowable even in theory. When I’m discussing this, I’ll probably stick to purely empirical claims, e.g., “we can make X chickens’ lives better in Y ways” or “we can reduce meat consumption by Z pounds” and be hand-wavy about the comparison between species. YMMV.

That inevitably rests on a strong assumption about the relative importance of chicken welfare to human welfare, and it looks like your work builds on Bob Fischer’s estimates for conversion.

Yupe, I relied on Rethink Priorities' (RP's) median welfare range of chickens of 0.332. However, even for their 5th percentile of 0.002, which is 0.602 % (= 0.002/0.332) of their median, corporate campaigns for chicken welfare would be 9.09 (= 0.00602*1.51*10^3) times as cost-effective as GiveWell's top charities. Uncertainty in other variables besides the welfare range means there might be something like a 5 % chance of corporate campaigns for chicken welfare being less cost-effective than GiveWell's top charities, but I believe we should be comparing the expected cost-effectiveness of both interventions, not a worst-case scenario of corporate campaigns with the expected scenario of GiveWell's top charities.

That’s a fine starting point but for my tastes, this is a truly hard problem where the right answer is probably not knowable even in theory.

Even if it is not knowable in theory[1], trade-offs are inevitable, so our actions implicitly attribute a given welfare range to chickens. So I would say we might as well rely on the best empirical estimate we have from RP instead of our vague intuitions.

  1. ^

    I think it is, as I strongly endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism.

Curated and popular this week
Paul Present
 ·  · 28m read
 · 
Note: I am not a malaria expert. This is my best-faith attempt at answering a question that was bothering me, but this field is a large and complex field, and I’ve almost certainly misunderstood something somewhere along the way. Summary While the world made incredible progress in reducing malaria cases from 2000 to 2015, the past 10 years have seen malaria cases stop declining and start rising. I investigated potential reasons behind this increase through reading the existing literature and looking at publicly available data, and I identified three key factors explaining the rise: 1. Population Growth: Africa's population has increased by approximately 75% since 2000. This alone explains most of the increase in absolute case numbers, while cases per capita have remained relatively flat since 2015. 2. Stagnant Funding: After rapid growth starting in 2000, funding for malaria prevention plateaued around 2010. 3. Insecticide Resistance: Mosquitoes have become increasingly resistant to the insecticides used in bednets over the past 20 years. This has made older models of bednets less effective, although they still have some effect. Newer models of bednets developed in response to insecticide resistance are more effective but still not widely deployed.  I very crudely estimate that without any of these factors, there would be 55% fewer malaria cases in the world than what we see today. I think all three of these factors are roughly equally important in explaining the difference.  Alternative explanations like removal of PFAS, climate change, or invasive mosquito species don't appear to be major contributors.  Overall this investigation made me more convinced that bednets are an effective global health intervention.  Introduction In 2015, malaria rates were down, and EAs were celebrating. Giving What We Can posted this incredible gif showing the decrease in malaria cases across Africa since 2000: Giving What We Can said that > The reduction in malaria has be
 ·  · 15m read
 · 
“I” refers to Zach, the Centre for Effective Altruism's CEO. Oscar is CEA’s Chief of Staff. We are grateful to all the CEA staff and community members who have contributed insightful input and feedback (directly and indirectly) during the development of our strategy and over many years. Mistakes are of course our own. Exec summary As one CEA, we are taking a principles-first approach to stewardship of the EA community. During the search for a new CEO, the board and search committee were open to alternative strategic directions, but from the beginning of my tenure, we’ve committed to a strategy under which we will: * Operate as one CEA, rather than winding down, breaking up or renaming the organization. Instead of optimizing for each of our team’s programs, we’ll be optimizing for EA as a whole. * Take a principles-first approach to EA, rather than becoming an AI org or otherwise re-orienting ourselves to specific causes. * Take greater responsibility for stewardship of the EA community, rather than restricting ourselves to passively providing infrastructure and support. This post explores stewardship in greater detail. Stewardship is about actors taking more responsibility for reaching and raising EA’s ceiling, and we believe CEA should play a leading role in steering, supporting and coordinating the community. Importantly, however, stewardship of EA is not ownership of EA: we don’t want to be the only leaders, and we do want a close collaboration with the community. During 2024 we focussed on building strong foundations that CEA will require to succeed at stewarding the community, including making over 20 hires (having started the year with 34 staff) while cutting a quarter of our costs, and developing our strategy for 2025 and 2026, including by listening to and learning from members of the EA community during visits I made to over half a dozen countries and in more than 200 one-on-one meetings. I feel good about the foundations we built and having priori
Neel Nanda
 ·  · 1m read
 · 
TL;DR Having a good research track record is some evidence of good big-picture takes, but it's weak evidence. Strategic thinking is hard, and requires different skills. But people often conflate these skills, leading to excessive deference to researchers in the field, without evidence that that person is good at strategic thinking specifically. I certainly try to have good strategic takes, but it's hard, and you shouldn't assume I succeed! Introduction I often find myself giving talks or Q&As about mechanistic interpretability research. But inevitably, I'll get questions about the big picture: "What's the theory of change for interpretability?", "Is this really going to help with alignment?", "Does any of this matter if we can’t ensure all labs take alignment seriously?". And I think people take my answers to these way too seriously. These are great questions, and I'm happy to try answering them. But I've noticed a bit of a pathology: people seem to assume that because I'm (hopefully!) good at the research, I'm automatically well-qualified to answer these broader strategic questions. I think this is a mistake, a form of undue deference that is both incorrect and unhelpful. I certainly try to have good strategic takes, and I think this makes me better at my job, but this is far from sufficient. Being good at research and being good at high level strategic thinking are just fairly different skillsets! But isn’t someone being good at research strong evidence they’re also good at strategic thinking? I personally think it’s moderate evidence, but far from sufficient. One key factor is that a very hard part of strategic thinking is the lack of feedback. Your reasoning about confusing long-term factors need to extrapolate from past trends and make analogies from things you do understand better, and it can be quite hard to tell if what you're saying is complete bullshit or not. In an empirical science like mechanistic interpretability, however, you can get a lot more fe